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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines moral reasoning in the classical Confucian and Pauline 
Christian traditions. It is demonstrated that moral reasoning in both these 
traditions is grounded in the concept of the moral agent as a related self. 
Specifically, affectionate concern for the other and for the other's well-being 
figures prominently in discussions of moral practice, behaviour and action in 
the two traditions. In the light of these Confucian and Pauline concerns, the 
thesis maintains that moral theories which uphold a notion of the moral agent 
as an essentially detached, individualistic self, need to be reassessed. This 
criticism is made by way of an examination of feminist critiques of 
contemporary moral philosophy. Such critiques question, in general, views 
which uphold justice, rights or rules as important and fundamental features of 
morality to the neglect or exclusion of aspects of human experience such as 
relational attachment. In addition, criticisms are also made of views which 
advocate that the definitive features of moral deliberation include criteria of 
impartiality, impersonality and/or autonomy. From the point of view of these 
criticisms, it is considered undesirable to maintain an ideal of autonomy in 
the sense of detachment specifically because that would rule out modes of 
human attachment that are typically an important part of women's experience 
of morality. The different strands of feminist moral philosophy are united in 
their invocation for urgent and significant renovation not only of the content of 
morality but also, and more importantly, of the patterns and methods of moral 
reasoning and the scope of morality. It is important to note, too, that many 
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feminist moral philosophers are quick to maintain that exclusive emphasis or 
overemphasis on detachment is detrimental not only to women's morality but 
is, in general, undesirable because it compromises on important aspects of 
moral agents qua human persons. 
This thesis adopts an approach which is sympathetic to the above-mentioned 
criticisms made by feminist moral philosophers of contemporary moral 
theory. In particular, it focuses on the care ethic which regards affection 
appropriate to, and responsibility arising from, relational attachment as 
fundamental aspects of moral deliberation. Through analysis of a number of 
moral theories, it contends that the notion of the detached, autonomous moral 
agent, if understood exclusively or in isolation, results in a warped and 
fragmented conception of the self. The proposal of this thesis, however, is not 
that notions of autonomy and universality in moral deliberation should be 
jettisoned but that they should be articulated in conjuction with notions of 
human relationality. The thrust of the thesis, more precisely, is that, while 
there are limits to emphasising autonomy and detachment as fundamental in 
moral deliberation, it is undesirable, on the other hand, to maintain 
conceptions of the self and of morality which are defined purely in terms of 
relationality. 
Through a detailed analysis of various concepts and ideas in each of the 
classical Confucian and Pauline traditions, it is argued that moral reasoning 
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shares several features with the care ethic. The point of this exercise, 
however, is not solely comparative. The project seeks, in addition, to identify 
and articulate problems with moral reasoning within each of the two 
traditions. One such problem is the neglect or failure to deal with the power 
structures that might operate within caring relationships. Confucian thought 
seems to uphold a notion of caring which not only allows for, but actually 
requires, the subordination and infantalisation of the person cared-for. 
Similarly, there is much debate amongst Pauline scholars regarding whether 
St. Paul's use of the concept love (aramt) is paternalistic and/or 
instrumentalist-the sense of seeing love as an instrument for creating or 
maintaining social harmony within a hierarchically organised social order. 
The investigation of problems such as these has important implications for 
our understanding of both the classical Confucian and Pauline Christian 
streams of thought. In addition, it addresses and highlights some possible 
difficulties in formulating a workable care ethic. More pointedly, it asserts that 
care morality, in order to be viable, needs to approach with careful 
discernment, its search for a proper balance between autonomy and 
relationality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Objectives and Scope 
This thesis has a twofold objective. First, it establishes a point made 
generally by proponents of care morality; namely, that contemporary moral 
theory needs to recognise the significance of relationships in individual 
human lives and, more specifically, to accommodate notions of relating with 
others. Such a view allows for a more robust and realistic picture of the self 
qua moral agent and, accordingly, challenges the concept of the ideal moral 
agent as an impartial, detached self. If accepted, the idea that the moral 
agent is a related self rather than a detached, atomistic individual 
necessitates a critical assessment of moral systems which uphold 
universalisability, impartiality and impersonality as central criteria of moral 
action and behaviour. 
Secondly, and relatedly, the thesis makes some cautionary remarks 
regarding the formulation of care moralities. Specifically, it is pointed out that 
while the structures of care morality differ in certain fundamental respects 
from those of justice-, rights-based or deontological moralities, proponents of 
care morality should not assert, simply and hastily, that care morality is 
irreconcilable with other moral systems, or that it shares no common features 
with them. In particular, it is suggested that proponents of care morality 
should be circumspect about the idea that morality is grounded solely upon 
the nature of particular attachments and that there are no objective and/or 
general criteria for assessing an agent's actions and behaviours other than by 
appeal to the relationship itself. 
In the context of discussing the two issues just mentioned, the thesis 
examines and compares moral reasoning in the classical Confucian and 
Pauline Christian traditions. It is argued that an examination of these 
traditions provides us with insights into the possibilities and problems 
associated with relational moralities and, more specifically, with the care 
ethic. 
As with the care ethic which emphasises connectedness of persons 
rather than their separateness, both Confucius and Paul believed that human 
beings are essentially related persons; both upheld notions of morality which 
value the connectedness of persons. With regard to the conception of 
morality, the Pauline and Confucian approaches are similar to the care ethic 
in that they stress emotional attachment and involvement in personal 
relationships as central to moral motivation. More specifically, it is 
demonstrated that both traditions, in their discussions of responsibilities, 
loyalties, obligations and commitment arising from relational attachment, 
accentuate the moral significance of concern for the well-being of the other. 
On the other hand, there are important differences between the two 
traditions regarding the substantive content of relational attachment. For 
example, an important theme in Confucian philosophy is the view that the 
nature of each particular relationship is the fundamental criterion of moral 
consideration. While the Confucians advocated a political community founded 
upon differential role relationships modelled on the Chinese family system, 
Paul believed, in contrast, that the newly-formed Christian communities 
should be organised on the basis of fraternal relationships. The different 
forms of political and social organisation upheld by each of these 
philosophies is deeply intertwined with issues concerning normative and ideal 
modes of interaction and with conceptions of moral agency, action and 
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behaviour. In this connection, the interrelated issues of human nature, moral 
agency and community within the Confucian and Pauline traditions are 
examined. 
The Confucian and Pauline traditions have been chosen for 
consideration for two primary reasons. First, being concrete systems, they 
have both figured significantly, and remain influential, in social, cultural and 
philosophical traditions. Classical Confucian philosophy, as elaborated in the 
Four Books', served as the basis of the Civil Service examinations in China 
for six centuries from 1313 to 1905. Moreover, it continues to exert an 
influence on, and attimes even to dominate, ways of life and modes of 
thinking in contemporary Asian communities. Similarly, Pauline thought, 
constituting part of the fundamental text in the Christian tradition, also 
continues to play an important role in contemporary Christian thinking and 
practice. Furthermore, Pauline thought was related closely to Hebraic 
religious belief and practice and overlapped at certain points with the then 
contemporary Greek philosophy, these two influences being significantly 
constitutive of the origins of Western philosophical thought. 
Secondly, the two philosophies look to human connectedness as the 
main ingredient in establishing community stability. The period in which 
Confucius lived (551-479 BC) was riddled with social and political upheaval; 
the Spring and Autumn Period (722-481 BC) marked the beginning of decline 
of the long-lasting Chou Dynasty ( 1111-249 BC). One of the interesting 
legacies of this turbulent period in Chinese history is the spawning of 
multifarious schools of thought; the period between the fifth and the third 
centuries BC is often characterised as the period of a 'hundred schools of 
thought'.' While some other schools of thought in China were advocating 
various forms of detachment, Confucianism was accentuating special 
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consideration for particular others in specific relationships. For instance, the 
Taoists viewed with scepticism existing social and political structures, and 
preached detachment from these artifices of human civilisation. Proponents 
of the Moist school upheld treating everyone equally based on a utilitarian 
calculus deriving from the notion of Universal Love. The Legalists, who were 
antagonistic to the Confucian enterprise as well, sought to establish (penal) 
law that was applicable equally to all persons, thus denying that relational 
attachment had any moral significance. 
In the case of Pauline Christianity, the early Christian communities 
faced a doubly difficult task in terms of fostering community stability because, 
although they were newly-formed, it was also believed that they were in 
transition toward an imminent teleological end. Within that context, questions 
about values, beliefs and modes of life had to be dealt with. Paul was quick to 
emphasise that, in spite of the variety of the believers' backgrounds, they had 
always to remember the purpose of the new communities (for Paul, this 
consisted essentially in belief in Christ's work and its significance) and that 
that was the primary unifying factor of life in the community. The divisive 
factors which Paul dealt with specifically were cultural (Jew-Greek), social 
(master-slave) and gender-related (male-female). Arguing that these 
differences were morally irrelevant in constituting the identities of the 
converts and, more generally, in the characterisation of the community, Paul 
emphasised that the most important feature of life in the community was a 
love (<Xyam]) modelled upon Christ's humble sacrifice. Paul appealed to 
<X)Um] as the justification, and as providing motivation for, other-regarding 
behaviour which, in turn, was important for community-building and 
community maintenance. 
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In the analysis of moral reasoning within the classical Confucian and 
the Pauline Christian traditions, some of the problems inherent in each of 
them are discussed. These include problems which pertain to the focus on 
relational attachment as a basis for morality in each tradition. It is in this 
connection that some cautionary remarks are made with respect to proposals 
for a viable care ethic. 
Texts 
A few remarks are necessary with regard to the usage of Confucian and 
Pauline texts in this thesis. The Confucian Analects (Lun-va) is regarded here 
as the primary source of Confucius' ideas. There are occasional references, 
as well, to the other three classical Confucian texts comprising the Four 
Books: the Doctrine of the Mean (Chung-yung), the Great Learning (Ta-
hsueh) and Mencius {Meng-tzu). 
There is an important and legitimate concern regarding the authenticity 
and origin of the Four Books. For example, there have been disputes 
surrounding the man Confucius [551 - 479 BC] as he is portrayed in the 
Analects and whether he did actually say what he is purported to have said. 
Additionally, apart from the high possibility of the cross-influence of ideas and 
the amount of tampering by both later Confucians and non-Confucian 
thinkers with the texts preceding the compilation of the Four Books by the 
Nee-Confucian, Chu Hsi [1130 - 1200], the original author/s ofthe Analects 
is/are not known and there were already at least three versions of the 
Analects in existence by the Western Han period (206 BC - 8 AD).' 
While the historicity and authenticity of passages in the Four Books, 
and other factors surrounding their compilation are, in themselves, interesting 
areas of academic concern, these issues are not of concern in this thesis. 
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The texts referred to above are considered as a canon, serving as the 
foundational source of Confucian thought. The passages of the texts are, in 
this sense, treated ahistorically over the period of their development; they are 
seen as offering insights into ideas and concepts which are characteristic of 
the history of the classical Confucian tradition. 
The Pauline material is treated in a similar fashion. The Pauline epistles, 
among the oldest of Christian documents, are seen as being representative 
of ideas that were influential in shaping early Christianity. While the letters 
reveal aspects of the character of the letter-writer, Paul, they also offer 
insights into the ordinary life of a first century Christian, whether as an 
individual or as a member of the newly-formed church communities. To this 
effect, there is a focus on the epistles as texts rather than on the issue of 
their authenticity and internal consistency. As is the case with the Confucian 
texts, almost every Pauline epistle exhibits problems of continuity and 
coherence; again, these are topics of important academic study which will not 
be dealt with here. Because of the disputes regarding the authorship of the 
epistles-only eight of them are unanimously acknowledged as being 
Pauline-the letters to the Galatians, 1 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, 
Romans, Philippians, Philemon and Titus are treated as primary text. The 
authorship of the remaining epistles is greatly disputed; they are thought to 
be either non-Pauline or deutero-Pauline. The uncertainty rests not only in 
the style of the letters but also in the different (sometimes inconsistent) 
treatment of issues; thus, only occasional reference is made to the non-
Pauline or deutero-Pauline letters. 
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In summary, the texts of the two traditions are treated as philosophical 
material providing insights into the reasoning processes, ways of life and 
modes of thought of each tradition. 
Methodology 
There are inevitable difficulties in cross-cultural comparisons. These 
difficulties are more pronounced and specific in the case of a philosophical 
exercise that aims to intelligibly and coherently discuss concepts within 
different traditions, written against the background of complex overlapping 
streams of thought. In this thesis, this task is further complicated by the fact 
that the primary comparative focus in each case is set by issues associated 
with contemporary care moralities: this gives rise to common points in parallel 
fashion. It should be noted, however, that differences should not be 
overlooked; it is clear that classical Confucian and Pauline Christian concepts 
have arisen from different contexts of experience, modes of thinking and 
forms of life. 
A primary difficulty is, obviously, that of translation. Important 
Confucian concepts such as jen and li, and Pauline concepts such as aya.1tl] 
have no equivalent in contemporary English. This is a general problem 
encountered in any translation process; the problem is compounded, 
however, in an exercise which discusses, examines and analyses these two 
traditions in a third language and which depends primarily on the categories 
and concepts of the third language. 
A way in which this problem is dealt with in this thesis is to explicate 
the relevant concepts within each tradition in its specific philosophical and 
socio-historical background. It is with this in mind that the chapters on the two 
traditions have been kept separate. 
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Secondly, much care has been taken in explicating the concepts: few, 
if any, of the concepts in either tradition have been explicated definitively. For 
example, while }en has been variously translated (by Confucian scholars) as 
love, benevolence, humanity, humanness, human-heartedness, morality etc, 
the view of }en that is held throughout this thesis is that, while it in some way 
resembles some of these concepts, it is nevertheless not exhaustively and 
fully defined by any single one, or combination, of them. In short, the view 
taken in this thesis is that the English terms just mentioned should not be 
seen as being equivalent to jen (in the co-extensive sense) but, rather, as 
being merely descriptive of jen. 
Apart from the problems associated with translation, a more pressing 
problem arises because of the nature of this research project: the success of 
the thesis, of its findings and conclusion, depends largely on its success in 
presenting both classical Confucian and Pauline notions of morality as having 
significant feature sin common with (contemporary) care moralities. To this 
end, a significant proportion of the thesis (Part 1: Chapters 1, 2 and 3) 
concentrates on demonstrating that the two traditions focus (as do care 
moralities) on fostering and cultivating relationships and, more specifically, on 
a concern for the other rooted in affection. Thus, it is noted that the early 
Christian communities did, in part, see themselves as groups set up to care 
for others; for example, to look after widows, the ill and children. Similarly, 
within Confucianism, family-type bonds are seen as crucial to the 
development of the moral agent and, thus, the concept of relating well to 
others grounded in affection plays a major role in Confucius' articulation of 
the ideal community. 
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Finally it should be mentioned that the inquiry into the Confucian and 
Pauline traditions is intended to have a two-fold effect. First, it is hoped to 
reveal problems in these two systems which proponents of the care ethic 
should take care to avoid. Secondly, because the thesis critically analyses 
the structures, ways of life, values and morality of the two traditions, its 
conclusions should flow back to inform other modes of inquiry into both 
traditions. 
The next Section outlines the project of this thesis and its approach to 
the material. 
Overview of Chapters 
The thesis is divided into two parts, each of three chapters. The aim of Part I, 
Morality and the Relational Self, is to critically analyse the connection 
between different conceptions of human nature and their corresponding 
views of morality. The term 'morality' is used throughout this thesis to cover a 
wider scope than just rules or principles of correct or appropriate behaviour, 
reasoning, or action. It encompasses, too, virtues-based approaches to 
human life and thus includes, as important foci of morality, features of 
individual lives such as conceptions of meaning, value and human 
flourishing, as well as human participation in activities and projects and our 
involvement with other people. The upshot of such a conception of morality is 
that it treats as morally significant a range of aspects of the self as a related 
being. In particular, the thesis examines in detail the moral issues 
surrounding agents' relationships-for example, notions of concern and 
loyalty-with significant others. In the context of this last point, the 
examination of different conceptions of morality will be carried out from the 
perspective of relational morality. 
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Chapter One, Morality and Human Nature, sets the background for the 
discussion of conceptions of morality and the self in Confucian and Pauline 
thought which follows in chapters two and three respectively. The first of two 
Sections in this Chapter (Section 1.1) contends that moral theories which are 
associated with the notion of the paradigmatic moral agent as a detached, 
impersonal and impartial self fail to capture important aspects of human 
moral life. In establishing this point, various moral theories are considered 
with a view to outlining their shortcomings. The moral theories discussed in 
this section include the social contract account found in Hobbes, the 
universalisability thesis of Kantian morality, the Greatest Happiness Principle 
of Mill and the impersonality criterion of Nagel. The primary purpose of this 
Section is to show that the views of morality considered are defective 
because they are based on inadequate conceptions of the human person. 
Section 1.2 begins with brief discussions of certain features of 
Confucian and Pauline conceptions of morality. The aim, in these 
discussions, is to demonstrate that both systems of thought place 
considerable emphasis on relationships and on norms and standards 
pertaining to relationships. In the light of conceptions of relationships within 
the two traditions, the personal-impersonal dichotomy, which is often 
employed in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, is analysed. 
Within that tradition, it is often assumed that the dichotomy is a precise and 
obvious one: according to this view, whereas intimate relationships are 
classified as personal (in the sense that one tends to be partial in relation to 
one's intimates), one's interactions with others with whom one does not have 
personal relationships is classified as impersonal. Against such a 
classification of relationships, it is contended that there are relationships such 
as friendship, for example, which do not fit easily into either category; and 
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that the dichotomy is, more generally, too schematic and oversimplifying. 
Consequently, moral systems which take the personal-impersonal dichotomy 
as fundamental should be revised. 
Within the framework outlined in Chapter one, Chapter two, Classical 
Confucianism: Learning to Be Human, sets out to analyse the notion of 
morality, or its equivalent, in the Confucian tradition. In the first Section (2.1), 
the Confucian concepts jen (human; humanity), li (social convention, modes 
of behaviour), hsiao (filial piety) and shu (reciprocity), concepts which are 
utilised in Confucian moral reasoning, are examined in detail. The aim of this 
exercise, apart from explicating the terms, is to demonstrate the reasoning 
processes at work in Confucian thought. What the analysis in question 
reveals is that Confucian morality is fundamentally concerned with 
relationships and the different ways in which agents stand in relation to one 
another. It is argued that Confucianism, starting from a belief in the family 
context as the primary locus within which morally significant emotions and 
attitudes of attachment are cultivated, posits an ideal of self cultivation 
understood as consisting in the fostering and enriching of one's relationships 
with others. 
The practicalities of the process of self cultivation are dealt with in 
Section 2.2. In general, this Section views Confucian thought in a positive 
manner, refuting certain tendencies to characterise the Confucian concept of 
the self as determined solely by social, moral and political obligations. It 
begins with a discussion of the idea that, in Confucian philosophy, personal 
identity is constituted in an important way by the kinds of relationships one 
has. Within such a conceptual framework, how the individual conducts 
himself and fulfils his responsibilities and obligations in connection with each 
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of his relationships both expresses and reveals aspects of his self. It is 
argued here, against views of Confucianism as repressive and formalistic, 
that Confucian self cultivation focuses on the development of moral character 
as expressed through relationships and not on external conformity to 
accepted modes of behaviour. 
Chapter three, Pauline Christianity: Human Nature and Morality, 
discusses the concept of the self in Pauline Christianity. It begins by 
examining various anthropological terms used metaphorically by Paul in his 
moral reasoning: K<Xplita (heart), vous (frame of mind; perspectivity), ecrro 
av6p0l1tov (the inner man) and crroJ.I.a (physical body). For Paul, the heart 
plays an important role in volition, cognition and in affection; it is significant 
that the three different capacities are thought to be connected. It is suggested 
in this Section (3.1) that Pauline thought tends to view the human person 
holistically. This is exemplified in the Pauline use of the concepts crroJ.I.a, ecrro 
av6p0l1tov and vous, as well as Kaplita,. Paul expects that a change in 
perspective (vous; commonly translated 'mind') due to a believer's 
commitment to Christian beliefs should effect changes in all other aspects of 
life, including one's attitudes to the physical body. Such internalist 
assumptions proved to be the source of Paul's personal struggles which he 
characterised as a struggle between two selves: one which had committed 
itself to Christian beliefs, and the other which refused to act according to 
those beliefs. 
In dealing with the incommensurability of his beliefs and his 
behaviours, Paul attempts to resolve one of the prevailing problems in moral 
philosophy. Instead of re-examining his internalist assumptions that a change 
in perspective entails a corresponding change in behaviour, he grapples with 
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issues of responsibility, suggesting that perhaps he is not fully responsible for 
certain of his sinful actions. In particular, he postulates the concept of the 
'inner man' and identifies himself with this inner man, implying that there is a 
corresponding 'outer man' for whose actions he is not responsible. This first 
Section draws the conclusion that Paul fails adequately to deal with the 
above-mentioned problems. 
The notion of responsibility figures at another level as well in Pauline 
thought. Section 3.2 focuses on Paul's treatment of choice and responsibility 
in the believers' choice between two contrasting modes of life. Paul presents 
two dualistic schemata in his assertion that the ways of thinking and modes 
of life of the new converts were to be markedly different from their previous 
beliefs and commitments. The first dualism is characterised in terms of the 
different features of the Christ-like and the Adamic lives. Located within the 
context of existing tension between the Jewish and the new Christian beliefs, 
the Adamic and Christ-like modes of life are presented as alternative and 
mutually exclusive choices. A similar antithesis-the second dualism 
considered in this Section-is posed between the spirit-led life (1tVEUj.ta.) and 
life according to the 'flesh' (crap~). While the representative figures of Adam 
and Christ are used to signify modes of human existence, the spirit-flesh 
dichotomy characterises tension at a greater, cosmic level. Relating the 
(Jewish) law and sin to the realm of crap~ and, by contrast, salvation and 
freedom to the realm of 1tVEUIJ.a, Paul again presents the converts with two 
antithetic life choices. The discussion in this Section entails an examination of 
both dualisms and asserts that Paul holds the believers fully responsible for 
their choice of modes of life. 
Another important feature of the Pauline conception of human nature 
is Paul's egalitarian tone in advocating that existing distinctions of cultural 
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heritage (Jew-Greek), social status (master-slave) and gender (male-female) 
be set aside or be regarded as morally unimportant; this is the subject of 
Section 3.3. The Section discusses the possible interpretations of Paul's view 
of the existing categorisations: whether Paul reckons that they should be 
abolished, or, on a weaker reading, that they are morally irrelevant in the 
constitution of personal identity and, thus, of community membership. The 
primary thrust of this Section, however, is to suggest that regardless of his 
intentions, Paul, in throwing these categories into question, is articulating a 
radically different concept of human personhood from existing ones and, in 
addition, is advocating a new and relatively egalitarian basis for the Christian 
communities. 
Part II, Relationships and Care, comprising three chapters, picks up on the 
theme, dealt with in chapter one of Part I, of the need for moral theory to deal 
with interaction with particular others to whom one might be related to in a 
range of ways. The particular focus of this part of the thesis is the 
significance of relationships and relational involvement and attachments in 
moral life. Both the Confucian and the Pauline traditions view the moral agent 
as an essentially related self and, furthermore, emphasise that the 
connectedness of human persons plays a significant role in moral agency. It 
is with this outlook that Part II examines in detail the dynamics of relational 
moralities. 
The phrase 'relationship-based morality' is used throughout this thesis 
to denote moral systems which recognise and acknowledge not merely the 
relatedness of human persons but, in addition that the nature of the 
relationship between the moral agent and the other is, at least in part, 
determinative of what might count as appropriate or correct behaviour and 
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action. According to this view, morality, moral reasoning and moral behaviour 
are dependent on, and variously circumscribed by, relationships between 
moral agents and related others. These features of relationship-based 
moralities are based on conceptions of agency and personal identity which 
are generally incompatible with notions of the self as an autonomous, 
detached individual. Requirements that moral considerations be impartial, 
impersonal and universalisable-such as those discussed in chapter one-
are connected to concerns for predicability and consistency in moral action. 
Accordingly, involvement with and attachment to particular others is de-
emphasised and sometimes even construed as a hindrance because it is 
seen to conflict with principles of impersonality and detached impartiality in 
moral deliberation. 
Chapter four, A Morality of Care, the first chapter of Part II, sets the 
background for the consideration of the relationship-based moral systems in 
Confucian and Pauline thought. The underlying stance of Part II is that 
criteria of impersonality and impartiality, while of crucial significance in many 
moral contexts, should not be understood as unconditionally and 
unquestionably applicable in all circumstances. In this connection, it is 
suggested that an overemphasis on impersonality or impartiality as 
fundamental criteria of moral consideration often goes hand-in-hand with the 
classification of personal or intimate relationships as being beyond or 
external to the domain of morality. Section 4.2 examines the significance of 
emotional commitments and attachments to morality. In particular, it focuses 
on the concern articulated by the feminist care ethic that morality should view 
attachments to particular others in specific relationships as important 
considerations in moral reasoning. However, while recognising the value of 
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the care perspective to contemporary moral philosophy, this Section 
contends that various proposals of the care ethic are practically unworkable 
because of an overemphasis on caring (for others) as a solely emotional and 
subjective enterprise. 
In response to the criticisms considered in the previous Section, 
Section 4.2 maintains that a clear distinction needs to be made between the 
emotions of care and the duties associated with care. It argues that even 
within caring relationships, there are certain norms and standards of 
appropriateness-with regard to duties as well as emotions-which can and 
need to be articulated. Such safeguards are necessary in order to prevent 
possible exploitation and subordination especially of the moral patient (the 
cared-for) in a seemingly caring relationship. Finally, the chapter explores the 
kinds of norms and standards that might be applicable to caring relationships, 
suggesting that these need to be worked out within specific socio-cultural 
frameworks and structures, taking care to allow for the expression of the 
richness and depth of human relationships. Indeed, through such a process, 
the re-conceptualisation of moral categories is already taking place. 
Chapter five, Confucian Community, investigates the Confucian 
conceptualisation of relationships, noting in particular its emphasis on 
cultivating relationships as the basis for establishing social, moral and 
political order. Section 5.1 analyses the nature of obligation in Confucian 
morality. Of the five kinds of relationship considered by the classical 
Confucians to be of special moral significance (father-son, elder brother-
younger brother, husband-wife, ruler-subject and friendship [Doctrine of the 
Mean, 20:8]), friendship is the only one which does not involve notions of 
--
superiority, inferiority and moral inequality. It is demonstrated, through an 
16 
analysis of notions of womanhood, filial piety and political obligation, that the 
inequality within Confucian relationships, although ideally founded upon 
appropriate affection and emotions of care, leaves much room for 
subordination and manipulation of those in roles considered socially and 
morally inferior (in other words, those in the position of the cared-for). 
Section 5.2 continues to describe and to analyse critically notions of 
obligation and responsibility in Confucian thought. It introduces the concept 
cheng-ming (rectification or regulation of names), which pertains to both the 
form and the content of appropriate and moral behaviour for participants in 
particular relationships. In this respect, Confucius expounds on a moral 
theory of naming: that the bearer of a particular title, say that of father, must 
conduct himself according to the requirements of that role. This theory is 
criticised on the grounds that Confucius seems to derive moral differentiation 
(fatherly roles, sonship, womanhood) from natural categories (male 
progenitor, male offspring, femaleness). 
In spite of the inconsistencies and problems with Confucian thought, 
Section 5.3, the concluding Section of Chapter five, makes a positive 
assessment of Confucian thought. It contends that contemporary moral 
philosophy should recognise, as the Confucians did, the importance of caring 
relationships in human life. Personal human relationships should not be 
simplistically and crudely cast aside, as being beyond the realm of morality; 
the values, norms and structures appropriate to a morality of care should be 
judiciously worked out in order to capture properly and adequately the nature 
and scope of the varieties of caring. 
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Caring relationships are an important aspect of Pauline morality as well. 
Chapter six, Pauline Community, examines this focus by analysing Paul's 
concept(s) and uses of love (a')'!X1tTJ) in his exhortations. Section 6.1 focuses 
on a particular aspect of a')'!X1t1], namely, its incompatibility with a certain 
legalistic conception of Jewish law. Specifically, the analysis details Paul's 
rejection of legalistic structures, particularly those embodied in existing 
Jewish codes. Consideration is given here to the Jewish requirement of 
circumcision which Paul belittles, rejecting its deontological and motivational 
structures. It is suggested that Paul's rejection of circumcision is an important 
development in the conception of morality and moral agency in the history of 
Jewish and Christian thought. 
In Section 6.2, Paul's pragmatic approach to interrelational and 
communal harmony is examined. In this context, a')'!X1t1] is highly functional 
both in integrating the community of converted Jews and Gentiles and/or 
Jewish and Gentile Christians, as well as in conflict-resolution. In terms of 
integration, Paul asks that differences be put aside, minimised or eradicated; 
to this effect he evokes several metaphors, notably the 'common meal' and 
the church community as the 'Body of Christ'. With regard to community-
maintenance, Paul's moral reasoning exemplifies a move from normative 
standards of acceptable practice to a focus on concern for the other, with 
such concern construed as a manifestation of a')'!X1t1]. 
In Section 6.3, some themes arising from the discussion of aya1t1] in 
the two previous Sections are drawn together in an attempt to compare the 
features of Pauline morality with some of the characteristics of care morality. 
The discussion focuses primarily on two aspects of Paul's moral reasoning: 
its mode and its content. While Paul's rejection of the requirement of certain 
observances as duties is important, what is particularly interesting is his 
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definition of o:ya7t11 as the fundamental defining feature of the Christian 
community and, as well, his uses of the concept(s) of o:ya7t11 in his moral 
reasoning. Aya7t11 is analysed in the light of notions such as autonomy, 
universalisability and caring affection. 
Notes 
'. See discussion below on texts. 
'. See Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, (ed Derk Bodde), (The Free 
Press, Macmillan, USA, 1948), especially Chapter Three, "The Origin of the Schools". 
'. See Appendix 3, "The Lun yO", in D.C. Lau, The Analects of Confucius, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, USA, 1979. 
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PARTI 
MORALITY AND THE RELATIONAL 
SELF 
If by the age of forty a man is still disliked, 
there is no hope for him. (Analects 17:26) 
The body does not consist of one member 
but of many ... If the whole body were an 
eye, where would the hearing be? ... there 
are many members, yet one body. 
(I Corinthians 12:14, 17a, 20) 
CHAPTER ONE 
MORALITY AND HUMAN NATURE 
The questions we ask about morality, such as "What ought I to do?" and 
"How am I to live?" are deeply connected with our notions of human 
existence. How we conceive of ourselves as human beings impacts directly 
on the question of how we are to live our lives. Different views of human 
nature serve as ontological and metaphysical bases for different conclusions 
about how we, as humans, are to live and what we should pursue, and how 
we might go about pursuing those ideals and aims. Basic to and constitutive 
of moral life is the fact that humans are social creatures. As human beings, 
we live in and belong to different communities and societies. The existing 
structures and modes of life associated with each of these communities 
provide important contexts both for self-definition and self-expression. 
The community, insofar as it is further divided into groups-some of 
which overlap in function and in interest-provides a myriad of options and 
opportunities for life choices. Rules and norms within the community are 
formed and develop with the general expectation that most members of that 
community will subscribe to those standards. Frequent rejection of or 
departure from these standards might result eventually in a member being 
ostracised or marginalised from the mainstream social life of the community. 
Questions about moral action or about being moral arise partly 
because human beings have to learn to live together in a community, 
acknowledging and accommodating the existence of others. It is evident that 
at least some rules are necessary for the maintenance of the social structure 
in any society in order that it not break down. Rules such as 'Do not exceed 
80 kilometres per hour when driving' or 'Do not litter' or 'Do not smoke' serve 
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to make life livable and pleasant for the general community. Individual 
choices are governed to varying extents, in different communities, by rules 
such as these which recognise that each individual has to give consideration 
to the likes and dislikes of others, even to those with whom we are not 
acquainted. 
Morality, being concerned with human interaction, is irreducibly social. 
This does not mean, however, that it can be simply reduced to a question of 
maintenance of social harmony. Minimally, morality may be understood as 
the codes and norms which allow people in a community to live in a way that 
minimises conflict. This reductionist conception of morality, however, is 
inadequate and inconsistent with the view that morality is fundamental to 
human existence and is integrally connected to the range of human 
activities-including such activities as improving technology, increasing 
knowledge and understanding of the human world and its environment, 
advocating justice and fairness, improving environments aesthetically, and 
acting for the sake of the greater communal good. These pursuits, separately 
or in combination, contribute to the quality of human life. 
The picture of moral life presented thus far attempts to capture some 
difficult tensions in moral philosophy. In particular, it highlights the necessity 
for universally- and unconditionally-applicable moral and behavioural codes 
while, at the same time, noting that much of human life is varied and diverse 
and defies classification and codification. 
The preceding discussion introduces the theme of this chapter. The aim of 
this chapter is to establish an agent-centred account of morality which 
attempts to take into consideration various aspects of human life which are 
morally significant. It makes the point that moral theories which emphasise 
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only specific aspects of human existence to the exclusion of other aspects, or 
theories which demand that moral agents detach themselves from their 
personal perspectives or their relational contexts are unrealistic; these views 
also fail to recognise the richness and variety of human experience. The 
particular aspect of human experience that is examined in this thesis is that 
of human relationships. It is argued in this chapter that moral theories should 
both accommodate the notion of the moral agent as a related self and, as 
well, incorporate norms and values of connectedness that play a central role 
in human relationships. 
The chapter consists of two sections. The concern of the first section 
is to demonstrate that moral theories which are limited in their expectations 
regarding morality, or which attempt to exclude aspects of human experience 
from morality are flawed. It is argued, too, that the effects of such flawed 
moral theories lead to inadequate conceptions of human nature: a theory 
which, for example, upholds a notion of the moral agent essentially as a 
detached self will accordingly constrain and limit human action and discount 
aspects of human experience. 
In arguing for a relational morality, the view of moral agents as 
detached and impartial selves is critically examined. It is in this connection 
that various accounts of morality are discussed. The first of these is the 
Hobbesian conception of contractarian morality. It is argued that Hobbes' 
rather simple construction of the social contract is associated with simplistic 
assumptions about human nature and moral motivation. A fundamental point 
made in this section is that Hobbes' notion of self-interested moral agents 
who participate in the social contract for mutual benefit reveals no dimension 
or capacity on the part of moral agents for forging and sustaining meaningful 
relationships. 
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The second of the four accounts with which relationship-based 
morality is contrasted is the Kantian universalisability criterion. The point is 
made that an overemphasis on universalisable courses of action and 
behaviour does not allow for aspects of relating with others which are agent-
specific and which are not universalisable. Notions of trust and care, for 
example, function differently and to different extents across relationships. 
Thirdly, aspects of Mill's greatest happiness principle are examined 
with a view to demonstrating that while considerations of collective goods and 
of the interests of other individuals occupies an important place in morality, 
the insistence that such considerations should always override allegiances 
with specific others, and the responsibilities and obligations arising from 
those allegiances, unrealistically restricts morality, as well as human 
experience. 
Finally, Nagel's proposal for a perspective-free stance is discussed. 
While a relationship-based morality presupposes the importance of personal 
involvement and, thus, of perspectivity, Nagel's system upholds a stance 
which aims to be independent of subjective points of view; it associates moral 
practice with the adoption of impersonal and objective points of view. One of 
the difficulties of Nagel's view, as argued in this section, is that it begs the 
question of whether it is desirable that moral agents should cast aside their 
personal perspectives. 
The second section of the chapter examines the dynamics of relational 
morality. It begins with discussions of relational morality within the Confucian 
and Pauline traditions. It then proceeds to describe aspects of existing 
debates between those who hold conceptions of the moral agent as a 
detached self, on the one hand, and those who advocate relational morality, 
on the other. A view that is discussed in detail is that it might be unhelpful to 
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describe relationships either as personal or impersonal because the 
dichotomy, while seemingly exhaustive, fails to capture the nature of 
relationships which could be both impersonal and personal (for example, 
depending on situations and circumstances). The suggestion, arising from 
this contention, is that, from the point of view of relational morality, it is 
perhaps a more fruitful enterprise to seek to address not merely the content 
of morality but also the existing structures in contemporary moral philosophy. 
1.1 Detached Selves 
One of the primary concerns of morality-a concern shared by many moral 
theories-is the tension between the needs and interests of the individual 
moral agent, on the one hand, and, on the other, the competing needs and 
interests of other agents, whether individually or collectively. Concerns 
regarding self-centredness and selfishness arise in this context. In 
addressing these themes, criteria such as impartiality, impersonality and 
universalisability are upheld by various theories as fundamental principles of 
moral deliberation. These criteria are important and instrumental in 
guaranteeing that morality is not haphazard in the sense that moral agents 
should not feel that how they treat or interact with others is a matter of 
subjective determination. 
Associated with the view that moral considerations are in general too 
important to be contingent upon the subjective viewpoints of individual moral 
agents, is a conception of the paradigmatic moral agent as a rational and 
detached self. Connectedly, the range of loosely related concepts such as 
impartiality, impersonality, autonomy, detachment, obligation, universality, 
consistency and rationality has been articulated in conjunction with moral 
theories such as contractarianism, Kantianism and utilitarianism. 
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Criticisms of the above-mentioned concepts, in particular, of their 
weight in certain moral theories, are advanced from a range of vantage 
points, three of which will be discussed briefly here. The first is the 
communitarian objection to liberal conceptions of the self. One of the 
assertions of communitarian thinkers is that a typically liberal 
conceptualisation of the moral agent as a detached, atomistic or abstract self 
does not capture the embedded ness of persons within particular 
communities. As a consequence, the contention runs, libertarian views fail 
properly and adequately to reflect socially-constituted aspects of the agent 
such as her character and identity which are pertinent to moral agency. In 
general, communitarian objections to the liberal conception of moral agency 
are situated within the context of more general disagreements regarding 
concepts of the self and of personal identity, and of how these might be 
associated with or embedded within social and political structures and 
contexts. It needs to be stated here, however, that while the communitarian-
libertarian debate is presented here as two distinct and clear polarities, there 
are important disagreements (especially regarding substantive issues such 
as the content of morality, equality and justice) within each of these 
positions.' 
While the communitarian-liberal debate focuses on how the moral 
agent qua self might be constituted, critics of impersonalist moral theories 
argue that accounts of morality should not require that moral agents be 
impersonal to the extent that they forego possibilities for the pursuit of the 
agent's interests, including their self-development. Within moral philosophy, 
impersonality is often taken to mean that moral agents should, when making 
moral decisions, adopt a disinterested and detached attitude in the case of 
competing interests: the moral agent is not to accord special emphasis or 
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priority to her own needs and desires when she has to choose between them 
and those of others. 
Secondly, another important usage of the personal-impersonal 
dichotomy in moral philosophy occurs as part of discussions of personal 
development and moral excellence: moral excellence is often (wrongly) 
thought to be comprised of the performance of selfless and other-regarding 
acts (impersonal), neglecting the pursuit of individual perfection (personal).' 
Critics of such views of impersonality note that impersonality, if construed as 
an overriding criterion of moral deliberation, in both of the above mentioned 
senses, is inadequate in various ways. In particular, it does not properly 
account for factors (especially motivational factors) which affect moral 
agency. Connectedly, the main consequence of this lack is that it forces the 
moral agent to compromise on her own well-being." 
The third kind of objection to impartialist and impersonalist moral 
theories is advanced from the point of view of relational moralities. In general, 
relational moralities question the central role of notions such as justice, 
equality, impartiality, impersonality and obligation within impersonalist moral 
theories. In addition to, or contrasted with, such notions, it is argued that 
moral theory should seek to accommodate values pertinent to human 
relationships such as trust, responsibility, care, love, compassion and special 
consideration for particular others. According to proponents of relational 
moralities, contemporary moral theory does not adequately account for the 
moral significance of relationships in a range of ways. Some critics focus 
specifically on the content of contemporary moral theory, arguing that a 
primary emphasis on principles or rules for moral action and behaviour does 
not allow that moral agents might be committed to, or responsible for, 
particular others.' In addition, some others have a more constructive focus, 
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discussing in detail how moral theory might incorporate values and norms 
appropriate to relationships.' A somewhat more radical-and perhaps more 
effective-approach is to question existing structures that posit stark and 
irreconcilable differences between rule- and principle-based moralities on the 
one hand, and relational morality, on the other.• 
The aim of the following sub-sections is to demonstrate that certain 
impersonalist moral theories are unrealistic in their formulations in the range 
of ways discussed previously. Through a brief examination of various 
theories, it is argued that conceptions of human nature and of moral agency 
are very intimately connected to theories of moral action and behaviour and, 
connectedly, that moralities which fail to capture and account for integral 
aspects of the moral agent qua human person are detrimental to the human 
condition. In this context, aspects of Hobbes' contractarian morality, Kantian 
universalisability, Mill's utilitarianism and Nagel's impersonal morality are 
critically examined. 
1.1.1 Morality for Mutual Benefit: Hobbes' Social Contract 
As beings living together within a society, individuals must learn to 
accommodate, at least in some way, the interests of others. Clearly, because 
of limited goods and unlimited wants, some wants have to be forgone in order 
that life in human society be livable and not fraught at all times with conflict. It 
is important, in this connection, that society is not seen predominantly as a 
loose collection of unconnected individuals seeking merely their own 
gratification. 
This is the view Thomas Hobbes held of uncivilised society-the state 
of nature. Hobbes' state of nature is characterised by limited goods and 
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unlimited desires; thus human beings have to learn to curtail their desires in 
order that social conflict be reduced. Comparing humans with other creatures 
such as ants and bees, Hobbes asserted that the former are unable to live 
"sociably one with another", without any coercive power. 7 According to 
Hobbes, human beings as a particular kind of social creature want to protect 
their own interests and needs, yet have to recognise that others want to 
pursue and protect theirs as well. The interests and welfare of others, once 
their legitimacy is recognised, has to be reconciled with the aim of living our 
own lives. In recognition of this primary difficulty, writes Hobbes, men come 
together in a social contract, ' ... as if every man should say to every man, I 
authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this 
assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and 
authorize all his actions in like manner.'" A commonwealth is generated when 
these people surrender their rights to a sovereign, which ' ... may use the 
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace 
and common defence. •• This sovereign power is established to ensure that 
the terms of such a contract are kept. 
This short description of Hobbes' social contract, while rather simplified, 
provides a basic summary of some of its important features. It demonstrates, 
for example, that a primary aim of Hobbes' social contract-and of 
contractarian theories in general-is the protection of certain specified 
freedoms and rights. The contractarian model is applicable particularly in 
those domains of interaction connected with political life and, more generally, 
in interactions in the public sphere. In terms of its protectionist character 
(protecting one's freedoms, interests etc.)-which could be framed more 
positively in terms of respect (respecting others' freedoms and interests)-
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social contract theories of morality are derived from a notion of community 
essentially grounded in decisions made collectively by members of the 
community. 
While accounts of community and of individuality vary in various 
formulations of contractarian theory, Hobbes' conception of human nature is 
rather modest. It is primarily in order to protect one's life and possessions that 
each individual is willing to relinquish some of his or her natural freedom. The 
mutual benefit arising from such a collective decision is, in Hobbes' view, 
obvious. In addition, from the motivational point of view, what ensures that 
individuals keep to the terms of the contract is a threat of punishment-the 
'sword of the sovereign'. 
Hobbes views human beings as primarily self-interested individuals for 
whom only a threatening external force can ensure respect for other's rights 
to freedom and to life. Hobbes' conception of human desires is pessimistic in 
that it is negative, basically emphasising non-interference. The Hobbesian 
conception of desire is also simplistic because it focuses narrowly on self-
regarding motives and, correspondingly, sees morality in terms of a delicate 
balancing act between one's own desires and interests and those of others 
where there is conflict. A Hobbesian social contract account does not attempt 
to account for or promote positive moral actions and behaviours which are 
intimately linked to important notions of moral agency such as responsibility, 
self-governance and self-regulation. It is in this sense that such an account 
trivialises both human experience and the significance of morality. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the relation between the 
individual and the community, Hobbesian morality is built solely on prudential 
considerations: the moral agent, as a party to the contract, makes a 
compromise: he hopes that his various rights will be respected by others if he 
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respects their rights. Hobbes' notion of social organisation and of the moral 
agent as a member of his community is flawed because it ignores the 
possibility that individual lives might indeed benefit from involvement with 
others through relationships and, more generally, from participation in the 
community. 
In summary, the preceding critical examination of the Hobbesian social 
contract is not intended as a full exposition of Hobbes' ideas but, rather, to 
demonstrate that certain of Hobbes' assumptions and views yield 
oversimplified accounts of morality, of moral agency and of human 
experience: morality is not merely about a socio-political life fraught with 
tensions between competing demands of the self and the other, and 
necessarily regulated by an external threat of punishment. 
The following section examines Kantian morality in a similar manner, with a 
view to demonstrating that the Kantian universalisability criterion should not 
be taken to mean either that universalisability is itself sufficient for morality or 
that it is the overriding criterion in morality. 
1.1.2 The Universalisability Criterion: Kantian Requirements of 
Morality 
In moral practice, consistency and predictability are, obviously, important 
because they enable moral agents to communicate successfully and to 
respond appropriately based on what is normally required and expected of 
them. For example, promise-keeping as an institution is possible only if 
certain standards of reliability and trust are upheld. We want people to be 
honest and fair, at least most if not all of the time, and not to be so only when 
they feel like it. Similarly, the same is required of oneself by others. 
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Immanuel Kant was concerned that morality should not be understood as 
option, in the sense described above. 10 He emphasised, for instance, that a 
particular type of imperative-what he termed a 'hypothetical 
imperative'---combined a means-end approach, having the general form, "If 
you desire or want X, then do Y." According to Kant, moral imperatives 
cannot be conditional and optional as in the case of hypothetical imperatives. 
Rather, moral imperatives command us unconditionally and are categorical in 
nature. Kant makes the point that the Categorical Imperative (CI) is a 
universal law in the following sense: 
... nothing remains to serve as a principle of the will except universal 
conformity of its action to law as such. That is, I should never act in 
such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a 
universallaw. 11 
That the Cl is an universal law is important for Kant especially because he 
held the view that human beings are, by nature, subject to 'inclination'12 
which, being under the jurisdiction of natural causal laws, is beyond one's 
control. Being moral, on this account, consists in transcending one's 
inclinations. For Kant, the application of the universalisability criterion to 
morality entails a rejection of moral principles which cannot at the same time 
be a principle for every moral agent. 
On Kant's account, too, morality is very closely tied up with rationality: 
the rational faculty of the human person, together with her autonomous free 
will, allows her to recognise and to act, as a moral agent, according to 
universalisable calls of duty-this is distinct and separate from human 
inclination. Indeed, God, whose will is wholly determined by reason alone, 
would not have any problem concerning moral action, according to Kant, as 
He does not experience the struggle between reason and inclination; what a 
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perfectly rational being does is what an imperfectly rational being (i.e. man), 
ought to do. 
Because humans are imperfect, they need to have their action and 
behaviour guided by imperatives. Rejecting the idea that one's inclinations 
can be a suitable motivating force for moral action, Kant postulated reason 
itself as being the force of obligatoriness of the Cl. In addition, he conceived 
of duty as a purely formal requirement which requires that the agent acts 
from respect for the moral law alone. While a perfectly rational being would 
not experience laws as imperatives, an imperative, in the case of humankind, 
is a command of reason to a will that does not of necessity act in accordance 
with reason. Kant sought the purely rational subject; although he recognised 
that humans are imperfect, he believed there was a kind of perfect rationality 
embodied in perfect beings to which humans should aim. 
An important point to be noted is that it is not at all obvious what Kant 
means by the phrase 'universal law'. There is one sense of universality 
(universalisability0 ) that clearly emerges when the Cl is contrasted with 
hypothetical imperatives and that is, that the universal law is obligatory. 
There is at least another sense of universality (universalisabilityu)-emphasis 
that moral imperatives do not admit of particulars-that is implied rather than 
explicit. On this view of universalisabilityu, the Cl is universalu in that it cannot 
be formulated to suit a specific person or circumstance.13 More specifically, 
while it allows for the derivation of particular applications (eg. "Carey should 
tell the truth") from universals (eg. "All persons should tell the truth"), it does 
not permit formulations based solely on particulars such as "All persons 
should do their best for Carey." 
It is obvious that Kant's universalisability criterion could have more 
than the two aspects discussed above (universalisability0 and 
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universalisabilityu). However, in the context of this thesis, what is important 
about universalisabilityu is that, in denying some place or role to particular 
persons or circumstances, it would seem that actions or attitudes which 
function or occur within the context of, say, personal relationships 14, do not 
count as moral. 
From Kant's writings, it is at best unclear how significant 
universalisabilityu is to his conception of the Cl. In the context of the 
discussion of this chapter, it needs to be noted that if universalisabilityu is 
understood to be a necessaf}' feature of morality, one of the (undesirable) 
outcomes is that practices, actions or attitudes operative within particular 
relationships might not be considered morally significant. 
What is being argued here is not a criticism of the Kantian Cl, but of an 
overemphasis on universalisabilityu in morality, because that would render 
invalid specific aspects of human attachment and, more generally, of 
personal experience. For instance, the way in which a particular mother cares 
for or loves her child is morally significant, yet not universalisableu. In other 
words, while certain aspects of parent-child relationships are universalisableu 
(such as: "All parents have responsibility in ensuring that their children are 
healthy"), there are other aspects which might not be universalisableu but 
which are yet morally significant (such as: "This father takes his child for a 
dental inspection every six months"). In other words, there are, and will be, 
differences between particular parent-child relationships and it should not 
simply be assumed that such differences, because they are non-
universalisableu, are therefore either unimportant or inconsequential insofar 
as the content of morality is concerned. 
In this connection, insofar as moral agency is concerned, it should not 
be taken as a given that moral agents are detached selves. In other words, 
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there should be place within moral theory to accommodate the fact that moral 
agents are, at least in some sense, related selves. According to some 
stronger formulations of relational morality, such attachments to particular 
others are constitutive of moral agency. Such a view need not be accepted, 
however, in order to maintain that, at a minimal level, a theory of moral action 
should attempt to account for differences across moral agents arising from 
their differential attachments to particular others. It is clear that an overly 
rigorous conception of the universalisability criterion could easily gloss over 
such important features of human attachment and, hence, of moral agency. 
The following section examines Mill's utilitarian Greatest Happiness Principle, 
showing that Mill's utilitarianism requires that attachments to particular others 
should not be given precedence over considerations of justice, equality and 
impartiality. 
1.1.3 Utility: Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle 
Utilitarian moral theories generally seek to curtail solely self-regarding or self-
interested motives, actions, rules or behaviours. In particular, they promote 
actions, practices, rules, behaviours and/or motives which procure maximum 
happiness of all individuals concerned. The utilitarian enterprise attempts to 
deal directly with the competing desires and interests of the self and others. It 
prescribes that moral agents should in principle act to procure what is in the 
interests and well-being of others over those of the self. More precisely, 
though, it is not merely the promotion of the interests and well-being of 
particular others or of groups but of collective good or of desirable states of 
affairs. 
34 
Variations across utilitarian views arise from two primary areas of 
debate. The first is a debate about the content of morality: pleasure, 
happiness, justice, welfare and preferences are some utilitarian goods. In this 
connection, Mill's fundamental objection against Benthamite utilitarianism 
was its lack of distinction between goods of differing qualities: Mill was 
concerned to emphasise the more desirable and qualitatively superior 
happiness connected with the exercise of the 'higher faculties', as contrasted 
with those deriving from 'mere sensation'. According to Mill, Bentham's 
measure of utility, because it fails to articulate the necessity of comparing the 
quality as well as the quantity of goods, is a 'shallow mistake'.15 
The second area of contention between Utilitarians is that concerning 
the method according to which outcomes might be assessed or goods 
realised. There are long-existing and robust debates between proponents of 
Act Utilitarianism ('Perform the act that will produce the greatest overall 
amount of utility') and Rule Utilitarianism ('Follow the rule that will produce the 
greatest overall amount of utility') and, more recently, of Practice 
Utilitarianism ('Support those practices that produce the greatest overall 
amount of utility') and Motive Utilitarianism ('Act on the motive that will 
produce the greatest overall amount of utility').'" 
Mill's greatest happiness principle needs to be situated within the 
context of his social and political philosophy. Mill was proposing a 
contractarian theory and, in that context, articulated a moral theory which he 
believed would suffice in promoting the pursuit of collective interests based 
on notions of justice, rights, equality and impartiality. In his view, what one 
must consider, in fulfilling the greatest happiness principle, is" ... not the 
agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned."" Mill is quick to reinforce 
the point that utilitarianism does not require self-renunciation: 
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The only self-renunciation which [utilitarianism] applauds, is devotion 
to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others; 
either of mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits 
imposed by the collective interests of mankind.'" 
However, and rather more stringently, 
As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism 
requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and 
benevolent spectator. 19 
Mill argues that while it might seem as if utilitarianism, in being 
consequentialist (in deriving the rightness of an action from its utility), 
precludes a consideration of the motives and/or characters of moral agents, 
there is in fact no inconsistency between concern about agent-motives and 
utilitarian theory .20 He points out that: 
Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions 
and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of 
them their full worth. They are also aware that a right action does not 
necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are 
blameable often proceed from qualities entitled to praise ... I grant that 
[utilitarians] are, notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the long run the 
best proof of a good character is good actions ... 21 
Mill maintains that whilst motives might be intimately linked to the agent's 
character and worth, from the point of view of the greatest happiness 
principle, the former are irrelevant insofar as right or moral action is 
concerned. 
Mill's response to the place of moral motivation and moral agency in 
moral theory is also relevant to considerations of relational attachment. In 
discussing the implications of the greatest happiness principle, he deals with 
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the concept of impartiality and points out that the upholding of impartiality, 
and of justice, seem to require that 'favour and preference' (of particular 
others) do not apply, and should be suspended in moral considerations. Mill 
is again, with regard to this issue, happy to concede that favour and 
preference (opposites of impartiality) are not always censurable. He affirms 
the place of relational attachment within the moral community, stating 
counterfactually that a person would be held morally blameworthy, rather 
than praiseworthy, if he did not give special consideration to his family or 
friends at least where he could do so" ... without violating any other duty."22 
Mill seems to imply that acting responsibly toward particular others 
(which might involve giving them special consideration) is a matter of the 
agent's moral worth which is ultimately unrelated to right moral action. 
Indeed, he seeks to maintain that in most cases, within a context of justice 
and equality, impartiality should prevail over considerations of relational 
attachment: 
Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean, 
being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is 
supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand; and resisting 
the solicitation of any motives which prompt to conduct different from 
what those considerations would dictate.23 
It is clear that Mill wishes not to allow that partial considerations for related or 
specific others might override the greatest happiness principle. Indeed, it 
seems that Mill holds partiality suspect for the very reason that it runs counter 
to collective or community interests. The criticisms of overemphasis on 
universalisability made in the previous section apply here as well: if moral 
theories require moral agents to consistently deny and forego relational 
attachments, those moral theories in question should be carefully reassessed 
37 
for their failure to take into consideration such morally significant details of 
human experience. 
Thomas Nagel, in contemplating issues of partiality and subjectivity in 
morality, proposes that moral agents adopt impersonal, objective points of 
view in their moral deliberation. Nagelian morality is discussed in the next 
section. 
1.1.4 Impersonal Morality: Nagel's View From Nowhere 
Thomas Nagel's work in morality deals with the difficult issues related to 
debates regarding moral motivation and reasons for action. In particular, he 
examines the complex tension between moral motivation which is agent-
centered, on the one hand, and objective reasons for action which are, in 
general, agent-neutral, on the other. In The Possibility of Altruism24, Nagel 
argues regarding altruism that the moral agent should, ideally, take a 
rationalistic, disinterested perspective when weighing the wants and interests 
of oneself against those of others. Nagel states clearly that his view shares 
two similar features with a Kantian one. The first is their respective internalist 
motivational structures. The second is a point related to moral psychology: 
that moral motivation is based in part on 'the agent's metaphysical conception 
of himself.25 
There is a more basic similarity between the two views which Nagel 
does not explicitly specify and that is that both moral theories primarily adopt 
an attitude of suspicion toward subjective agent-relative moral considerations 
which are not applicable to most other moral agents. Thus, while Kant's 
paradigmatic moral agent is the rational man who acts according to 
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universalisable principles, Nagel conceives of morality in terms of agent-
neutral impersonal practical judgments: 
[In morality i]t is important that what is judged does not apply only from 
a personal standpoint, and hence only to one's own case ... (To be 
properly moral) requires the acceptance of universal practical 
principles which apply in the same sense to everyone, and which are 
impersonally formulable, so that one can arrive at any true conclusion 
about what the persons in a situation should do, or have reason to do, 
without knowing what one's own place in the situation is, or indeed 
whether one occupies a place in it at all."" 
For Nagel, the solipsist-one who cannot 'cast his reasonings in impersonal 
form'27-cannot be a successful moral agent. In a later work, The View From 
Nowhere"', Nagel describes how the moral agent should come to 
acknowledge the incompleteness of personal and subjective points of view. 
Dealing with the larger issue of metaphysical reality here, Nagel searches for 
an objective conception of reality which implies that a grip on reality and, 
similarly, on morality, involves a knowledge of what other perspectives are 
like 'from the inside'. On that account, moral deliberation would involve, first, 
knowing one's own perspective and those like ours; and, then, considering 
perspectives different from and even alien to ours, perspectives which we do 
not already know 'what it is like to be'. 
Nagel states that his aim in ethics is normative rather than descriptive, 
and that he wants a richer metaphysics of morals; however, he also indicates 
that he does not know what that richer conception would involve. This 
uncertainty is reflected in a passage in which he describes the process 
through which one tries to attain a disinterested perspective: 
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If we can make judgments about how we should live even after 
stepping outside of ourselves, they will provide the material for moral 
theory ... ln the sphere of values or practical reasoning, the problem is 
different. As in the theoretical case, we must take up a new, 
comprehensive viewpoint after stepping back and including our former 
perspective in what is to be understood. But here the new viewpoint 
will be not a new set of beliefs, but a new or extended set of values!' 
Heroically, Nagel attempts to offer a moral theory that is inclusive (in 
impersonally taking into account all subjective perspectives) and yet inclusive 
of an account of personal identity. He expresses the problem thus: 
Given a complete description of the world from no particular point of 
view, including all the people in it, one of whom is Thomas Nagel, it 
seems on the one hand that something has been left out, something 
absolutely essential remains to be specified, namely which of them I 
am."' 
Nagel's view in The View From Nowhere is a more moderate one than in The 
Possibility of Altruism in that, in discussing how a moral agent might juggle 
her own perspective as one amongst others, he concedes that it is not 
necessary that a particular moral agent abandon all the values which she 
cannot sustain impersonally and objectively.31 However, he still requires that 
the moral agent strive toward an objective self, reasoning that "I do not give 
[myself, the objective self,] any privileged status by comparison with other 
points of view ... [treating] on an equal footing those [experiences] it receives 
directly [via the body identified as TN] and those others it learns about only 
indirectly."32 
While Nagel's account attempts to deal with the subjective aspect of 
human experience, the solution appears unworkable because of the 
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extraordinary demands it places on ordinary moral agents to juggle 
perspectives. 33 
Additionally, another question that should be raised regarding Nagel's 
theory is its assumption that the optimal solution to subjectivity in morality 
rests in an impersonal weighing of one's own perspective with those of 
others. In other words, Nagel's theory begs the question of whether it is 
desirable that an agent adopt an impersonal perspective with regard to her 
own interests, needs and desires. Such an assumption fails to take into 
account motivational factors which are crucial in human intention and action. 
Furthermore, it seems that such reasoning requires the moral agent to ignore 
the relatedness of humans and her feelings of attachment to others arising 
from that relatedness and interdependence. These concerns are important 
sources of motivation for the individual to seek not only her or his own 
welfare but those of others as well. Indeed, to insist on impersonality, a 
stance acquired through adopting and accommodating other perspectives, is 
to require that one dissociate oneself, if necessary, from what one cares 
about. The desirability of such prescriptions needs to be carefully scrutinised. 
If individual differences are to be respected, if perspectivity is an aspect of 
difference amongst people, and if human existence is necessarily 
perspectival, it follows that the adoption of an impersonal and objective 
perspective might entail a rejection of individual modes of human existence. 
In summary, the point of this section has been to demonstrate that 
certain accounts of morality and moral practice leave no room for subjective 
human experience and/or fail to appreciate that some aspects of that 
experience might be morally salient. The particular aspect of human 
experience that is considered here is that of relational attachment and the 
special loyalties, obligations and emotions arising from it. It has been argued 
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that the attempt to hold as basic the notion of the moral agent as a detached 
self, through emphasising concepts such as impersonality, impartiality and 
universalisability either as necessary or overriding criteria of morality, is 
unrealistic in that that forces moral agents, in their moral practice, to deny or 
to count as irrelevant their special attachments. 
The discussion in the following section focuses on the dynamics of relational 
moralities. It briefly examines the nature of connectedness in the classical 
Confucian and Pauline Christian traditions and then proceeds to analyse 
various arguments and proposals for relational morality. 
1.2 Morality and Relationships 
Many of the projects we undertake and the activities we engage in, such as 
playing games, bushwalking and research, involve others. Some of our 
projects such as giving to charity and carrying out a survey presuppose the 
existence and involvement of others. The connectedness of the human 
person is an important fact of human life. We are born into, grow up in, and 
are trained in environments that include other people. Learning to be moral 
presupposes, as its context, a moral community.'' 
In both the classical Confucian and Pauline Christian traditions, the 
articulation of codes and norms governing relationships is deeply situated 
within existing ways of life and modes of thought. It is also bound up with 
other concerns about social and political structures and institutions. 
The discussion in the following sub-sections (1.2.1 and 1.2.2) focuses 
on general aspects of relationships in the classical Confucian and Pauline 
Christian streams of thought, situating the ideas of each tradition within the 
respective socio-political and historical frameworks. 
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1.2.1 Relationships in Confucian Thought 
In Confucian thought, the human being is conceived of as a member of a 
species which has as one of its distinctive characteristics a moral nature. 35 lt 
may sound trivial and superfluous to make the comment that human beings 
are similar because they belong to the same species. However, from an 
ontological point of view, Confucius and his disciples hold that this similarity 
in nature is morally significant: every human being inherently possesses the 
capacity for self-development. This view is one of the primary tenets of 
Confucian moral thinking. And because human beings share the same 
nature, it follows that the proper context for the manifestation, development 
and realisation of this nature is the human community itself. 
For the Confucians, being moral and becoming moral are meaningful 
only within an intersubjective shared communal context; the locus of meaning 
in human life and its values, both for the individual as well as for the 
community, is to be found within the cultural, social and political structures of 
the community. The picture ofthe ideal community provided in the Analects is 
marked by a feudal-style hierarchy maintained by the active participation of 
all the members of the community who understand their relative positions in 
the various levels of the socio-political hierarchy. 
Consequently, much emphasis is placed on the articulation of 
behaviours and norms applicable to one's situation as a party to specific 
relationships. The Confucian self-cultivation process-often dubbed 
'humanisation'-can only be carried out in an intersubjective context. The 
process of humanisation-of being human-is, for Confucius, one whereby 
the moral agent carefully and thoughtfully learns how to respond 
appropriately to different people in different situations. This does not mean, 
however, that humanisation is merely a socialisation process through which 
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the individual internalises the codes and values of the community. This is 
exemplified in the way the Confucian li, loosely translated as norms of social 
propriety, are characterised in the Analects. Not only are existing li subject to 
modification, what is more important is the feeling of reverence which 
necessarily accompanies li behaviour. The feeling of reverence is, in short, 
respect for the other. Thus li might be more fully described as norms of 
appropriateness guiding behaviour within meaningful relationships. 
Significantly, li are often referred to in conjunction with jen, a term referring to 
distinctly human qualities and symbolising not only self-esteem but also 
respect for the other. 
The humanisation process is, effectively, one in whichjen is cultivated; 
this process begins within the family. Thus filial piety (hsiao) is an important 
value in Confucianism because it is within the family that the different 
loyalties and dynamics of each kind of relationship are first experienced and 
learnt. One learns, within that context, not simply how to respond to another 
person but also, at a metamora! level, the meaning and significance of 
responsivityto other human beings to whom one is related in a variety of 
ways. The Confucian concept shu (reciprocity) encompasses both these 
meanings of response in thinking about human relatedness. 
In Confucian thought, how one should respond in a particular situation 
is dependent both on circumstantial factors and on the nature of the 
relationship/s between the people involved. One's response to others reveals 
the kind of person one is. Given that the cultivation of the self is effected 
through developing meaningful relationships, it follows that the development 
of the self depends on a wide range of factors specific to the life of the 
individual moral agent. Given also that the quantity and quality of possible 
permutations of relationships any one person could have is infinite, each 
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person is a distinctive self for whom self-cultivation has a specific and 
specialised procedure and meaning. The Analects itself is a paradigm of such 
ways of thinking: it contains anecdotes about how people have behaved-
appropriately or inappropriately-in a specific situation, the behaviours being 
manifestations of particular kinds of character. There are dialogues between 
Confucius and a range of people with Confucius giving each a different reply 
to the same question. In one instance, Confucius specifically explains that he 
has tailored his responses to the characteristics of his interlocutors. On a 
larger scale-at the community level-the importance of response is 
predicated upon an somewhat idealistic hope that members of the Confucian 
community will take a personal interest in the community through developing 
meaningful relationships with others in the community. 
It could be argued that the central focus of the Analects is the ideal 
political community comprising efficient, functional relationships. This 
emphasis on relational ties need not be construed solely in utilitarian terms, 
however, because within Confucianism, the issue of individual good is not 
separate from that of the common good; indeed, it is debatable whether the 
Analects accommodates any concept of individual good. 
Within the Confucian community, the well-being of individuals within 
the ideal Confucian community is ensured when relationships have been 
carefully cultivated according to intersubjective relational norms. What this 
means in practical terms is that a man who is, for example, both a father and 
a son acts appropriately when dealing with his son and his father 
respectively. To fill in the picture more adequately, however, one needs to 
consider more substantial issues (rather than merely appropriate actions and 
behaviours) including concepts of self cultivation, the definition of 
personhood, and moral agency. The person who excels in his self cultivation 
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and who enjoys a good life, the Confucian chun tzu (unfortunately accounted 
for solely in masculine terms~ is judged a success not merely in terms of 
having a cultivated moral character but, more importantly, and necessarily so, 
in having developed meaningful relationships. The establishment of the self is 
none other than the successful locating of the self in its communal context 
and in being at ease with the infinite variety of human situations and contexts. 
It is within the framework of the programme of 'fitting in' well within the 
Confucian communal structures that meaningful relationships are deemed to 
have a central role. Much emphasis is placed on the cultivation of 
relationships within the communal context. The development of the self is, 
accordingly, measured in those terms. The Confucian concepts li, jen, hsiao, 
shu, and, more comprehensively, the self-cultivation process, are discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Two; the dynamics and problems of the Confucian 
notion of relationships are analysed in Chapter Five. 
1.2.2 Relationships in Pauline Thought 
The Pauline tradition places special emphasis on relationships as well. The 
reason for maintaining and cultivating relationships, though, is markedly 
different from those in the Confucian case. Paul considered himself the 
apostle to the Gentiles. Accordingly, he understood his task to involve 
modifying certain Jewish concepts and requirements in order that non-Jews 
could be successfully integrated into the community. This was, indeed, the 
beginning of the Christian tradition as separate and distinct from the Jewish 
one. 
Attempting to throw off the cultural baggage of the Jewish tradition, 
Paul insists that a new age had arrived, marked by the Christ-event (the 
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ). His primary task, in that context, 
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was to found and care for the early Christian church communities, justifying 
both to the Jews as well as the Gentiles the significance of the Christ-event. 
The Jewish religion, together with its tradition and customs was, up to 
the Christ event, the special possession and prerogative of the Jews. 
Adherence to the Mosaic laws, the holy days, and, for males, circumcision, 
were group boundary markers which distinguished the Jews from others: they 
were thus symbols of their status as God's elect. These facts Paul could not 
simply brush aside. Indeed, he affirmed, in his letter to the roman church, 
"They are Israelites, and to them belong the adoption, the glory, the 
covenants, the giving of the law, the worship, and the promises; to them 
belong the patriarchs, and from them, according to the flesh, comes the 
Messiah, who is over all" (Romans 9:4,5). 
There are several ways Paul could have dealt with the Jewish 
tradition. He could have argued for its total irrelevance, upheld the tradition 
(thus asserting that all other persons and races are to seek their salvation 
from within the tradition, accepting and keeping its laws and customs), or he 
could have set out a compromise situation. The general strategy which Paul 
adopted was not simply to fit the Gentiles within the Jewish framework but to 
offer a new interpretation of Jewish history which placed the Jewish story 
within his own apocalyptic eschatology which saw a new beginning, and not 
an end, in the Christ event.37 
In making the point that Jewish history was part of wider human 
history and that it provided the lead-up of events to Christ's resurrection, Paul 
claimed the relevance and necessity of the following events: the covenant; 
the respective roles of Moses and Abraham; the Judaic law as guide; the 
fulfilment of the requirements of the law. Yet, these elements receive new 
interpretations in the light of the resurrection: Moses (one of the Jewish 
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fathers) is given a negative role; Abraham is upheld as the epitome of faith (in 
demonstrating that fulfilment of the law is unnecessary); the law is futile in 
salvation; circumcision (of the male) does not contribute to the status of that 
person. 38 
Paul views the Jewish law as inadequate for salvation: although holy 
(Romans 7:7-13) and necessary (Galatians 3:24-6), at times Paul even 
regards it as a sufficient cause of sin (Galatians 3:19, 22; Romans 3:20; 4: 15; 
5:20). Indeed, Paul seems confused regarding the role of the law. It seems 
that, on the one hand, he could not absolutely abolish the law because it 
would have meant that God, being whimsical, had changed his mind. On the 
other hand, the law had to be less significant than the Christ event and had to 
be portrayed as being insufficient for salvation; hence the need for Christ. In 
short, he tried not so much to relate the new to the old as the old to the new. 
One can quite easily perceive Paul's reconstruction of Jewish history in 
statements such as: "I do not nullify the grace of God; for if justification 
comes through the law, then Christ died for nothing" (Galatians 2:21). 
What was once applicable only to the tribe and race was now available, on 
an individual basis, for all who believed. In this connection, Paul's emphasis 
on faith (mcrns) was important because it signified a clear difference between 
the Judaic and Christian traditions: it was the individual's belief (and 
commitment to the significance of Christ's work), rather than publicly-
verifiable conduct or codes that signified membership of the Christian 
community. This move allowed for converts from a range of different cultural 
backgrounds to collectively affirm their belief in Christ and to see the norms 
and standards of their respective cultures as relatively unimportant insofar as 
membership of the Christian communities was concerned. 
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For this reason, because the composition of the early Church 
communities was mixed and diverse, cohesiveness of the group and 
community-maintaining values were extremely important. It could be said that 
love (aymtT]) was a core value which Paul emphasised in order to instil 
harmony within the community. In other words, apart from its theological 
dimension, aya1tT], as used in the different epistles, had a range of different 
functions. For example, disagreement regarding normative codes was settled 
through an appeal to aya1tT]: those who had deeper insights were asked to 
understand the points of view of those who had difficulty understanding the 
significance of the Christ-event (Romans 8; I Corinthians 8, 10). In addition, 
aya1tT] was appealed to in settling disputes regarding a person's position in 
the social hierarchy. Paul, in invoking aya1tT], argued that insofar as 
participation in the communities was concerned, there was to be no hierarchy 
of contributions: no particular contribution was to be deemed more important 
than any other (I Corinthians 12-14). 
In spite of the functional role of aya1tT], it was at times portrayed in the 
epistles as the basic value in human life (I Corinthians 13). Thus, Paul 
characterises aya1tT] not merely in terms of its functionality but, rather, in 
terms of the depth of affection and concern that underlies meaningful human 
relationships. The dynamics of human interaction and the Pauline 
conceptualisation of relationships are discussed more fully in Chapters Three 
and Six. The following section investigates notions of relating. 
1.2.3 Impersonal and Personal Relationships 
The major objection to moral theories which overemphasise universality, by 
philosophers wanting to emphasise the significance of human relationships in 
morality, is that those moral theories in general cannot, or do not, attempt to 
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accommodate norms and codes pertaining to interaction within specific 
relationships. No doubt this lack in some contemporary moral theories is due 
at least in part to the wide variety of types of human relationship that cannot 
be systematised or are not reducible to simpler categories. Notwithstanding 
this, however, there are broad patterns among relationships across the range 
of human societies. 
For example, in a parent-child relationship, it is generally understood 
that caring about the physical, emotional and mental well-being of one's child 
is typically expected of parents. This does not mean that all parents are 
necessarily caring of their children in the same way, nor that some person 
other than a parent (say, a teacher) cannot care for a child in the way parents 
normally do. Rather, certain forms and expressions of caring-such as 
monitoring the child's social and moral development, tending to the child's 
health and, basically, ensuring that the child leads a happy life-are 
paradigmatic of parental caring.'" A teacher, as mentioned earlier, could care 
for a pupil in the way a parent normally cares for a child. It is, however, 
neither required nor typical for a teacher to do so. 
Apart from certain regularities and generalities, though, the variation in 
relationship norms across communities is perhaps too diverse to allow 
properly detailed classification. For example, subservience might be the 
behavioural norm for a child with respect to a parent in a particular moral 
community and in another, trust, and the cultivation of equality in the 
relationship as the child matures, might be what is emphasised. Adding to the 
complexity which frustrates attempts to classify norms in specific 
relationships is the variation within each specific relationship. In the case of 
friendship, for example, not every friend appreciates the offer of one's advice 
or opinion; thus, offering of advice might be appropriate to some friendships 
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but not others. Even more acutely, a particular friend might at times 
appreciate my opinion and at others prefer me simply to support his 
decisions. Being a friend in such cases is difficult because the friend's needs 
are not always consistent. But being a friend to anyone is, in that respect, 
difficult because it involves the cultivation of sensitivities to certain needs, 
likes and loves of the friend. Particularly with friendship, but also with other 
relationships, the cultivation of sensitivity to the needs, desires and interests 
of the other in varying circumstances, and the ability to respond and act 
appropriately, are crucial in forging and maintaining a relationship. 
In general, any kind of relationship presupposes sensitivities between 
the persons in the relationship. Variations within relationships are diverse and 
complex because sensitivities and appropriate and acceptable responses are 
in large part determined by the individuals involved in each relationship and, 
in part, by the situations that arise within each relationship. Each relationship 
is unique because the individual participants bring into the relationship 
important features of their individual lives. In this way, the formulation of 
precise rules or guidelines to assist in interaction within relationships is 
doomed to fail. 
On this view, the world of the other is not simplistically and crudely a 
world of undifferentiated others whose interests, separately or together, 
compete with one's own. Rather, those others-including people who are 
mere acquaintances as well as those with whom I am intimately connected-
are different individuals who are differently related to myself. Insofar as some 
of these people are, for me, not intersubstitutable and not replaceable, the 
relationships I have with them can never be duplicated. 
The acknowledgment that people are non-intersubstitutable and that 
each relationship is unique necessitates a re-examination of detachment, 
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impartiality and impersonality as unquestionably appropriate approaches in 
the evaluation of all moral situations. Some critics of the inadequacy of 
impersonal and impartial criteria in moral evaluation have suggested that 
there should be a comparable focus on the ethics of relationships, a domain 
within which principles of impersonality and impartiality are irrelevant or play 
a diminished role. 
Stephen Toulmin is critical of the 'inerrancy of rules and principles in moral 
philosophy'."' For instance, in discussing a range of issues in applied ethics, 
he contends that in certain cases, responsiveness and reasonableness, and 
equity rather than impartiality, are the appropriate operative criteria. Citing as 
an example the resolution of legal disputes, Toulmin argues that in the 
particular cases of labour-management conflicts and the renegotiation of 
commercial contracts, mediation or conciliation is seen as the appropriate 
form of resolution, rather than confrontation. This is important, he stresses, 
and it is not accidental that mediation is the appropriate method in such 
cases because " ... the parties to a labor grievance will normally wish to 
continue working together after the adjudication". 41 Implying that the approach 
towards dispute-resolution in the situations cited above is merely 
commonsensical, Toulmin points out that the alternative, taking such cases to 
court, is generally inappropriate in contrast to, for example, criminal 
prosecutions. 
Toulmin mentions that his thesis applies not only in the arena of social 
ethics but in ethics in a narrower and more personal sense as well. He 
argues, for example, that in dealings with persons with whom one is 
intimately linked, Toulmin, " ... discretion is all, and the relevance of strict rules 
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is minima1"42 while in dealings with strangers, much is guided by rules and 
there is little left to discretion. 
Toulmin's criticism of impartialist and impersonalist morality, and his 
proposal for relational morality, is based on a dichotomy"' between an ethics 
based on rules and one of discretion. He maintains a clear distinction 
between the kinds of norms and principles operative within the domain of 
dealing with strangers, on the one hand, and with intimates, on the other. In 
his analysis, Toulmin views the two systems as complementary in an 
inversely proportional way such that, if one set of operative principles is 
applicable in a particular case, then the other set will only be minimally 
applicable at best. 
John Kekes, in his analysis of the notion of impartiality and its place in moral 
theory, makes a similar point, though dealing specifically with what he terms 
'personal morality'.44 Kekes argues against the view that impartiality is " .. a 
necessary condition of a rule being moral'045• Defining impartiality as " ... the 
exclusion of special interests, the equal treatment of all moral agents [and] 
the prohibition of discrimination"'", he contends that such a requirement is 
typically associated with 'social morality', as opposed to 'personal morality'. 
The concern of social morality, in Kekes' terms, is to curb selfish and 
malevolent attitudes toward others. Personal morality, on the other hand, 
looks at the pursuit of the good life, which often involves self-interest. An 
insistence that impartiality is a necessary condition of morality would entail 
that personal morality is not morality at all. 
The upshot of such reasoning, Kekes claims, is that the enterprise of 
morality is defined solely in terms of social morality. This would mean that 
whatever is classified under 'personal morality'-including one's self-
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interested, rational, pursuit of the good life and the cultivation of intimate 
personal relationships-is either construed as nonmoral, or, alternatively, has 
to be assessed according to the standards that apply in the area of social 
morality. Kekes' criticisms of impartialist morality, and his proposed solution, 
resemble those ofToulmin's: 
The more impersonal a relationship is, the more impartial it ought to 
be. But, it seems to me, the corollary is also true. The more personal a 
relationship is the less role there is for impartiality. Indeed, impartiality 
destroys intimate relationships."' 
Both Kekes' and Toulmin's analyses, which suggest an inversely proportional 
applicability relationship between the two systems, seem to oversimplify the 
concept ofrelational morality. The proposals are predicated upon the 
presupposition that the solution to an overemphasis on impartial and 
impersonal criteria is to promote the aptness of personal discretion in certain 
circumstances. More precisely, both proposals rely on a dichotomous 
separation between what counts as impersonal and what as personal. While 
Kekes states that there is a continuum of intimacy (in opposition to 
'distance'), a dichotomy is implied in the clear definition of the separate poles 
of the continuum (intimacy versus distance). 
The problematic aspect of both proposals is most obvious when their 
practical application is considered. According to the two accounts, the first 
step in moral practice is, presumably, to make a decision whether a particular 
relationship is, in Kekes' terms, personal or impersonal. This involves making 
judgments regarding who is a stranger and who an intimate. The primacy of 
this move is clear in both accounts: the kind of relationship has to be 
determined prior to the application of appropriate reasoning strategies. 
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It seems that both Kekes and Toulmin have overlooked the complexity 
of this process. It is not clear from either account-or it is assumed to be 
apparent-how one decides that certain relationships are impersonal and 
others intimate. Indeed, as exemplified in our ordinary moral lives, much of 
our time is spent trying to work out what the boundaries of a particular 
relationship are and there are often no clear answers. 
It could be said that Kekes and Toulmin are accurate in portraying the 
processes of moral deliberation at a descriptive level. At the level of moral 
theory, however, much more needs to be specified because it otherwise 
leaves an excessive amount of important, unspecified detail to the discretion 
of the moral agent. There needs to be a set of criteria regarding how one 
might to decide, for example, in a relationship which has elements or 
moments of both impersonality and intimacy, whether the relationship is an 
impersonal or an impartial one for some particular purpose or in some 
particular respect. My relationship with a colleague, for example, might be 
intimate in that I confide in her about the personal and domestic situations in 
my life. On the other hand, there might be situations in which I treat the same 
colleague impartially as, for example, if I draw attention to one of her 
mistakes which has implicated an innocent other (with whom I have no 
special relationship). 
If Toulmin's and Kekes' proposals are to be practicable, there needs 
first to be criteria regarding what kinds of relationship are intimate and what 
kinds personal. It needs to be recognised that the intimacy or impersonality of 
a particular relationship does not just vary with persons; distance from, or 
intimacy with, another person is contingent, too, on other contextual and 
circumstantial factors. In other words, it is the case with most relationships 
that the relational proximity between two persons is not a constant and the 
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nature of the relationship is not the (only) criterion offundamental moral 
significance. For these reasons, it cannot simply be assumed that such 
proximity or distance is easily articulated. 
Additionally, it must be noted that morality should not be dependent 
solely upon a moral agent's subjective evaluation of the relationship. While, in 
practice, it is normally the case that individual moral agents are deemed the 
most appropriate persons to decide who is a stranger and who an intimate 
and while all moral agents are, at times, engaged in such decisions, morality 
should not be grounded in the subjective feelings of particular moral agents 
and whether they happen to like or dislike another. In other words, if the 
evalution of a particular relationship is left solely to the discretion of individual 
moral agents, and if morality is dependent on the nature of the relationship, it 
could mean that certain proposals of relational morality simply collapse into 
tribalism and favouritism. 
Another difficult problem with both Kekes' and Toulmin's views is that 
they assume that intimacy (and/or distance) is a definable, unitary standard 
or concept, thus ignoring the empirical and moral fact that there are a variety 
of ways of expressing intimacy. For example, intimacy could involve the 
eliciting and offering of details and information about one's private life; 
physical closeness; and comfortable silences. None of these expressions of 
intimacy is appropriate in all relationships that might be considered intimate. 
Some of them might be appropriate only within certain relationships in certain 
situations. It seems that the inadequacy of the proposals arises from a 
fundamental error in assuming that there exists a clear distinction between 
what counts as impersonal and what as personal and, in addition, that all 
relationships can be precisely classified according to the distinction, or 
located along a continuum constructed upon that distinction. In dealing with 
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this problem, it would seem that both Toulmin's and Kekes' proposals have to 
be rejected because the structures of the two systems they propose, as well 
as the relation between the two, are not viable. In other words, while their 
criticisms of impartialist and impersonalist morality might be plausible, their 
solutions are questionable because those solutions are still embedded in the 
structures and discourse of contemporary moral theory. Perhaps a more 
fruitful approach to constructing a viable relational morality would involve 
addressing the structures, as well as the content of morality: more 
specifically, the impersonal-personal dichotomy should be reassessed. 
Lawrence Blum, who argues that certain interactions and relationships do not 
fit neatly into the impersonal-personal framework, maintains that: 
... the damage that the personal/impersonal framework does to moral 
theory lie only partly in what it omits. What also tends to happen is that 
the omitted phenomena are taken up and squeezed into the 
framework itself, which thus preserves the illusion that 
personal/impersonal comprises an exhaustive dichotomy of morally 
relevant standpoints or classes of motives but actually distorts or 
misportrays the non personal, non impersonal phenomena.'" 
Blum uses compelling examples from situations in friendship and vocation. In 
the case of friendship, Blum argues, because it involves a significant amount 
of variability and individuality (although there are general principles that do 
apply in all cases of friendship, such as concern for the well-being of one's 
friend), it can indeed be viewed as purely personal or as purely impersonal, 
although to do so would be to misconstrue its 'deep good'. It is certainly 
possible to consider a particular friendship solely in terms of the good one 
derives from it. Blum argues that to classify friendship, as it often is, as 
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'personal' in the personal-impersonal framework, could have undesirable 
outcomes in that friendship merely as a personal project-disregarding the 
well-being and the good of the friend-is a distorted conception of friendship. 
Blum's solution is to disengage friendship from the model of the 
personal good as seen from an impersonal-personal framework so that the 
depth of real friendships can be realised, including response to the reality of 
the other person " ... in her own right, to her particular needs, to her way of 
looking at things, and to her individuality more generally."49 Blum's analysis 
allows for a deeper and more robust conceptualisation of relationships: it 
recognises that it does not help to categorise relationships either as 
impersonal or personal, and then to attempt to work within that framework. 
Indeed, Blum feels that such structures in our thought patterns might 
adversely affect the way we relate to others. 
The discussion of the impersonal-personal dichotomy in this section 
foreshadows the discussion in Part Two of the thesis on the related self. 
Chapter Four, the first chapter of Part Two, examines the content of relational 
morality and, more specifically, of the feminist care ethic. Similar questions 
are raised regarding whether proponents of the care ethic should seek to 
evaluate the content as well as the structures of existing moral theories. 
The following two chapters in Part One, Chapters Two and Three, 
analyse conceptions of human nature and of self cultivation in the classical 
Confucian and Pauline Christian traditions respectively. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CLASSICAL CONFUCIANISM: LEARNING TO BE HUMAN1 
Confucius remarks in Analects 7:1 that he is a transmitter (of teachings and 
ideas) and not an innovator. This statement should not be left unquestioned 
because Confucius was both a transmitter and an innovator. He was a 
transmitter in the sense that he utilised many pre-existing concepts such as 
jen (traditional meaning: goodness or morality), hsiao {filial piety), li 
(traditional meaning: sacrificial rites) and chun tzu (nobleman) in articulating 
his ideas and ideals. Also, at many points in the Analects Confucius states 
that he is a lover of antiquity (eg 7:19); by antiquity he means certain 
practices and beliefs of the Chou dynasty embodied especially in the 
hierarchical feudalistic socio-political structure governed by the Duke of Chou 
(Analects 7:5; 3:14). 
In spite of Confucius' remarks that he is only a transmitter, he was in 
fact an innovator: he so drastically modified some existing concepts that, in 
certain instances, little, if any of their original meanings remained. Concepts 
such as jen and hsiao he adapted and interwove into his system: jen had 
previously referred simply to humaneness or human goodness but Confucius 
gave it a central place in his philosophy and deepened its significance. 
Similarly, hsiao he constructed as a prerequisite of life in political society 
whereby the Confucian sage-king was the patriarchal head of the state-
family. In addition, Confucius greatly extended the scope of /f.--which 
originally and narrowly referred to sacrificial and religious rituals and the 
propriety or appropriate performance of these rituals-to apply as well in the 
sphere of social interaction. Indeed, for Confucius, human interaction had 
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religious significance and therefore /f-.-norms of social propriety-played a 
highly significant role in his system because they guided such interaction. 
It could be said that the most radical innovation of Confucius was the 
transformation of the concept of the chun tzu. While it had been used to refer 
to men with inherited social statuses (lit.: son of prince) Confucius substituted 
the criterion of acquired moral character as a prerequisite of social and 
political leadership for that of noble lineage. This points to one of the most 
important themes in classical Confucianism: that one could, and had to, learn 
to be human. This learning was associated with education which was, before 
and during Confucius' time, accessible only to nobility. Confucius, however, 
departing from tradition, was keen to point out that neither poverty nor inferior 
social status ought to be obstacles to learning (Analects 7:7; 15:38); the only 
precondition was one's eagerness to learn (Analects 7:7; 5:28; 8:17; 11 :6). 
In dismissing the traditional views of obstacles to education such as 
poverty and low-birth, Confucius was, indeed, challenging certain aspects of 
government. He believed that education2, which provided the basis for self 
cultivation, should be available to all; and, just as importantly, he advanced 
the view that every person had the potential to cultivate themselves. 
It needs to be noted, however, that while Confucius was emphatic that 
learning, and hence self-cultivation, was available for every person, he also 
maintained that the processes and the aims of self-cultivation varied amongst 
people. For example, he believed that not everyone could become a chun 
tzu: some were wanting in ability (perhaps as a matter of birth), others simply 
lacked determination (Analects 8:9; 9:29) such that even in the case that 
education were made available to all men, there would be limits to the 
attempts of some to cultivate themselves.3 As a corollary to this view of self-
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cultivation, the view of government in the Analects incorporates a political 
division of labour: direct involvement in government was not a central issue; 
rather, every person had a role to play within political society. For instance, 
by being a good son (and not necessarily by being an effective chun tzu) one 
was already making a positive contribution to the government of society 
(Analects 2:21).4 
The first section of this chapter involves a detailed analysis of Confucian 
concepts pertaining to morality and moral reasoning. Through an explication 
of the concepts (jen, li, hsiao, shu and tao), the aim of the section is to 
discuss classical Confucian views on human being, meaning in life and the 
development of the self, especially with a view to demonstrating the 
Confucian notion of the related self. For the classical Confucian, to be human 
was, necessarily, to exist as a member of a community with a network of 
interpersonal relationships. The distinguishing feature of a Confucian 
community, as portrayed in the Analects, is a hierarchically-ordered political 
society consisting of networks of relationships marked by subordination and 
superordination and by attitudes and behaviours appropriate to such 
ordering. Each person qua individual was a centre of relationships5 and thus 
had responsibility to cultivate these relationships. Consequently, a necessary 
aspect of the development of the self is the cultivation of one's relationships. 
Given that there are infinite permutations and combinations of 
relationships one could have, self development is an open-ended and 
individualistic process-individualistic not in the autonomous sense but in the 
sense that each person is uniquely different; the difference being constituted 
by differences in the types and qualities of relationships. In Confucian 
thought, personal identity is constituted in an important way by the 
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relationships one has. In this connection, the discussion in the second 
section of the Chapter focuses on how the various Confucian concepts 
(discussed in the first section) are interwoven to justify and support the 
Confucian ideal of self development within a relationship-based hierarchical 
network. 
2.1 Human Nature and Morality 
Confucius upheld an optimistic humanism in his conceptualisation of the ideal 
community. The stance in the Analects regarding human nature is that there 
is some predisposition of humans toward the good or the moral; Confucius 
remarked that "If a chun tzu (a Confucian gentleman) lived among [the 
barbarians] there will not be vulgarity or corruptness" (Analects 9:13; see also 
4:25; 13:16; 8:2; 13:19). While the concept of human nature-whether as 
innately good or predisposed toward good-is not developed in the Analects 
itself, there is considerable focus on how human nature might be developed 
(Analects 1:12; 3:19; 4:13; 6:25; 8:8;15:32; 20:3).6 1ndeed, all ofthe 
Confucian concepts are articulated in conjunction with self-cultivation. This is 
demonstrated in the following sub-sections. 
2.1.1 Human Nature and Moral Cultivation 
Confucius believed in a hierarchically-ordered society and in values which 
upheld that structure as a remedy to social unrest. Thus, he imputed certain 
virtues to social hierarchy which, he asserted, was rooted in the order of the 
world. He cited heaven (t'ien) as the source of world order, at a variety of 
levels? T'ien is a cosmic force, responsible not only for the existence of all 
things (pai wu) but also for the natural course of events, such as the four 
seasons (Analects 17:19, and especially Chung-yung, 1:1; 17:3). In addition, 
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t'ien is also portrayed as having supernatural powers to which humans had 
access through prayer (Analects 3:13; 14:37). Most relevantly, however, t'ien 
was the ground of human morality, the latter being distinctive of the human 
species. This cosmology provided justification for the Confucian idea that in 
every human being lies the potential for self development. Herlee Creel 
expresses this idea succinctly: 
[Heaven is] a cosmic counterpart of the ethical sense in man, a 
guarantee that somehow there is a sympathy with man's sense of right 
in the very nature of the Universe.8 
Confucius' usage of the term t'ien defies precise definition. It is the source of 
virtue inherent in humanity (Analects 7:22) and is itself the prevailing moral 
order (Analects 2:4; 18:8). The idea of a moral order within the natural one 
present not merely in human social life itself but also in the structure of the 
world represents an interdependency between human beings and the natural 
order, both of which are grounded in t'ien. Therefore, it was an important 
point, for Confucius, that there is order in the human social world. In this 
context, order prevails when people take up their rightful positions within 
society and, accordingly, live according to the requirements of their social 
roles. Government is effective, according to Confucius, when the father 
correctly or appropriately "fathers", the prince rightly "princes", and so on-
with people not overstepping the boundaries of what is appropriate to their 
roles and statuses in society. 
Liu Shu-Hsien, discussing the conceptualisation of human existence in 
Confucian thought, describes the kind of interplay between the concepts of 
transcendence and immanence, and between humanity and heaven: 
Now the Confucian approach to the problem of transcendence and 
immanence becomes clear. Heaven is transcendent in the sense that 
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it is an all-encompassing creative power which works incessantly in 
the universe. It is not a thing, but it is the origin of all things. And it 
cannot be detected by sense perceptions, because its "operations 
have neither sound nor smell." But Heaven is also immanent in the 
sense that it penetrates deep in every detail of the natural order, in 
general, and the moral order of man, in particular. But Heaven in no 
sense should be regarded as something completely beyond nature; on 
the contrary, it is that which constitutes the warp and woof of nature. 
As for man, he is beyond any doubt a creature in the world and hence 
a part of the natural order. 9 
The view that human life is subject to certain contingencies because it is part 
of the natural order is expressed in the concept of t'ien ming (mandate or 
decree of heaven). Thome Fang discusses various theories of t'ien ming in 
ancient China and their implications for moral action: 
In ancient China there were five theories about destiny or the Mandate 
of Heaven. The first was fatalism: the Mandate of Heaven is fixed and 
unchangeable. The second was moral determinism: Heaven always 
encourages virtue and punishes evil; therefore, man can determine his 
reward and punishment through moral deeds. The third was anti-
fatalism, advocated by the Moist School. The fourth was naturalistic 
fatalism, which means that destiny is not controlled by Heaven in the 
sense of an anthropomorphic God but by Nature and works 
automatically. Lastly, there was the Confucian theory of "waiting for 
destiny." According to this doctrine, man should exert his utmost in 
moral endeavor and leave whatever is beyond our control to fate. It 
frankly admits that there are things beyond our control but that is no 
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reason why one should relax in his moral endeavor. The tendency was 
definitely one of moralism and humanism."10 
It is difficult to determine which, if any, of these views of t'ien ming Confucius 
believed in; he stated very simply that what is beyond human control includes 
death and life, riches and honour (Analects 12:5.3, see also 6:8; 9:6; 11:8). 
While Confucius thought it important to know t'ien ming-commenting 
on the development of his own life, Confucius asserts that at fifty, he knew 
t'ien ming11-the idea of what is supernatural, or beyond human control, has 
only a limited role in his system. He remarked, on one occasion, that "while 
one is not able to understand (and thus to carry out) the affairs of human 
beings, why bother trying to understand the affairs of spirits; while one is not 
able to understand life, why bother trying to understand death?" (Analects 
11 :11). This remark has often been quoted in support of the view that 
Confucius was agnostic and that his philosophy is a-religious. 
What seems to be the more important point of this remark-which is, 
unfortunately, often missed-is that Confucius felt that issues beyond human 
control were only of secondary importance. D.C. Lau offers an interesting 
analysis of the concepts t'ien ming and ming which supports this point. He 
points out that while, in the Analects, heaven (t'ien) is a synonym for t'ien 
ming; ming, used on its own, actually has a different meaning.12 According to 
Lau, ming refers to events controlled by destiny: events which are not 
brought about by human agency and over which human endeavour has no 
effect (Analects 6:3; 11 :7). Given this, therefore, one should learn only to 
pursue the things or events that one can potentially affect. Thus Confucius 
criticised Tzu for not accepting his lot and for indulging in speculation even 
though Tzu was often correct in his speculation and it increased his wealth. 
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In this connection, Lau offers an enlightening interpretation of Analects 
20:3: "A man cannot become a chun tzu unless he knows ming''. The phrase 
"knowing ming" (chih ming), according to Lau, looks very much like 
Confucius' statement regarding himself at fifty: chih t'ien ming. Lau argues 
that the two concepts are actually quite different: while chih t'ien ming is "to 
understand why Heaven should so decree ... ", "chiming' refers to knowing 
and understanding " .. that certain things in life come under the sway of 
Destiny and that it is futile to pursue them. "13 
Lau's analysis is clearly consistent with many passages in the 
Analects where Confucius is described as refusing to engage in speculation 
(Analects 6:20; 7:9; 7:20; 9:1). In this connection, then, it could be said that 
part of the Confucian enterprise is to sort out what kinds of things are within 
human control and, more pointedly, which aspects of (the existing chaotic) 
socio-political life could be rectified through human efforts. Confucius clearly 
stated that wealth or poverty, honour and (the occurrence of) life and death 
were beyond human control. A distinctive feature of Confucius' thought is that 
these aspects of human life are not only not to be a hindrance, but also that 
they are irrelevant to one's self cultivation. Clearly, while there are some 
limits to self-cultivation, poverty and low-birth were not (to be) limiting insofar 
as education and learning were concerned. 
With regard to the concept of human nature (hsing), there is similarly little 
emphasis on defining the concept; the concept was only evoked when it was 
instrumental to demonstrating a need for self-cultivation. Indeed, there is only 
one instance in the Analects when Confucius is recorded as having explicitly 
used the term 'hsing': 
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By nature humans are alike, through cultivation they become different 
(Analects 17:2). 
It seems that the purpose of this passage, in referring to hsing, was not to 
directly comment on it but rather to stress the necessity for educating and 
developing oneself. It needs to be noted that difficulty in translating this 
passage is encountered not only as regards the term hsing14 but also with the 
terms xi (practice) and jin (translated 'alike' here, but could also mean 'near'). 
Legge, who provides another interpretation, argues that the term used here 
refers not to moral constitution alone but includes the complex combination of 
material, animal and intellectual aspects as well. He states that it is 
suggested in this passage that it is through association with these other 
faculties that the moral element of human nature is led astray. He argues that 
the Confucian conceives the intrinsic moral element to be similar in all human 
beings, while the other three faculties differ, albeit only slightly. These three 
faculties develop differently among different individuals and thus variously 
influence the individual's moral nature.15 Legge's interpretation, however, 
imposes on the concept a structure: moral, animal, material and intellectual; 
categories which do not exist in the Analects. In addition, given the 
vagueness of the statement, even in its original Chinese, it is perhaps more 
useful to recognise the futility of authoritative definition and to examine the 
concept within its contexts of use. 
There are other passages in the Analects which seem to contradict the 
passage 17:2. For example, in 16:9, although there is no reference to the 
term hsing itself, there is an allusion to some people being born with the 
possession of knowledge, while others are not: 
Confucius said, "Those born with possession of knowledge are the 
highest of persons. Those who learn and, as a result, attain 
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knowledge, are the next. Those who require much effort in learning, 
and, though not thoroughly understanding, do learn, are yet another 
category. Those who require much effort in learning and do not learn 
are the lowest of the lot." 
It could be plausibly argued that Confucius here is more focused on the effort 
to learn rather than the abilities that some are born with and others without. 
Thus, while there may be some who are born with the possession of 
knowledge, what matters most is that each person has a concern for 
learning. Indeed, other passages in the Analects which discuss differences 
among persons has a similar focus on learning without any reference to any 
inherent state. Thus in 17:3, Confucius remarks that "only the wisest and the 
most stupid do not, and cannot change", because, presumably, the former 
are too wise to allow a decline in their knowledge or wisdom and the latter 
are too stupid to improve themselves. There is a concern therefore not with 
what one might be inherently born with but with existential differences: 
There are some with whom we may study but not to study or 
understand principles with; there are some with whom we may 
together understand principles but not be established with; there are 
some with whom we may be established with and yet unable to weigh 
(assess) events and situations with. (Analects 9:29). 
It is difficult to offer an accurate rendering of the above passage and to work 
out what Confucius meant exactly by 'being established with' or 'to weigh 
events with'. The point being made here, however, is that there are marked 
differences between people-and that those differences be maintained. This 
is similar to Confucius' statement regarding friendship that some people may 
be friends while others not, depending on their stages of development 
(Analects 1 :8.3) 16. 
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This radical differentiation of persons is balanced by Confucius' belief 
in the availability of self-cultivation for all people. In many passages in the 
Analects, he makes the point that with regard to teaching or, more 
specifically, the willingness to teach others, there is, and should be, no 
differentiation of categories (of persons) (Analects 15:38). Poverty or inferior 
social status (Analects 8:21; 7:7) should not be a hindrance to learning and, 
accordingly, is not a valid reason for a teacher to not want to teach a pupil: 
"In teaching there should be no distinction of classes" (Analects 15:38)17. 
Similarly, Confucius himself had 'low' beginnings, being born neither of 
nobility nor of wealth and was yet able to develop his various abilities 
(Analects 9:6). The view that self cultivation is a possibility for every person is 
also maintained in another classical Confucian text: 
The way which the chun tzu pursues reaches wide and far, and is yet 
secret. Common men and women, however ignorant, may intermeddle 
with the knowledge of it; yet in its utmost reaches, there is that which 
even the sage does not know. Common men and women, however 
much below the ordinary standard of character, can carry it into 
practice; yet in its utmost reaches, there is that which even the sage is 
not able to carry into practice ... The way of the chun tzu may be 
found, in its simple elements, in the interaction of common men and 
women; but in its utmost reaches, it shines brightly through heaven 
and earth. (Chung-yung, 12) 18 
Because he believed in an equal potential, in each person, to develop 
himself, Confucius played down the notion of the divinely-inspired ruler while 
articulating his idea of a cultivated gentleman, the 'chun tzu', who, regardless 
of beginnings or origins, had successfully cultivated himself (although there is 
no end to this process of cultivation). Confucius reworked the scope of 
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application of the term 'chun tzu' to include those who were not born into 
noble lineage but who, instead, had successfully cultivated themselves. Prior 
to the time of Confucius, chun tzu referred to men of noble birth; their rank 
and status was accorded by virtue of their noble lineage. 
W. Scott Morton discusses Confucius' modification of the term and, with a 
statistical count, shows that 'chun tzu' was used 90 times in the (pre-
Confucian) Book of Odes, out of which only 16 uses, or 18% of uses were in 
the ethical sense. In the Analects, however, the term was used 65 times, with 
62 times or 95% being used in the ethical sense. He concludes that 
Confucius had transformed the meaning of chun tzu to refer to people who, 
regardless of status at birth, had cultivated themselves. 19 
Thus, while Confucius recognised the fact that human beings are 
socially, morally and intellectually different, he maintained the equal potential 
of every human being (one might say that this potential is inherent in human 
nature) to cultivate themselves. Therefore, self development consists in 
improving or working on the nature that one already has by virtue of being 
human; to this effect Confucius remarked thatjen is near or, one might say, 
at hand (Analects 7:29; also 19:6). 
2.1.2 Humanity: Jen 
The conceptjen is a dominant theme in Confucianism, although it occurs in 
other Chinese philosophies as well. In Chinese Buddhism, jen has long been 
used as an honorific for the Buddha, for a worthy person, for a temple or a 
pagoda. In ancient Taoist classics (notably in Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu), jen 
was severely denounced as hypocrisy, but it was eventually incorporated into 
the Taoist ethical system as a cardinal virtue (by Ko Hung, 284- 363). It is 
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mentioned only occasionally in pre-Confucian texts, and in all these cases it 
denotes the particular virtue of kindness, especially the kindness of a ruler to 
his subjects. 
Jen, however, is essentially a Confucian concept occupying a fundamental 
position in the Analects; 58 of its 499 chapters are devoted to the discussion 
of jen and the term appears 105 times.20 Although Confucius made jen the 
central theme of his conversations, he never defined the term. Thus, the best 
description that could be attempted is an examination of the way it was used 
by Confucius in its various contexts in the Analects and other Classical 
Confucian texts. 
The etymology of jen is composed of, on the left half, the character 
signifying 'human', and on the right half, the character signifying 'two'. It thus 
suggests not only the relatedness between at least two beings belonging to 
the human species, but, more importantly, their interdependence. It is 
recorded in the Analects 1:4 of one of Confucius' disciples that his self-
examination consisted in evaluating his relationships with others, this practice 
being based on the idea that the individual in relation to others constitutes an 
important element in self-evaluation. The idea of human relatedness is based 
on the Confucian theme that human life is meaningful only if one is a 
participating member of a community. 
There is, therefore, a distinct sense thatjen is connected with morality, 
although it is not a merely behaviourist conception of morality that jen should 
be identified with. Jen involves a more substantial, fuller account of being 
human-whereby morality is but one, albeit an important, aspect-which 
takes into account the character of the agent and, more generally, the way 
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human beings should live. It is a quality so fundamental to human life that life 
itself should be sacrificed to preserve it (Analects 15:8). 
Even though jen is an essential quality of human life, Confucius 
remarks, in Analects 3:3 and 4:2, of the possibility of losing one's jen. This 
means that one could cease being jen or, in other words, being human. What 
these two passages give a sense of is that one has to work atjen, that is, at 
being human. The process of self cultivation, according to Confucius himself, 
is exceedingly difficult. Yet, it seems merely to require personal commitment 
(strength): 
I have not seen a person who loved jen, or one who hated what was 
non- (or not) jen. He who loved jen would esteem nothing above it. He 
who hated what is non- (or not) jen would practice jen in such a way 
that he would not allow anything that is notjen to approach his person. 
Is any one able for one day to apply his strength to jen? I have not 
seen any one without sufficient strength to do so. Perhaps there is 
such a case, but I have never seen it. (Analects 4:6; see also 15:3; 
15:12). 
The difficulty of attaining, or of being jen, is further expressed in Analects 
14:30, where Confucius states an almost impossible situation: the man of jen, 
being virtuous, is free from anxieties; being a man of wisdom he is free from 
perplexities; and being a man of courage, he is free from fear. Several 
concepts are linked in this passage: virtue, wisdom and a Jack of perplexity or 
anxiety amounting to ease in action and in dealing with human affairs?1 In 
Analects 4:2; 4:3; 4:5.3; 9:13, jen is associated with other virtues such as 
wisdom and strength; in Analects 12:1 ,2,3, it has to do with moral 
behaviour.22 This quality which marks out the distinctiveness of the human 
species serves also to identify beings belonging to that species. In other 
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words, jen is both the distinguishing and distinctive characteristic of all 
humanity. 
Jen, however, is not a mere capacity either, for it is to apply in all 
situations. This is clearly stated in Analects 4:5.3: "the chun tzu does not 
even during a meal cease to act according to jen; in instances of haste and 
danger, he acts by it." Jen cannot be conceived of as a mere aggregate of 
virtues; in Analects 12:1; 12:2; 12:3; 17:9, Confucius utilises various different 
concepts to elaborate on whatjen would encompass: these provide important 
but not sufficient insights into the nature of jen. It encompasses more than 
the merely moral and the one sense of jen which is consistent with a// its uses 
in the Analects is that it is the substratum, the source of all human virtue, of 
which the moral is but a part. Jen appears to represent the ultimate moral 
achievement in personal, social and cultural life. The meaning of jen 
integrates other important ideas such as affection, community and 
relatedness. 
Because different human relationships have their own contexts of 
meaning and appropriateness, it is not possible, Confucius felt, to have 
lawlike rules of behaviour which generalised over individuals or situations. 
For these reasons, Confucius never attempted to define jen; he used the 
term differently in different contexts. It could also be argued that Confucius' 
lack of definition of jen demonstrates that he wanted the term to have an 
indeterminate range of reference. To define the term would restrict its 
application, for in its most general sense, jen refers to the human. Confucian 
philosophy is a humanistic philosophy; its focus is on human life within its 
lived reality. It seriously narrows the Confucian enterprise to think of it merely 
as a moral philosophy and consequently to characterise it according to the 
categories appropriate only to moral philosophy in the Western philosophical 
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tradition. Consequently, the individual-society distinction exists only on the 
theoretical level; jen, because it is manifest as shared humanity, can only be 
cultivated and developed within the context of the human community.23 1n this 
connection, because li upheld the hierarchies and powers which propelled 
human social life and further facilitated human social behaviour, it was 
inseparably linked with jen throughout the Analects. The next section focuses 
on li. 
2.1.3 Norms of Social Interaction: Li 
The term li was used in pre-Confucian literature (in the Shu Ching and the 
Shih Ching) to denote ritualistic religious behaviour toward spiritual beings for 
the purpose of inducing supernatural protection and blessing.24 
Etymologically, the term is composed of two halves: 'religious' and 
'sacrificial vessel'. Even before Confucius' time, however, the scope of 
application of the term had already been extended (in the Tso Chuan and the 
Shih Ching) such that it was used to refer as well to the norms guiding 
appropriate social behaviour. Confucius continued this usage of li. Thus, for 
instance, Tsu-hsia, one of Confucius' disciples, argued that if the chun tzu 
were to act toward others according to /i, all within the 'four seas' would be 
brothers (Analects 12:5.4). 
Because /i is described in some passages of the Analects primarily in 
behaviourist terms, some commentators have understood lias purely 
formalistic ritual devoid of deeper significance. In addition, li have been 
criticised as (unnecessarily) rigid and as upholding a hierarchical social 
structure with a view to subjugating the peoples.25 
These criticisms stem partly from (particular conceptions of) the 
Confucian construction of five relationships as forming the primary structure 
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of social reality: sovereign-subject; father-son; husband-wife; elder brother-
younger brother; friend-friend ( Chung-yung 20:8) as being the basic and 
important ones, and that the cultivation of these relationships are the proper 
paths to be taken by all under heaven. 
Of these five basic relationships within human society, only one is a 
relationship between equals; the other four relationships are marked by the 
difference in statuses between a superior (sovereign-, father-, husband-, and 
elder brother) and an inferior or junior (subject, son, wife and younger 
brother). Li serve to mark out these differentiated roles; they support and 
uphold these hierarchies. However, Confucius stated explicitly the 
indispensability of li in all human relationships at all levels of the social 
hierarchy. He also commented on the proper use of li and also on actions 
which violated li.26 
There is, in addition, a clear connection between order in society and 
the practice of li by the people in that the codes and norms of behaviour 
serve to maintain the socio-political hierarchy; this in turn means that people 
differentiated according to their roles in society do not overstep the social 
boundaries. 
This strictly hierarchical construction of relationships was further 
supported by li: actions were considered appropriate or inappropriate 
according to one's status in a particular relationship. In this connection, the 
most important relationship, according to Confucius, is the father-son 
relationship; it is the one on which all other relationships are modelled. 
Therefore, filial piety, couched in terms of the father-son relationship, is the 
important guiding principle in parent-child relationships and is the root of both 
li (Analects 2:5) and jen (Analects 1 :2). The encouragement to a son to 
conceal the crime of the father (Analects 13:8) violates values of honesty and 
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responsibility to the larger society but seems to be accepted with simple 
conviction by Confucius, a conviction grounded in the belief that the son's 
response is a mere reflection of the natural order. Confucius, and especially 
Mencius, believed that the family setting would provide the individual with the 
ideal environment in which to begin self cultivation. Mencius went further 
emphasising that, given the biological connection between the parents and 
the child, love for one's parents is innate, and that this love is the feeling of 
filial piety (Mencius 7 A: 15). 
The view that the Confucians sought through lito establish and perpetuate 
hierarchy was also advanced by the Legalists. Their accusation was that 
within the Confucian system, authority was maintained by the partiality of li. 
As the Legalists saw it, social order should be maintained by legal rules 
which did not make concessions for those higher on the social and/or moral 
scale. The function of law, the Legalists felt, was to obliterate the already-
existing hierarchies present in their society. 
Admittedly, Confucius did seem to be protecting the nobility because 
in 513 B.C., when the state of Chin set out to publicise the penal laws, 
Confucius criticised, saying, "Chin is going to ruin. It has lost its (proper) rules 
(of administration) ... people will study the tripods, and not care to know their 
men of rank. And what profession can the superiors keep?". 27 This complaint 
of Confucius' reflects the ideology of nobles who felt that the move towards 
legalisation threatened their authority as a ruling class.28 Based on these 
comments, it might be warranted to contend that Confucius sought to uphold 
hierarchy and protect the elite minority. 
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However, that provides only part of Confucius' rationale regarding good 
government. More specifically, the understanding of lias rigid and formalistic 
rules ignores Confucius' insistent emphasis, appearing many times in the 
Analects, that it was especially the ruling nobility, with their pronounced 
responsibilities, who needed to be morally responsible for their conduct. 
Thus, Confucius' stance against rule by law was based on the assumption 
(hope?) that the nobles were expected to have already successfully 
cultivated themselves. Motivationally, li are distinguished from laws because 
li are those through which the character is established. More important, 
though, li stem from jen (Analects 3:3), whereas laws do not. A people ruled 
by laws will have no sense of shame, even although wrongdoing is generally 
avoided (Analects 2:3), and this sense of shame is crucial to the cultivated 
life. Confucius states, "I have not yet seen one who could perceive his faults, 
and inwardly accuse himself' (Analects 5:26).29 
Thus, to view the concept of li in the Analects, as referring to strict, 
rigid rules which uphold the social hierarchy and protect the ruling minority 
while legitimating domination of the common people is to misunderstand 
Confucius' use of the term. It could be argued that Confucius was idealistic to 
think that there would be chun tzu who were paradigms of moral excellence 
and responsibility and who could, through their moral achievements, 
influence the common people. Confucius commented regarding government 
that if one were to advance the upright and to hold back the wrongdoers, the 
people would follow (Analects 2: 19): if the ruler were serious (about his task) 
the people would respect him; if he were filial and kind, they would be loyal to 
him; if he advanced the good and taught the incompetent, they would be 
diligent in their quest to be good. (Analects 2:20; see also 12:19). Therefore, 
idealistic though Confucius was, it cannot be maintained, even from the 
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sayings in the Analects alone, that the Confucian li was just a system of 
formalistic hierarchy-maintaining codes. 
According to the Analects, the li are norms of conduct which have gradually 
been established through tradition and custom and they assist people in 
acting appropriately in relationships. Li serve to regulate the correctness and 
decorum appropriate to interactions between people related to each other in 
various different ways. In Analects 8:2.1, li are viewed as being necessary to 
social behaviour and, indeed, as providing an aesthetic sheen to human 
interaction: 
Respect without li is labour wasted; carefulness without li is timidity; 
courage without li is intimidation; straightforwardness without /i is 
rudeness. 
Lias used by Confucius retains a sense of ritual behaviour, a sense of ritual 
that actually provides for more than the p1:1rely formal and that does have 
deeper moral and cultural significance. This is indicated in Confucius' 
comment in Analects 15:4 that Shun, one of the sage-kings, had governed 
efficiently without exertion; he did nothing except to face south: the ruler's 
ritual posture. Indeed, in this passage, the two aspects of /i-ritualistic and 
social-are assimilated such that the ruler who governs according to li does 
so effortlessly and yet efficiently. The analogy between li in the ritualistic and 
in the social senses could be drawn based on several points of similarity. An 
explication of the similarities will help in elucidating Confucius' conception of 
li. Five similarities will be discussed. 
First, the practice of ritual assumes interaction between at least two parties, 
often between the human and the divine. On the more practical level, li guide 
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human interaction and the practice of li presupposes at least two parties; " ... 
the problem of li does not even occur when one has absolutely nothing to 
relate to".30 Secondly, ritual behaviour is patterned and therefore, as the term 
'ritual' itself denotes, becomes, after some practice, polished and is also 
carried out with a certain ease. Acting according to li within the Confucian 
community allows one to participate in social 'ceremony': one becomes 
socially competent and interacts with others-understanding what is required 
in a variety of situations within a variety of relationships-with seeming 
effortlessness (see Analects 14:30). 31 The third similarity is that while the 
performance of ritual is disciplined and is carried out according to the rules 
pertaining to the ritual, lias norms of appropriateness governing social 
behaviour involve discipline. Reflecting at one point on the onerous task of 
self cultivation, Confucius wonders, sceptically, whether there is any person 
with sufficient strength and determination to attain this condition (Analects 
4:6; 8:7; 15:3; 15:12). Fourthly, both ritual and li are meaningful, in different 
ways, in their immediate and larger contexts. For example, the specific ritual 
of food offerings to ancestor spirits at the family altar has its immediate 
significance for the members of that family participating in that ritual. On the 
other hand, in the larger and more inclusive context, ancestor worship has 
social significance as well, reflecting a community's cultures, ways of life and 
philosophies. Li have exactly these two levels of meaning as well: in an 
immediate sense for the participants-the people involved in a relationship-
whereby, say, one treats the other with respect; and, within the larger 
community, where the notion of respect for persons is upheld and within 
which that particular act of respect is manifest. Finally, a very important 
similarity between ritual and social interaction as guided by li, according to 
Confucius, is the 'spirit' with which one performs that action;" ... by its 
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essentially humanistic-religious and aesthetic origin, by its very nature an act 
of li is expressive and indicative of one's cultivated, native human emotion or 
feeling, which Confucius calledjen".32 Accordingly, it is recorded (in Analects 
3:12) that Confucius sacrificed to the spirits of the dead (ancestors), and to 
the gods, as if they were present. He also commented that if he did not 
participate in the ritual, then it is as if he did not sacrifice at all. Fingarette33 
presents li has having some 'magical' quality in the sense that when it is 
practised, relationships function smoothly and social life is seen as 
'ceremony'. Although Fingarette's thesis has been variously criticised, it does 
provide an interesting perspective from which to understand the mechanism 
of li. Furthermore, it is hard to dispute his point that li are significantly related 
to the relationships each individual has.34 
Indeed, as Confucius often insisted, li are varied and variable and are 
manifest differently depending on the situation and the people involved. For 
example, there are instances where Confucius recounts how he modified 
various li in relation to worship in the ancestral temple in Analects 9:3.35 It is 
thus not appropriate to categorise li in terms of 'rightness' or of 'moral 
correctness'; nor are li merely rules of correct social behaviour: Confucius did 
not care about outward show (Analects 17:21). Rather, his focus is on the 
value of human action and, in that context, on whether one has acted 
appropriately in a situation given the nature of the relationship, and taking 
into account the characters of the people involved in that relationship. The 
focus of Ji is the human relationship rather than correct social behaviour. 
Because of this focus, there is flexibility in the application of oneself to 
the variety of situations and relationships in human life. A.S. Cua, who offers 
liberal readings of Confucian morality, explains this flexibility in terms of the 
ching-chuan principle.36 Ching is 'an invariable rule, a standard of conduct, 
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constant, recurring'; while chuan pertains to 'exigency, circumstances, that 
which is irregular, and opposed to ching, that which is constant or normal-
from this comes, therefore, the idea of temporary'. Applied to moral theory, 
Cua suggests, the doctrine of ching-chuan is a theory of the normal and the 
exigent, or the exceptional. While the former is an 'invariable rule in the sense 
of a rule regularly and invariably applied to situations or actions that fall within 
the scope of its application', the latter applies in situations in real life that 
'appear to fall outside the scope of the application of rules'. Cua's description 
allows a certain flexibility in moral practice that strict deontological and rule-
based theories will not admit since flexibility invariably leads to a sense of 
arbitrariness with regard to the application of a rule or principle. The 
argument for a reading of lias not purely formalistic, yet not totally contingent 
on the whims of the moral (or immoral) agent, is further substantiated in the 
next section in which a connection is drawn betweenjen and li. 
2.1.4 If a Man is Without Jen, What has He To Do With Li?37 
U and jen are linked together inseparably in the Analects. What is debatable, 
however, is the nature of that connection. There are three basic positions that 
could be adopted. The first is thatjen is more fundamental; the second that li 
is more fundamental; and the third that the two are interdependent and each 
is as important as the other. It will be argued here that the third view is most 
consistent with the relevant passages in the Analects. 
Tu Wei-ming's conception of the connection between jen and li is thatjen is 
more fundamental. He characterises jen as a concept of 'personal morality' .38 
This, however, could be misleading because there is no sense at all of 
personal morality-in the sense of individual virtue-in Confucian philosophy. 
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If by 'personal morality' Tu means inner disposition as opposed to observable 
behaviour, it could be plausibly argued that, consistent with the Analects, jen 
refers to an inner or internal aspect of human action pertaining to a person's 
character. In this sense, it is largely correct to say of Confucius' ideas thatjen 
is the 'inner' or internal aspect or component-simply because it is what 
being human is all about-while /i is the 'outer' or outward manifestation of 
jen because /i is ontologically grounded in the natural order of the world in 
general and of human relationships in particular. 
It needs to be noted, however, that to say that one concept pertains to 
the 'inner' feeling or disposition while the other is an 'outer' manifestation is 
not to imply that the former is therefore more fundamental and is a higher 
order concept. It seems that Tu's conceptualisation of li andjen is thatjen is 
both 'inner' and more fundamental than /i. Thus, while he argues thatjen and 
li are interdependent in an important way-there is a creative tension: lias 
externalisation of jen; lias principle of particularism that signify jen, he also 
maintains that " ... jen as an inner morality is not caused by the mechanism of 
li from outside. It is higher-order concept which gives meaning to /i.'039 
If, by 'personal morality', Tu means the enterprise of human 
development which involves individual search for autonomy as opposed to 
learning within an intersubjective context, then it is inconsistent with the 
Analects. Tu's usage of the phrase 'personal morality'-he remarks that "as a 
concept of personal morality, jen is used to describe the highest human 
achievement ever reached through moral self-cultivation'o40-is not sufficiently 
clear in indicating what he means. Furthermore, he concedes at one point 
that the concept 'personal morality' was not necessarily a category in 
Confucian thought. 
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The only sense in which jen involves the concept of the 'self is in the 
context of human self cultivation. The term 'self in self cultivation (hsiu cht) 
could mean only that individual effort is important. From the Confucian point 
of view, the cultivation of the isolated individual self, not only as independent 
from, but also as unconnected with, other persons, is meaningless and 
impossible. 
Thus, while it theoretically might be possible to isolate the 'self from 
'other', the process of self-cultivation is the cultivation of the self-in-relation; it 
is not possible practically to isolate the individual self from its web of 
relationships. Cua expresses this sentiment in "Tasks of Confucian Ethics"41 
when he states that "Jen as an ideal theme in part pertains to the 
psychological condition of responsive agency. Methodologically, the practice 
and development of jen begins at the personal level ... What is personal from 
the Confucian viewpoint can, and ultimately must, have a public or 
interpersonal import. Jen, as an ideal, involves relation between men rooted 
in the agents' conscientious and continuing effort at self cultivation." That the 
idea that the 'self in self cultivation is meant as an emphasis on personal 
effort rather than on the personal development of the agent is also affirmed 
by Fingarette at two instances: first, he points out that in Analects 14:45, 
'cultivate' in hsiu chi does not have oneself as the object42; secondly, he 
argues that 'self cultivation' does not receive any philosophical centrality in 
the Analects and that any focus on self cultivation is not on the self as some 
item of 'ultimate or generalised significance', but rather, it is to encourage one 
to cultivate cerlain traits.43 
Finally, Tu's conception of the jen-/i connection is problematic 
especially in light of a passage in the Analects (which Tu himself discusses, 
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but does not later take into consideration) which suggests that one learns to 
be jen through conducting life according to li: 
kechi fu li isjen ... (12:1) 
The interpretation of this phrase is, to say the least, contentious. While ke 
means to overcome and fu means to live according to, ke chi has often been 
(mistakenly) transcribed as overcoming the self. This translation imposes on 
the Confucian text a devaluation of the physical body and its selfish desires, 
a view which owes more to Buddhism and/or certain strains in Western 
philosophy than to Confucianism. 44 
Tu rightly denies that it is a Confucian idea that one should "engage in 
a bitter struggle with one's own desires"45 and consequently identifies kechi 
with self cultivation (hsiu shen). Regarding fu /i, Tu rejects the idea that it 
means "to submit to rituals'.46; he proposes that, in a more authentically 
classical Confucian sense, fu li implies active participation. 
While Tu's analysis of "ke chi fu II" is largely consistent with the 
Analects, he does not seem to have brought the implications of the last-
mentioned passage to bear on his discussion on the jen-li connection. 
There is another perspective on the passage in question offered by Shun 
Kwong-Loi which reveals an insightful analysis of the phrase. 47 Shun makes 
the point that the meaning of the phrase is dependent on whether one is to 
take chi or chi fu lias the subject of ke. While the former focuses on the self 
as subject needing to be worked upon, the latter implies a less absolute 
alignment of oneself with li. 
Regardless of the interpretation of ke, Shun goes on to say, this 
passage in the Analects, together with 12:2 and also 1 :2 and 2:5 together, 
could be cited to support what he terms a 'definitionalist interpretation' of the 
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jen-li connection. On this interpretation, Shun states, " ... li can be 
characterized independently of jen but not vice versa ... it is the observance 
of /iwhich has ultimate value, from which the value of being the kind of 
person who generally observes li is derived.'118 This account is a version of 
the more general view referred to above that li occupy a more fundamental 
position than jen in Confucius' thought. 
The definitionalist interpretation of the jen-li connection poses a 
challenge to Tu's position, which, according to Shun's terminology, would be 
classified as instrumentalist. This latter interpretation, according to Shun, 
holds that "Jen has evaluative priority over li ... It isjen alone which has 
ultimate value, and the value of the existence of li practices in society, and of 
an individual's observing such practices, is derived from the instrumental role 
li plays with regard to jen. "49 
Shun's discussion of definitionalist and instrumentalist interpretations 
of the connection between jen and li is situated within the larger context of his 
thesis that there are, indeed, passages in the Analects to support each of 
these accounts. He proposes that, although the Analects is not authentically 
Confucius' or even Confucian, there is a way of construing the jen-li 
connection which sees jen and li not as merely interdependent but also as 
integral to each other. Furthermore, Shun argues, his characterisation of the 
jen-li connection takes into account all relevant passages in the Analects 
such that the text could be understood as a whole. 
Shun's thesis implies an internalist connection between 'inner' jen and 
'manifest' li. This connection is explicated via the analogy of the connection 
between the mastery of a concept and the mastery of a certain linguistic 
practice. While having mastery of a concept (likened to jen) is like having the 
capacity to have thoughts of a certain kind, having mastery of a linguistic 
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practice (likened to It) is like having " ... the capacity to use a language 
correctly in appropriate circumstances and to respond in appropriate ways to 
its use."50 
Given this connection, Shun proceeds to argue that the mastery of a 
concept is given verbal expression within a certain community; within this 
community mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice is both necessary 
and sufficient for the mastery of the concept. A person's mastery of the 
concept and mastery of the corresponding linguistic practice are not merely 
causally related; indeed, one cannot have one but not the other of the two 
capacities. 
There are four important observations if this analogy is applied to the 
jen-Ji connection. First, with respect to sacrifices to ancestors, for example, 
the participation in such while observing Ji is both necessary and sufficient for 
one's attitude of reverence toward ancestors Uen). Secondly, the attitude can 
be instantiated in other communities with different conventional practices 
associated with the attitudes. Thirdly, there is scope for revision of the 
existing practices because " ... the possession ofthe attitude ... provides a 
perspective from which revision of the existing ritual practices can be 
assessed.'.s1 Finally, revision of existing practices, although possible, will be 
limited by a somewhat conservative approach since such revision has to be 
intersubjectively validated. 
Shun's particularly precise rendition of the possession of jen and the 
observance of li brings together all the relevant passages on jen and li in the 
Analects. In addition, it reflects the tone of the Analects in that although 
Confucius did use jen in the sense of 'inner' component to the 'outer' 
manifestation of li in passages in the Analects, he wanted to eliminate this 
distinction when it came to practical action in the sense that he sought to 
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argue that to embody one without having the other would be meaningless. 
For how could the shared human elementjen ever be realised if it were not 
also manifest within the human community? Likewise, acting according to li 
without comprehending its meaning and understanding its significance is 
nothing more than empty formalism {Analects 3:26; 3:4.3; 17:11). It is in this 
connection that we begin to understand why Confucius never attempted to 
definejen, for jen " ... almost by definition requires concrete manifestation".52 
The necessity of a social and cultural context for the expression of jan-
actions which give heed to the details of performance and style (II), is 
captured in Cua's view that: 
Li appears to be the convention that defines the form and possibility of 
moral actions. In this sense, li defines the conventionally accepted 
style of actions, i.e. the form and possibility of moral achievement 
within the cultural setting, or what may be termed 'cultural lifestyle' ... 
In a more contemporary idiom, we may express this idea in terms of 
the tie or contact of an individual agent's actions with the cultural form 
of life which gives them the locus of identification and the possibility of 
moral achievement. 53 
Cua's explication of the connection between jen and li allows for 
modifications to be made to li and, at the same time, emphasises its 
intersubjective aspect. It can be said, therefore, that li derive from a variety of 
sources including one's motivational and intentional states (although these 
categories are not Confucian); intersubjective norms and standards; and 
established values. These established standards have evolved from the 
ethical and aesthetic insights of those who have experienced similar 
situations in the past. It is in this connection that Confucius comments that he 
is a transmitter. Adaptable to changing situations, li have a polyphonic 
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meaning and mean more than mere social convention. Indeed, they could be 
characterised as "aesthetic expression[s] of natural human feeling", denoting 
" ... only those patterns or norms of social behaviour that tend to mutually 
exalt the character and dignity of the participants"54. 
Understood in this light, it can be seen that although Confucius was 
more concerned with social expedience than moral absolutes, his work does 
not reduce moral norms to social norms. The status quo, empty formalism 
and the pursuit of harmony are explicitly rejected; acts according to li are to 
be accompanied by an attitude of reverence (ching) (Analects 1 :12; 3:26). 
Thus, Confucius remarked that the outward show of giving gifts of jade and 
silk-obviously accepted social practice in Confucius' time-does not 
constitute /i (Analects 17:11). Similarly, superficiality is condemned not only 
at the personal level but, more importantly, at the level of the community. So, 
the good villager," ... who, though he acted as if he were following the 
Confucian norms, was actually only following convention without consciously 
engaging in moral practice at all",55 is despised as being a 'thief of virtue'. 
One's character is revealed through both the means and the ends of 
one's projects and activities: 
Look at the means a man employs, observe his reasons or motives, 
examine where/what he takes his rest or feels at home in. How can his 
character be hidden? (Analects 2:1 0) 
When applied to the jen-li connection, Confucius can be understood to be 
expressing an internalist connection between motivation and action and, in 
that context, between jen and li. It is through actions according to /i-
including the accompanying attitude of reverence-that we might say of a 
man that he embodies jen. However, li are not merely the vehicle for the 
expression of jen because li actions, importantly, allow for the development of 
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jen through careful and thoughtful internalisation of existing practices and 
teachings. Confucius criticised thoughtlessness: 
To learn without thinking through is effort wasted ... (Analects 2:15) 
He wanted his students to express opinions and to dialogue with him, 
condemning uncritical acceptance of his views: 
Hui is of no help to me because he is pleased with everything I say. 
(Analects 11 :3) 
Thus, one learns about the codes of conduct operative in one's social 
environment and carefully and diligently selects the ones which are relevant 
to and which are important in the conduct of one's roles in the community. 
This dynamic connection between jen and li is expressed in the Master's 
statement that: 
Where nature (substance) exceeds cultivation (culture) there is crudity; 
where refinement exceeds nature there is antiquarianism; where 
cultivation and nature are correctly balanced, we have the chun tzu. 
(Analects 6:16) 
The chun tzu needs to strike a balance between internalising everything that 
is social or cultural and expressing what is (innately) human. The last 
passage implies the futility of formalism in general and specifically condemns 
inflexible conservatism. Together with Analects 6:25-the chun tzu who has 
extensively studied culture and who abides by li still holds to what he believes 
is right---6:16 provides a fuller picture of /ithan just the simplistic conception 
that they are rigid codes which are, in effect, tools of social control. Li function 
as the catalyst for transmitting the jen embodied in each person to a 
harmonious community; they allow for jen to be properly contextualised. 
In an ideal Confucian community, the chun tzu has successfully 
cultivated himself within his communal context; the experience is an 
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intersubjective one and his success is measured in terms of the ease with 
which he deals with others (see Analects 14:30). This manifests itself in the 
quality of the relationships he has. The ideal Confucian community is 
constituted by people in meaningful and functional relationships. According to 
the Confucians, the training process begins within the context of the family. 
2.1.5 Filial Piety: Hsiao 
Hsiao is another important concept in Confucian thought. As with other 
Confucian concepts in the Analects, it is characterised in a variety of ways. It 
is most crudely portrayed, in 2:5, as obeying parents' wishes. In 2:7 and 2:8, 
however, hsiao is understood more expansively. Thus, it is said that it is not 
enough to constitute hsiao merely to support one's parents or to extend them 
courtesies such as offering them food first or to undertake their tasks. The 
most significant of this series of passages 2:5 to 2:8 is 2:6, whereby 
Confucius remarks that" ... parents are anxious lest their children should be 
sick"56. This passage provides a different perspective to filial piety from the 
other passages; it strongly suggests that filial piety is not a requirement of 
children toward parents alone but that the term implies that parents have 
responsibilities as well; namely, to demonstrate to their children the concern 
and love appropriate to the parent-child relationship. 57 
Although the Confucians felt that the range of relationships into which 
one enters needs to be differentiated according to priority and the type of 
responsibilities involved, the basis for asserting the priority of hsiao (upon 
which other relationships are modelled) is the idea that one's immediate 
family is the natural starting point from which one establishes other valuable 
and worthwhile relationships. Emphasising the biological connection between 
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parents and children, Mencius made this point explicitly. He went as far as to 
assert that love for one's own parents is innate, and that this love is the 
feeling of filial piety (Mencius, 7 A: 15). In addition, filial piety is the germination 
or starting point of the gradually expanding virtue, the universal love of 
humankind. 
Mencius' definition of 'universal love' was very different from that of the 
Moists'. According to the latter, universal love was love which applied 
unconditionally and impartially to all human beings, regardless of their 
relationship to the moral agent. Mo Tzu (479- 438 B.C.), the leader of the 
Moists, argued that love should be without distinction and that everyone 
should be loved equally. 
It is questionable, however, whether Moist universal love was totally 
unselfish, because Mo Tzu upheld a deeply utilitarian theory regarding its 
effects; he proposes all-embracing love for its utility, expressing, "He who 
loves others must also be loved by others. He who benefrts others must also 
be benefited by others. He who hates others must also be hated by others."58 
Mencius found this concept totally unacceptable; he asserted that the 
Moist universal love was deeply flawed because there is a special 
relationship with one's father and with one's ruler: 
The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the world. If the people in their 
opinions do not follow Yang Chu, they follow Mo Ti. Yang advocated 
egoism, which means a denial of the special relationship with the ruler. 
Mo advocated universal love which means a denial of the special 
relationship with the father. To deny the special relationship with the 
father and the ruler is to become an animal. (Mencius 38:9). 
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Mencius' discussion of relationships is limited in scope because it is restricted 
only to one's (the male person's) relationships with the father and with the 
ruler. It is possible, however, to extend the scope of the discussion to include 
the whole range of possible relationships on the basis that the family context 
is considered the natural training ground for the formation of all one's 
relationships. Care and concern is first developed within the family and is to 
be applied, later, to relationships with those not within the family. It needs to 
be noted that the priority of family relationships over extra-family ones is not 
merely a sequential priority whereby one first develops family relationships 
and then carries on to develop other relationships. The priority is also a 
qualitative one; especially as argued by Mencius, and also by Confucius at 
various points in the Analects, especially at 2:24: ''To offer sacrifice to the 
spirit of an ancestor not one's own is obsequious ... "59 
Learning to be filial and being filial has implications for both social life (in the 
young man's cultivation of himself (Analects 1 :6)) and political life (either in 
one's participation in the political society as a subject (Analects 1 :2) or as a 
ruler (Analects 2:20; 8:2.2)). The practice of filial piety by all in the community 
has an invaluable impact. This is set out in chapter one of the Hsiao Ching 
(Book of Filial Piety): the scope of filial piety begins in the service of one's 
parents, is continued in the service of the chun tzu and ends in the 
establishing of the self. What this means for the ruler, who is supposed to 
cultivate himself as well as to influence his subjects to cultivate themselves, 
is perhaps best expressed in Chapter 9 of the Ta-hsueh (Great Learning): 
What is meant by "'In order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary 
first to regulate the family," is this:- It is not possible for one to teach 
others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, 
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without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state. 
There is filial piety:-therewith the sovereign should be served. There 
is fraternal submission:-therewith elders and superiors should be 
served. There is kindness:-therewith the multitude should be treated 
... when the ruler, as a father, a son, and a brother, is a model, then 
the people imitate him.60 
It is assumed that the attitudes and emotions that are characteristic of happy 
family life are stable and strong. Filial piety was (and is?) a principle of social 
action and also a moral virtue within Chinese society. 61 Confucius utilised the 
concept, giving it fundamental importance in his system when he stated that 
hsiao is the root of jen (Analects 1 :2). The sense that hsiao, and thus, jen and 
li, are intimately connected with one's character rather than with mere 
behavioural compliance is apparent in Confucius' conversation with Tsai Wo 
during which he discharges the latter from the usual three-year mourning 
period (Tsai Wo had only been in mourning for a year) because Confucius 
felt it did not make sense to force Tsai Wo to continue this practice given that 
Tsai Wo himself did not see any sense in continuing this practice beyond a 
year (Analects 17:21). Mourning, in the eyes of Confucius, was an expression 
of hsiao and emphasis on the feeling of filial piety is succinctly expressed in 
Analects 19:14: 
Tzu-yu said, "When mourning gives full expression to grief nothing 
more can be required."62 
It is this depth of character and emotion which Confucius' system seeks to 
propagate; for Confucius, these are the features which affirm the individual 
both as a distinct self and as a self-in-relation with others. It is from within the 
primary familial context of attachment that one learns the significance of 
engaging with others in a meaningful and responsible way, affirming the 
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interrelatedness of human beings. The interrelatedness of human beings and 
the mutual responsibility of each party in a relationship is the topic of the next 
section. 
2.1.6 The Golden Rule: Shu 
An integral aspect of Confucian moral life is the interrelatedness of the 
human person to other people. To that effect, Confucius emphasised shu as 
an expression of one's mutual responsibility in a relationship. In living the 
Confucian life, one has to respond appropriately to those with whom one has 
a relationship. 
Life as a totally independent, non-related individual is unacceptable in 
Confucian thought (Analects 18:6) and, consequently, an account of virtue or 
value that emphasises personal excellence in isolation is deemed 
meaningless. The articulation of what it means to act with shu occupies an 
important position in the Analects. It is, in short the 'golden rule': Do not do to 
others what you do not wish to be done to yourself (Analects 5:11).63 
The golden rule, evidently, assumes a similarity-in-kind amongst 
human beings such that one is able, through the interpolation of personal 
wants and interests, to work out another person's wants and interests.64 This 
theme of shu, therefore, is not a call to unending dedication to the cause of 
others while one neglects one's own because the self is, clearly, the starting 
point and, especially for the chun tzu, the source of virtue (Analects 15:20). 
Confucius also stresses loyalty to oneself (chung) and relates chung and shu 
by reference to the metaphor of the 'i-kuan'65 or thread. About this metaphor, 
Chan Wing-tsit states (commenting on Analects 4:15): 
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... Confucianists have not agreed on what it means. Generally, 
Confucianists of Han and Tang times adhered to the basic meaning of 
"thread" and understood it in the sense of a system or a body of 
doctrines. Chu Hsi, true to the spirit of Neo-Confucian speculative 
philosophy, took it to mean that there is one mind to respond to all 
things ... All agree, however, on the meanings of chung and shu, 
which are best expressed by Chu Hsi, namely, chung means the full 
development of one's [originally good] mind and shu means the 
extension of that mind to others. 56 
The determination of what counts as appropriate response has to be worked 
out within the framework of the nature of the particular relationship in 
question. Thus shu encompasses a moral aspect based on one's appropriate 
responses given one's role in the relationship. It is in this light that 'reciprocity' 
seems to be an inadequate translation of shu because it implies an 
equivalent 'pay-back' response. This is, however, clearly not the case as, for 
example, in a teacher-pupil relationship where it would be peculiar for the 
teacher to expect (moral) guidance from a pupil in response to the guidance 
the teacher gives. 
It is more appropriate to translate shu as 'mutuality'. This is because 
mutuality best captures the sense of response and responsiveness to the 
other, as well as the ideal of mutual responsibility for the relationship. Thus, 
shu is not concerned with mere response but with response in an appropriate 
manner in the circumstances and given the nature of the relevant 
relationship. The idea of responding appropriately plays a significant role in 
Confucian philosophy because it is the operative principle according to which, 
specifically, the common people learn from the ruler who is their model. The 
chun tzu is a paradigm for all (Analects 13:11): he is able to transform all that 
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is bad or immoral. Similarly, good government by the chun tzu affects both 
the near and the far; the former in the sense that they are happy, and the 
latter in the sense that they are attracted to the virtue of the leader(s) 
(Analects 13:16). Fingarette67 proposes an interpretation of the Confucian 
doctrine of models and suggests that a model is not merely of instrumental 
value to the learners, but has its intrinsic value as well. What this means is 
that "whether or not others make use of a consummatory model is not of the 
essence of its being such a model-it is its own fulfilment."66 Using an 
illuminating analogy with a baseball game, he imagines a particular match 
which embodied various kinds of suspense, skill, excitement, remarkable 
performances and turns of fortune that can be said to characterise baseball 
at its best. One could say that this was a model game. This need not mean, 
however, that it is a useful game to copy-certainly, one would not insist that 
all other baseball games be exactly modelled after, or be copies of, this 
particular game. 
This brings to the fore the idea that models are not to be exactly 
copied. Indeed, for Confucius, exact imitation would bring about the vital 
project of maintaining the different norms and values of the various different 
relationships. In other words, one's response to a model must be appropriate 
and correlative rather than purely imitative, because, for example, if the 
model were a ruler; it would be highly inappropriate for the ruler's subjects to 
be copies of the ruler. The latter situation would be a major catastrophe in the 
Confucian system. What is required, rather, is an appropriate response; what 
is inappropriate would be an appreciation of the model expressed through 
mere imitation. 
This point is also the thrust of Roger Ames' comment on Fingarette's 
thesis. 59 Ames suggests that Fingarette's theory might be further supported 
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by a more detailed analysis of the concept of a person in Confucius' 
philosophy. Ames comments that 
... underlying Confucius's notion of person is a pervasive philosophy of 
organism. Discrete, discontinuous and essential individuality is not 
operative with respect to his understanding of either person or 
personal realization ... the chun-tzu is not individually determined by 
an internally contained process of self-realization or by some private 
enlightenment experience. 70 
With regard to this point, Ames adds, Fingarette's distinction between the 
instrumental and the consummate senses of a model obfuscates the 
dynamism of the kind of relationships prescribed by Confucius. 71 This, in turn, 
according to Ames, weakens Fingarette's thesis. 
Ames is correct in insisting that the Confucian process of 
transformation of the self and of society must be conceived of as a dynamic 
one. The dynamism of the system Confucius proposed allows for the 
transformation of the whole community based on the effectiveness of shu. In 
the light of Ames' comments, Fingarette's thesis can be modified accordingly: 
that as people respond to these Confucian models within an organismic 
society, the relationships within the Confucian society are constantly being 
harmonised and, therefore, individuals are constantly engaged in, ideally, 
improving themselves. In practical terms, this dynamism applies not only to 
the formation of new relationships-for example, one becomes a parent on 
the birth of a child-but also to the development of different ways of 
conceptualising existing relationships-for example, a student becomes a 
colleague. This process is unceasing, given that the final outcome is that" ... 
all within the four seas will be brothers" (Analects 12:5.4). 
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The next section discusses how the process of self cultivation integrates the 
important Confucian concepts discussed so far, and what it means to achieve 
human excellence in the Confucian context. 
2.2 It is the Human Being which Furnishes Tao with Value and 
Meaning ... 
... simply abiding by the tao does not render human life meaningful or 
worthwhile (Analects 15:28) 
Whilst Taoist conceptions of the tao involve deep metaphysical issues 
regarding the nature of reality, and Taoist ontology is inclusive and all-
encompassing (in that it sees all existence as deriving from and thus 
dependent on tao), the Confucian statement cited above reveals a stark 
humanistic theme. The statement, possibly a Confucian rejection of Taoist 
ideals, establishes the extent to which humans are in control of, and 
responsible for, creating their own paths of development. 
In contrast to the Taoist enterprise, which promoted a natural order to 
which all beings, non-human as well as human, should conform, the 
Confucians did not agree that human existence was to be subjected to a 
notion of order which was independent of human life. In that connection, 
while Taoists were distrustful of much of social, moral and political life-
claiming that these were artificial, merely human, constructs-Confucians 
sought to introduce forms of behaviour and other structures that would assist 
in the coordination and maintenance of life within communities. 
Another feature of the Confucian conception of tao which the Taoists 
would have vehemently rejected is that tao, being a product of human 
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innovation, was variously manifest according to the different capacities of 
different individuals. For example, Confucius advises in Analects 15:39 that 
those whose tao are different should not make plans for one another. This 
passage reveals the humanistic emphasis of Confucius' philosophy; his belief 
that human life is not totally determined in that there is scope for plan-
making. More significantly, it implies that individual perspectives are brought 
to bear on one's plans and that tao differs for each person; in this context tao 
seems to refer to a perspectival world-view. 
That there are different paths for different people--'path' being the most 
literal translation of ta~s a view which, in Confucian thought, could be 
understood to mean that the self cultivation process is a particularistic 
enterprise, focusing on certain characteristics of each person rather than on 
universally applicable aims or goals. This view is supported not only by the 
fact that the Analects describes tao as being specific to different people or 
groups of people72 but also by the Confucian conception of the human person 
as being constituted, at least in part, by the kinds and the qualities of 
relationships one is involved in. Thus one who is a father, for example, would 
cultivate himself, in that respect, differently from one who is a daughter. 
Similarly, with respect to the qualities of relationships, one who is, for 
example, a pupil involved in a relationship of mutual respect and 
understanding with her teacher will cultivate herself, qua pupil, differently 
from another who is merely subservient and obedient to her teacher. 
It is in this sense that self cultivation takes on a different meaning for 
each individual because of the uniqueness of each person as a being-in-
relation with others. The idea of the uniqueness of each individual person, 
together with the humanistic emphasis of Confucian thought, entails that tao, 
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in the Analects, cannot be conceived of as it is in taoist thought as a 
transcendent order of reality and/or, in moral terms, as an unwavering 
standard or principle. 
Hall and Ames, in their discussion of the Confucian tao, reject the 
understanding of it as some order of transcendent principle. 73 They thereby 
challenge the views of Arthur Waley and D.C. Lau who characterise tao, 
respectively, as the" ... one infallible method of rule" embodied essentially in 
the" ... Way of the ancients" and as" ... the sum total of truths about the 
universe and man, and not only the individual but also the state" and which 
" ... comes very close to the term "Truth" as found in philosophical and 
religious writings in the West". 74 
Their most sustained criticisms, however, are of Fingarette's 
conception of the Confucian tao as a transcendent objective order.75 
According to Hall and Ames, although Fingarette recognises the particular 
individuality of each person with regard to self realisation, he nonetheless 
holds on to a conception of the tao as moving from the particularistic to the 
universal, from the humanistic (of human origin) to the transcendent, as one 
cultivates oneself. Fingarette's tao exists objectively and independently of 
human life. As Hall and Ames observe: 
[For Fingarette,] [t]he ultimate source of meaning and value is this 
objective tao, and the greater the human achievement, the less 
particular the human and the more impersonal the tao becomes.76 
Hall and Ames argue that Fingarette's conception of tao restricts the range of 
possibilities of human life and is essentially inconsistent with the ideals in the 
Analects including its humanistic orientation and the tolerance and flexibility 
of self cultivation, the multiplicity and multivalence of tao in its association 
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with various historical figures, varying levels of human achievement and a 
broad range of cultivated interests. 
Hall and Ames are basically correct in their criticisms of Fingarette's 
conservative characterisation of tao as objective and transcendent reality 
and/or truth independent of human beings. In addition to their criticisms, it 
needs to be noted that Fingarette reads into Confucius' tao a (non-existent) 
two-tiered conception of human life and meaning; contrary to Fingarette's 
views, Confucius was never interested in metaphysical issues and issues of 
transcendence (of human life) (see Analects 6:20; 7:9; 7:20; 11:11). 
The idea that tao is some kind of universal moral principle is also upheld by 
Sandra Wawrytko who draws a parallel between Confucius' tao and Kantian 
Moral Law in their respective concepts of respect for persons.77 Wawrytko's 
larger project is a synthesis of the two systems: she proposes an ethical 
theory which combines Kant's respect for the Moral Law-"Kant's rigid 
architectonic"78-tempered by the Confucian emphasis on the complexity of 
human life expressed in and through dynamic community. Wawrytko does 
recognise that respect for persons takes completely different forms in each of 
the systems: it is expressed hierarchically in Confucian thought and 
universally in Kantian thought. 
Her discussion of tao, though, seems at points confused for, while she 
holds that" ... Confucius advocates the cultivation of a sense of judgment 
which is guided by experience and fitted to concrete cases"79, and, at the 
same time criticises Kant for 'objectionable inflexibility'80, she yet describes 
tao as an unwavering standard. She argues: 
Tao, as revealed by i [Wawrytko translates this as 'judgment'], 
provides a universal and unwavering standard for judgment. In the 
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terminology of ethics, Confucius exemplifies a deontological or rule-
oriented approach, as is borne out in the Analects.81 
Furthermore, she characterises i, which she connects in an important way 
with tao, as" ... the conscious decision to adhere to the correct Way based 
solely on the fact that it is correct ... [1] serves as the general "standard of 
evaluation", bestowing meaning upon one's acts".82 Thus, in Wawrytko's 
account, while Confucian ethics is contextually sensitive and flexible, there is, 
on the other hand, an unwavering, 'correct' standard to be sought after. 
It is difficult to understand why and how Wawrytko sees the Analects 
as embodying a rule-oriented approach (while she in the same paper 
discusses the Confucian stress on following the examples of models, which 
renders moral learning an open-ended process). In addition, she contends 
that i bestows meaning upon one's acts. This assertion directly contradicts 
Analects 15:28, a passage which Wawrytko herself discusses. It is surprising 
that in her discussion of this passage, she alludes to the need for creativity in 
the practice of i. 
Furthermore, the idea that there is an unwavering and correct 
standard presupposes the existence of a standard of conduct which does not 
take into account individual differences. This view is inconsistent with the 
general view in the Analects that courses of development and, by extension, 
ways of responding to and in situations, vary from person to person. The 
focus of the Analects seems to be on appropriate action and behaviour rather 
than on 'correct' forms. Thus, what is at issue here is not so much that there 
is flexibility in the application of a standard-Wawrytko does indeed 
appreciate Confucian ethics for its flexibility-but rather that there is a 
('correct') standard at all. 
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Apart from the general sense of confusion in Wawrytko's discussion of 
tao, her enterprise of effecting a synthesis of the Confucian and Kantian 
systems is ill-conceived because the two systems are so essentially different 
in their structures and aims that Kant himself was not willing to concede that 
the Chinese were ever concerned with, or entertained issues pertaining to, 
virtue or morality: 
Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient ... Their teacher 
Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine 
designed for the princes ... and offers examples of former Chinese 
princes ... But a concept of virtue and morality never entered the heads 
of the Chinese. 
In order to arrive at an idea ... of the good [certain) studies would be 
required, of which [the Chinese] know nothing.83 
From Kant's point of view, the Chinese never contemplated issues of virtue 
and morality for at least two reasons, neither of which Wawrytko seems to 
have taken into account in her project. First, the idea in Confucianism that 
human beings are empirically given and have to learn to behave 
appropriately depending on the nature of each different relationship is closely 
connected to the Confucian notion of (the value of) social hierarchy and 
differentiation and of different loyalties due to different categories of people. 
Obviously more particularistic than any deontological moral theory or 
universalisability criterion would allow, this move by Confucius forces the 
agent to make choices and to accord different priorities to the variety of 
people he comes across. Distinguishing between people is not advocated, 
crudely, as a means to effect discrimination but, rather, as a means to work 
out one's responsibilities (for example, whether as father, friend or subject). It 
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seems, in the light of Confucian theory, naive to insist that all should be 
treated equally, or loved equally, or to try to achieve a social setting in which 
relational values are not accorded any significance and, in fact, to be played 
down or eliminated. 
Wawrytko seems not to have grasped this crucial and essential feature 
of Confucian philosophy and how dramatically different this feature is from 
any notion of morality in Kantian thought. Thus she states, very generally, 
that "Due to the primacy of respect, Kant joins the Confucians in condemning 
the impracticality of universallove."84 She fails to note, in making such an 
over-generalised statement of comparison, that Confucius and Kant reject the 
idea of universal love from within their respective systems for specific 
reasons which render their ideals mutually exclusive each of the other. The 
Confucian abhorrence of universal love as both impracticable and 
inappropriate as the operative principle in relationships-the arguments most 
strongly advanced by Mencius-is based on a reason directly opposite to that 
of Kant's. While Kant did not see any role for love or attachment in one's 
quest to be moral, it could be said that Confucius impressed, in comparable 
terms, that moral duty (to another) was dependent on the nature of one's 
relationship (with that other), the latter constituted in part by the feelings of 
loyalty and attachment appropriate to it. Their ideas of what constitute 
morality and, in that connection, what it means to be a moral person, are in 
direct opposition: Kant's universal man must, in being moral, be autonomous, 
rational and impartial85; Confucius' chun tzu must, in his quest to be moral, be 
differently loyal and differently attached to different people. Thus it is these 
very different (and opposing) reasons which are so fundamental to each of 
their ideals that led them to reject universal love; their common rejection of 
the practicality of universal love should not itself be overrated. 
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Secondly, the Kantian and Confucian conceptions of human nature 
and morality, and of the connection between the two, differ drastically as well. 
Wawrytko is alert to the fact that there is no dualistic conception of human 
nature in Confucius' thought corresponding to that in the Kantian system. She 
writes that "[i]n the assumed duality of human nature, Kant detects a seething 
rebellion against reason, plotted by the "beast within"."86 What Wawrytko fails 
to deal with, however, are the implications of Kant's dualistic conception of 
the human being whereby one feature or ability has to be overcome by 
another, or put aside, in order that the other can be effectively applied; and, 
in that connection, how Confucius did not conceive either of human nature or 
of morality in such terms. 
Confucius never engaged in moral philosophy the way Kant did. 
Morality, or moral issues, were never a primary concern for Confucius. In the 
Analects, moral concerns were but a component of larger issues which 
encompassed the political, social and moral structures of communal life. 
Thus, to assume that Confucius and Kant were engaged in similar projects is 
to narrow both the scope of Confucian categories (to the merely moral) and, 
more generally, the whole Confucian enterprise. 
What emerges from the preceding discussion is that Confucius did not 
engage in moral philosophy in two connected, though different, ways: first, 
moral philosophy was neither his fundamental nor sole concern; secondly 
(what we might call) morality is not confined to a limited number of actions 
and behaviours but rather, is an important component of all human action 
and is inseparable from the self in its social and political spheres. These 
different aspects of human action and behaviour, including the moral, are 
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embodied in the Confucian conception of /i, chung, shu, jen, li and hsiao. 
These concepts circumscribe what it means to be human in a Confucian way. 
Just as it is inappropriate to assimilate Confucian thought to the sphere of 
(Western) moral philosophy, so it is inappropriate to read it primarily as a 
religious ethics. This latter approach is adopted by Joel Kupperman in 
"Confucius and the Nature of Religious Ethics".87 There, Kupperman argues 
that religious ethics is significantly different from 'big moment' ethics. The 
major difference between the tWo, he proposes, is that while 'big moment' 
ethics is concerned solely with" ... moments of sharp moral decision ... "88 the 
former focuses on a deeper, 'emotional harmony' which is expressed in and 
through every act and activity," ... even at moments when [the agent] is not 
making or preparing for a moral decision.',sg 
Kupperman is primarily correct in asserting that Confucius was 
interested in the inner cultivated character of the agent as the basis of all 
actions and not merely in isolated moments involving moral decisions. In 
making his point, however, Kupperman has imposed onto Confucius' thought 
a (non-existent) dichotomy between moral and non-moral actions and 
behaviour. Kupperman writes that generally, and this applies in the case of 
the Confucian person too: 
... most of a man's life normally is entirely neutral with respect to 
traditional moral codes; that is, moments of moral choice or action 
normally will comprise very little of the duration of his life.90 
But does the Confucius of the Analects think of human life in these terms? 
Would he say that most of a person's life is concerned with actions and 
behaviour which are morally neutral? Indeed, the converse seems to be the 
case, for he remarked that "even within the space of a meal (which has to do, 
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in a large part, with the gratification of bodily desires) the man of jen does not 
act contrary to jen; in moments of haste and danger, he abides by jen" 
(Analects 4:5.3). 
If jen is understood as the shared human capacity, and if embodying 
jen entails having proper respect for and commitment to human life both in 
oneself and in others, then Confucius' remark to abide by jen in all situations 
implies that there is a moral component in a// one's actions and activities 
expressed in and through one's attitude toward human life. The point here is 
this: the Confucian conception of human action cannot be simplistically 
categorised either as moral or nonmoral; if in every action one is to embody 
and exemplify jen then it is the case that every action has moral significance. 
This conception of human action is integrally connected to the Confucian 
conception of human existence as encompassing at least, the following 
inseparable spheres: social, cultural, historical, political and moral. Every 
single action-for example, the decision to conceal that one's father has 
stolen a sheep (Analects 13:18)-has ramifications in each of these spheres. 
Thus characterisation of lias moral rules is totally inappropriate. 
Confucius' reference to concepts of connectedness were never clearly 
defined, and this lack of concern about precise definitions could be attributed 
to his orientation towards particularistic rather than universalistic, flexible 
rather than inflexible, codes of conduct and appropriate behaviour. As argued 
in a previous section of this chapter, he modified li codes at times and, also, 
at one instance, specifically commented that the chun tzu is flexible in that 
respect; the two translations of Analects 15:36 listed below give an important 
insight into how Confucius conceived of flexibility: 
A chun tzu is devoted to principle but not inflexible in small matters.91 
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A [chun tzu] is correctly firm, and not firm merely.92 
The text of the Analects -its mode of discourse and its philosophical 
method-also demonstrates this point: what is taken as recorded sayings of 
Confucius appears either in the form of an instruction for a specific person 
regarding a specific matter, often based on discussions of the chun tzu. What 
occupies a larger proportion of the text is not so much a list of the virtues or 
characteristics of the paradigmatic chun tzu as descriptions of what the chun 
tzu would do in a wide-ranging variety of different situations. 
Closely associated with Confucius' flexible approach to codes of 
conduct is his focus on the character of the agent rather than on external 
behaviour or on isolated instances of action or behaviour. What is meant by a 
person's character is, in Confucian terms, the 'inner' cultivation of the person. 
It is this inner cultivated (or uncultivated) self which is the source of behaviour 
and action and, therefore, the primary concern of Confucius; indeed, he drew 
a strongly internalistic connection between 'inner' cultivation and 'external' 
behaviour: 
If one's will is set on jen, one will be free from wickedness or evil. 
(Analects 4:4)93 
Certain other passages in this chapter of the Analects reveal similar 
internalist assumptions: 
... the man of jen is attracted to jen because he feels at home in it. The 
wise man is attracted to jen because he finds it to his advantage. 
(Analects 4:2)94 
The Master said, "I have never seen a person who values and abides 
by jen or one who hates not-jen. The person who values and abides 
by jen will not accord priority to anything else; he who hates (what is) 
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not-jen will practise jen in such a way that not-jen cannot affect him. 
(Analects 4:6.1) 
Confucius held suspect the motivational content of strict principles or rules of 
action.95 Like penal laws, rules may, through threat of punishment, be 
effective in exacting external compliance (Analects 2:3) but they do not aid in 
a person's self cultivation (Analects 3:26; 17:11; 17:21). Indeed, at the 
political level, mere compliance of subjects to rulers was not endorsed by 
Confucius (Analects 13:15). 
The kind of person Confucius sought to give effect to his teachings were men 
with certain intentional and motivational characteristics, men who valued and 
abided by jen.96 These men of jen have a certain composure: "being jen [they 
are] free from anxiety; being wise [they are] free from uncertainty; being 
courageous [they are] free from fear" (Analects 14:30). It follows, then, that 
"[w]hat the chun tzu seeks is in himself; what the small man seeks is in 
others"97 (Analects 15:20). 
It is in this sense that self cultivation, in Confucius' system, is an 
individualistic process: the search is not for a universal man but, rather, for 
men who, in their particular lives, embody and manifestjen within human 
community and who influence others to do so as well. That self cultivation is 
a particularistic process shaped by each person for him/herself, does not also 
mean-the point has already been noted-that humans are to be understood 
as independent, autonomous individuals. Rather, self cultivation takes place 
within an intersubjective context in which the developing person affinms 
himself as a person-in-relation with others. 
This idea of the person as the centre of relationships is highlighted by 
Tu Wei-ming, who describes the self as the locus from which concentric 
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circles of influence emanate, moving gradually from the family as the 
innermost ring, to the community, country, and world.98 Although it was rather 
idealistic of the Confucians to suggest that the effects of self cultivation are 
as far-reaching as they suggested, the Confucian view of the emanating 
effect of self cultivation can be given a less radical and more plausible 
interpretation by reference to a community of developing selves which 
together aim to realise the Confucian ideals. 
That Confucius proposed the concept of the individual as a related self 
rather define it atomistically does not diminish the moral responsibility of the 
self. Instead, moral responsibility is construed within a context of 
interdependence. Fingarette outlines the contribution of the members of a 
community to what he feels is a distinctively human community. He writes: 
Is it enough merely to be born, to eat, breathe, drink, excrete, enjoy 
sensual gratification and avoid physical pain and discomfort? Animals 
do this. To become civilized is to establish relationships that are not 
merely physical, biological or instinctive; it is to establish human 
relationships, relationships of an essentially symbolic kind ... "Merely 
to feed one's parents well" ... "even dogs and horses are fed." (2:7) To 
be devoted to one's parents is far more than to keep the parents alive 
physically. To serve and eat in the proper way, with the proper respect 
and appreciation, in the proper setting-this is to transform the act of 
mere nourishment into the human ceremony of dining. To obey the 
whip is to be not much more than a domestic animal; but to be loyal 
and faithful to those who rightly govern, to serve them and thus to 
serve in the human community, to do this out of one's own heart and 
nature-this is to be a true citizen of one's community. 99 
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The human person or self is conceived of in terms of its social 
interdependency with other human persons. Given that communal life is the 
only locus of meaning for the human, what is integral is that the self has to be 
cultivated within the present society-in the here and now-in conjunction 
with all others in one's community. There is thus a distinct sense in the 
Analects that self cultivation is to take place within an intersubjective context 
because the modes of life of the community-involving culture and history 
and, more simply, the stories which people in that community tell-play an 
irreducible role in shaping the individual. 
These modes of life of the community are learnt through the 
inculcation and practice of li (Analects 6:25; 12:15), beginning with hsiao in 
the family context (Analects 2:5). The different loyalties to, and affection for, 
other people are dictated by the kind of relationship one has with the other. Li 
are the vehicle of expression for these differing attachments. Furthermore, 
given that one can only be truly human within the communal context, 
relationships and attachments are important to the individual person in a 
fundamental way. 
The cultivation of the self which includes, in an integral way, the 
development of one's relationships with others (Analects 6:25) can be 
understood by reference to the concepts of chung and shu. It is in these two 
concepts that the idea of respect for persons, insofar as it exists in Confucius' 
thought, is embodied. While chung might be translated as 'sincerity to 
oneself and shu as mutuality or mutual responsibility and attachment to 
others, chung and shu together are expressions of the respect for human life, 
both in oneself and in others. It is in this sense that both chung and shu are 
connected with jen, the distinguishing characteristic of all humanity (Analects 
4:15). To uphold jen is to affirm the value of human life within its communal 
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setting and, therefore, to understand the self as expressed and manifest only 
through li. Li are applied according to norms of appropriateness rather than to 
defined rules or principles. 
What counts as appropriate in a certain situation is dependent on the 
nature of the relationship involved. The course of action decided upon and 
carried through, in turn, reveals the kind of person one is. Thus, because the 
Confucian self-cultivation process is at once intersubjective and personal and 
particularistic, its effects and outcomes are open-ended. In this connection, 
Hall and Ames conceive of jen as 'person-making' and of tao as 'road 
making'.100 "The human being has an active, creative role in continuing, 
broadening, and extending the tao, such that the tao is historically composite 
and cumulative, the human unfolding of chosen areas of importance"101 . 
Roadmaking, Hall and Ames argue, refers to "making a roadway real"102, 
rather than simply being led along a path. Thus the Confucian concept of self 
cultivation involves the self as initiator and creator within its social and 
cultural environment and according to the roles one occupies in the variety of 
relationships one engages in. The distinctiveness of each person, although 
all share in the same quality of being jen, rests in the (successful} integration 
of all the relationships one engages in. Thus, for example, I am at once a 
daughter, friend, partner, teacher, employee, colleague, and so on. This does 
not mean, however, that each person is completely constituted by the roles 
slhe plays. Rather, the quality and meaning of a satisfactory Confucian life is 
based on how one fulfils the responsibilities within each relationship. Thus, 
the Confucian life is seen as a dynamic process whereby one might form new 
relationships, end some other relationships and develop or modify certain 
others; it is in and through these processes that one is human. Tu describes 
118 
the dynamics of this process, distinguishing between Confucian and un-
Confucian ways of understanding personhood: 
The dramatic image of the modern person who assumes a variety of 
social roles is definitely unConfucian. The idea of my assuming the 
role of son in reference to my father and simultaneously assuming the 
distinct and separate role of father in reference to my son is unnatural, 
if not distasteful. From my own experience ... I have always been 
learning to be a son. Since my son's birth, I have also been learning to 
be a father and my learning to be a son has to take a new significance 
as a result of becoming a father myself. Furthermore, my being a son 
and a father is also informed and enriched by being a student, a 
teacher, a husband, a colleague, a friend, and an acquaintance. These 
are ways for me to learn to be human.103 
As Tu writes, how one conducts oneself in the range of relationships one 
engages in constitutes one's ways of being human. Each individual is a 
necessary and distinct node within a web-like network of different 
relationships, and these different relationships, in different combinations and 
permutations, make for the distinctiveness of each human life. Affirmation of 
the quality of life as such can only be achieved within the network of human 
relationships. Life in this community is a dynamic, unceasing one because 
one needs constantly to be working on and developing different relationships 
with different people in the quest for the common good. In the words of Tu, 
"ontologically we are irreducibly human, and existentially we must struggle to 
remain human."104 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PAULINE CHRISTIANITY: HUMAN NATURE AND MORALITY 
Paul the apostle understood his primary task to be apostle to the Gentiles 
(Romans 1 :5ff; 11: 13). He felt that his mission was to preach to the Gentiles 
regarding the facts and significance of the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. 1 The epistles were Paul's attempts to maintain contact with the 
converts to his religion. In them, Paul encourages and advises the converts 
to live lives that reflect both the death and resurrection of Christ. It was to be 
a different way of life; the believer was a 'new creation' (II Corinthians 5: 17) 
and thus had to live according a different set of norms and codes from his or 
her previous one. 
This new life, however, was not a permanent condition. Rather, the 
converts, including Paul himself.-indeed, the whole of creation-were 
waiting for a teleological end in the context of which humans were but a part 
of God's greater cosmological plans (Romans 8:22,23). This event, Paul 
claimed, was the parousia (napouma), the 'day of the Lord' (I Thessalonians 
4: 15f; I Corinthians 1 :8; Philippians 1 :6f) which would be signified by a variety 
of incidents manifesting the victorious power of Paul's God. 
In the meantime, however, the focus of the epistles was on life in that 
'in-between' period. Paul wrote to the converts, as and when the need arose, 
regarding their behaviour and conduct.2 The justifications for his various 
exhortations and advice were based primarily on the two theological aspects 
of human life discussed above. The first was the changed status of the 
believer brought about by the Christ event; the lives of the believers, Paul 
claimed, were to reflect that change. The second was the hope associated 
with the eschatological end; the conduct of lives was, similarly, to reflect such 
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hope. There were, indeed, some practical problems regarding this latter 
situation: Paul had to reprimand a group of enthusiastic believers who, in that 
eschatological context, had decided upon the futility of work. The epistle of 2 
Thessalonians was written to encourage this group to recognise that even in 
view of the coming age (mcov), one had to live responsibly, i.e. to continue in 
their vocations. 
The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct the Pauline conception of the human 
being by bringing together various lines of thought in the epistles. The 
epistles to the various churches reveal Paul's thinking about human nature, 
the human condition and human agency in the light of the work of Jesus 
Christ. 
The first section sets up the framework from which to understand the 
Pauline conception of humanity. It examines the anthropological terms which 
Paul uses. These include Ka.pBta. (heart), vous (attitude/perspective), 
ecrco/e~co a.v6pC01tov (the 'inner/outer man') and crcoiJ.a. (body). This exercise is 
crucial in investigating Paul's conception of human being and human life 
because these concepts play a significant role in his moral reasoning. 
Accordingly, rather than investigating his derivation of the concepts, this 
section focuses on how each concept functions within a variety of situational 
contexts. The concern here is not merely Paul's methodology in his moral 
reasoning but, more significantly, the meanings of the anthropological 
concepts which, in spite of a degree of indeterminacy, together constitute 
Paul's notion of the human person. One of the themes emphasised in this 
section is the idea that Paul upholds a holistic conception of the human 
person and believes-in the epistles this idea is generally simply assumed-
that there is an internalistic connection between one's attitude and one's 
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behaviours. This internalistic connection is grounded in a cognitivist 
understanding of the conversion experience. 3 What Paul attempts is to 
convince the believers that an ontological change in their being-brought 
about by the Christ event-entails a corresponding change in their lives and 
behaviours. The cognitivist point of view is described by Bultmann, a New 
Testament scholar, as the 'indicative-imperative' construction.4 
Paul discovers, however, that an internalist view of moral motivation is 
problematic in the light of empirical evidence. He describes the conflict he 
himself faces when he does what he knows is sinful (and hates); at one point 
he seems to attribute the source of this tension to anthropological dualism, 
positing an 'inner' man (who desires the good) and an 'outer' man (who does 
what is sinful). However, instead of rejecting either the internalist or the 
cognitivist views, Paul upholds those and maintains that the source of evil or 
sin lies beyond himself, in the external world. One implication of this stance is 
that a dualistic conception of human nature is dismissed. 
The tension, as suggested in the epistles, arises from a more potent 
and complex conflict between competing realms of power. When Paul names 
crap~ (commonly translated 'flesh') as the source of sin, as opposed to 
spiritual existence (7tVeujla} founded upon the life of Christ, he could be 
interpreted to be alluding to a dualistic conception of human nature. However, 
it is argued, in the second section, that although crap~ and 7tVEUila are, 
seemingly, anthropological terms, Paul does not use them to describe a 
dualistic conception of the human person. Rather, he uses them in a 
metaphorical manner to represent two different modes of life, upholding a 
way of life which is 'according to the spirit' (Kata 7tVEUjla}. 
The other dualism dealt with in this third section is that between the 
Adamic and Christ-like ways of life. Similar to the crap~-7tVEUjla distinction, 
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Paul uses the Christ-Adam contrast to outline different modes of life for the 
believer in the in-between period. A major difference between these two sets 
of dualisms, however, is their respective temporal settings within Paul's 
eschatology. While the Adam-Christ contrast derives from Paul's rejection of 
the predominance of Jewish values (and thus represents modes of life before 
and after the work of Christ), the crap~-1tVEUJla metaphor represents life, for 
the believers, in its present and future conditions. To describe the respective 
time frames in terms of past, present and future is, however, simplistic. This 
is because, according to Paul, the effects of the future age are already 
manifest, though not fully, in and through the believing communities. 
This in-between time was a difficult one both for Paul and for the 
believers because while, on the one hand, the believer's mode of existence-
indeed, his being-had either undergone or was to undergo change and 
redefinition, on the other hand, the believer understood the life conditions of 
this period to be provisional. The third section of the chapter deals with this 
tension. 
While frequently emphasising to the believers that a change had 
already been effected in their lives, Paul nonetheless maintained that they 
had to wait for the 1tapoum.a (the coming age) in order to experience in full 
the benefits of Christian life. He upheld a relatively egalitarian picture of 
conditions in the future atrov which would see the obliteration of certain social 
(master-slave), cultural (Jew-Greek) and gender (male-female) distinctions 
and prejudices (Galatians 3:28). However, these utopic conditions were yet 
manifest and the believers had to wait for that period. Instead of encouraging 
an active role on the part of the believers to strive toward those conditions, 
Paul advised them to" ... remain in the condition in which you were called" (I 
Corinthians 7:20, 24). 
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From Paul's ideas about the conditions of life, the possible ways in which to 
conduct one's life and the human predicament in the in-between period, we 
can piece together, at least to some extent, his conception of the human 
being, human agency and the moral life. First, however, the certain basic 
concepts regarding human nature will have to be examined. 
3.1 Paul's Anthropological Terms 
An important aspect of Paul's usage of anthropological terms, as will be 
shown in the following sections, is that he never attempts to define the terms 
and, in addition, sustains a fluidity in meaning in relation to each of them. 
These concepts serve different functions within different arguments; the 
majority of them, though, appear in contexts in which Paul tries to encourage 
(or to discourage), and to justify to the converts certain courses of action or 
appropriate (or inappropriate) kinds of behaviour. 
Regarding his usage of the terms Ka.pota. (heart), vous (attitude or 
perspective), ecrro/e~ro a.v6pC01tov ('inner/outer' man) and crro11a. (body), it is 
interesting that rarely does he posit a dualistic tension between any of these 
aspects or capacities of the human being (given that then, there were 
prominent dualistic conceptions of human nature upheld by the gnostics and 
the pneumatics, for instance). Nor does he suggest that any one of them is 
predisposed toward good or evil (although at least two of them, Ka.pota. and 
vous, are associated with intentional aspects of human beings). For example, 
Paul affirmed the possible holiness of the bodily aspect of the human person 
(I Corinthians 6: 12-20; 9:27; Romans 12:1 ,2) and also its possible corruption 
(Romans 1 :24). Furthermore, although Paul discusses the Old Testament 
conception of original sin in I Corinthians 7, he does not suggest that human 
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nature is evil or sinful, nor does he subscribe to Greek notions of denying the 
empirical body or of repressing physical or material desires in quest for the 
(morally) good life. The first of the Pauline concepts to be examined is 
Kaplita. 
3.1.1 Heart: Kapota 
Kapota plays a central and primary role in Paul's conception of the human 
being. The heart, according to Paul, is not only the centre of emotion, 
affection, volition and decision making, it is the fundamental active initiator of 
all purposeful (-ras ~ouA.as) action and behaviour. Kapota is, indeed, such an 
important part of the human person that it is that which God judges or tests (I 
Corinthians 4:5; I Thessalonians 2:4). 
In its more specific manifestations, this central source of individual 
agency is the decision-making capacity, capable of firm resolution and 
determination (I Corinthians 7:37), and of cognitive comprehension (II 
Corinthians 9:7)5• It is also, importantly, the seat of affection and emotion: 
Kapota is the source of one's emotional attachment which persists in spite of 
physical separation (I Corinthians 5:3; II Corinthians 6:11; 7:3; 8:1-6; 
Philippians 1 :7).6 
The heart as the subjective, internal aspect of the person is also 
emphasised when Kapota is contrasted with face (npocromov) in reference to 
physical separation (I Thessalonians 2:17): Paul yearns to see his 
Thessalonica converts 'face-to-face'. The contrast between heart and face is 
more emphatic and substantial in II Corinthians 5:12 whereby Paul upholds 
the priority of intention (expressed in terms of Kapota) over behaviour 
(expressed in terms of npocromov). In this passage which is concerned with 
the issue of circumcision, Paul writes to the converted Gentiles-as well as to 
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the dissatisfied Jews-that the circumcised heart is preferable to physical 
circumcision and is, indeed, the necessary and sufficient condition of being a 
believer. 
Because Paul uses Kapllux in different contexts to designate all the 
above-mentioned capacities, it could be said that the heart signifies, for Paul, 
the aggregation of those capacities which make up the intentional self. This 
becomes clearer in the light of various passages which more succinctly 
depict Kapllta as having a specific orientation which is fundamental in the 
determination of the behaviours and actions of the individual. 
The orientation of Kapllta could be towards Christ's spirit and love and 
this, obviously, affects the believer in a positive way (Galatians 4:6; II 
Corinthians 1 :22; 3:2-3). One of the consequences of such a change is 
UJ'(X1tTJ (love) (Romans 5:5) while another is obedience (to the teachings of 
Paul's church} (Romans 6:17) and yet another is m<mS (faith) (Romans 10:9-
10), all of which are to be manifest in the believing communities and which 
help the believers through the difficulties of the in-between time. 
It is also possible, on the other hand, for a person to be negatively 
oriented: criticising those who refuse to change their ways, Paul condemns 
their hearts as centres of perverse thoughts, (Romans 1:18ff) characterising 
their hearts as being hard and impenitent (Romans 2:5). 
Three conclusions may be drawn from the preceding discussion. First, it is 
significant that the capacities for emotion and affection as well as those for 
decision-making and volition are functions of the one Kapota. However, 
Paul's understanding of the relation between some of these capacities, for 
instance, whether decision-making processes are affected by emotion, is not 
clear. What is more definite, however-and this is the second point-is that 
136 
Paul attributes to each individual control of the orientation of their own 
Kapota. Examples of Paul's encouragement and chastisement of the 
converts are premised upon this assumption. 
The third and related point is that, in his praise and blame, Paul 
assumes an internalist connection between the orientation of Kapota and the 
behaviour and conduct of the person. For example, he does not merely 
criticise the unacceptable behaviour of the ungodly but focuses on the 
morally inept orientation oftheir hearts (Romans 1: 18ff; 2:5). On the other 
hand, appropriate conduct is encouraged not on its own terms nor by the 
upholding of a certain value or values but rather through exhortations to 
modify the orientation of one's Kapota (Galatians 4:6; II Corinthians 1 :22; 3:2-
3; Romans 5:5; 6:17; 10:9-10). For Paul, therefore, action and behaviour are 
manifestations and functions of one's beliefs and intentions. Given this 
emphasis on the first-person perspective, there are constant admonitions 
from Paul to the converts to make appropriate changes to their attitudes and 
perspectives as a· necessary condition of their new lives. The changes in 
attitude are discussed in the next section particularly in connection with 
Paul's usage of vous. 
3.1.2 Perspective: Nous 
Paul's conception of vous does not in general concur with Greek 
philosophical notions of the rational mind or of the human capacity for 
rationality. Instead, it is most commonly used in the epistles to refer to the 
attitude of the believer which, in Paul's view, plays an important role in 
motivation? For example, vous is functional in Paul's encouragement to his 
converts to 'renew' their vous or to 'have' the vous of Christ; there is the 
presupposition that this renewal is itself sufficient in motivating, and hence in 
137 
producing, behaviours appropriate to belief in Christ. According to Paul, there 
are different ways in which life has changed since the Christ event. To 
experience these changes, one needs to make changes in vous in a range of 
ways: 
(a) personal life: each person is to offer him or herself to God, and part 
of that spiritual worship ('tTIV l.oyt1CT]v Aa'tpetav) involves renewing 
(avax:oo.vcooet) their vous (Romans 12:2); their renewed attitudes and 
perspectives allow them insight into God's will. 
(b) communal lives: the believers are to be united in the same vous; 
having the same attitude is, Paul maintains, the remedy to schisms in 
the Corinthian church community (I Corinthians 1:10). 
(c) the in-between period: it is with this usage that vous as 'attitude' is 
particularly clear. In the letter to the enthusiastic Christians at 
Thessalonica, Paul's recommendation is that they have an attitude of 
calm rather than zealousness and its manifestations, regarding the 
advent of the day of the Lord (II Thessalonians 2:2). 
(d) the vous of Christ: in I Corinthians 2:16, Paul deals with the 
Judaistic view of God's omnipotence, supremacy and inscrutability 
(Isaiah 40:13). In this context, vous is used to contrast the inferiority 
and inadequacy of human wisdom and understanding with that of 
God's. Paul concludes optimistically, however, asserting that though 
the believers cannot have the vous ofthe Lord, they (can) have the 
vous of Christ.8 1t needs to be noted that vous is narrowly and 
inappropriately, although frequently, translated 'mind' in both 
occurrences (mind of the Lord and mind of Christ). This is because, in 
the larger context of his preceding discussion, Paul attempts to point 
out that it is only through having the perspective of Christ that the 
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human being can begin to understand spiritual things (1tVE'IlilUnKa). 
The usage of vous in this passage is similar to that in Romans 12:2 
whereby to renew one's vous is to adopt a different perspective-
specifically, that of Christ's-such that one is able to comprehend 
spiritual things. 
As with his usage of Kapota, Paul's use of vous reveals his internalist 
assumptions regarding belief and action. What he assumes is that insofar as 
one believes in Christ and in the Christ event, one's attitudinal perspective 
will change: one will adopt the Christian perspective. Adopting a new 
perspective results, in turn, in changes in the way one acts and behaves. 
Such assumptions are exemplified in Paul's criticisms of the ungodly: just as 
their hearts are the source of sexual immorality (Romans 1 :24), so also are 
their debased vous to be blamed (Romans 1 :28). 
Supplementing Paul's focus on perspectivity as an important element in 
moral motivation is the connected, but different, emphasis he places on 
personal responsibility. Thus, implicit in Paul's exhortation to renew one's 
vous is the assumption that it is not beyond one's control to do so. The idea 
that one can choose, and hence determine, one's entire perspective is 
consistent with Paul's view that the orientation of one's heart is within one's 
control. The conception of the human being as having full control over his/her 
own orientation, perspective and actions is, however, brought into question 
when Paul discusses the tension between the 'inner' and 'outer' man. 
3.1.3 The Inner Man: Ecrro Av6pC01tOV 
The notorious section (7:14-25) in the Romans letter has sparked much 
theological as well as philosophical debate with regard to issues including 
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motivation, responsibility, akrasia (weakness of will), personal identity and the 
concept of human personhood. Such issues are raised with particular 
acuteness by the statement at v. 20: 
Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that 
dwells within me. 
This statement seems to suggest either a dualistic conception of the human 
person or a disclaimer of responsibility for one's own action, or both. 
Karl Barth, an important commentator on Pauline thought, held that the 
above statement reveals Paul's belief that he was constituted by his two 
selves residing in the one body.9 This dualistic conception of the human 
person, which Barth attributed to Paul, bothered Barth himself to the extent 
that he saw the need to reaffirm the one person-one self theory by way of 
response to Paul's view as he saw it: 
Reality, even the reality of religion, knows but one man ... within the 
four walls of the house of sin dwells but one man.10 
It needs to be examined, though, whether Barth is correct in his 
understanding of Paul's statement as implying a dualistic conception of the 
human person. Barth's interpretation of the passage is questionable in the 
light of Paul's claim (v. 7b) that it is sin (dwelling in him) which is to blame. 
Paul does not assert that there are two selves in him, one which does not 
want to sin and the other which actually sins. Nor does he claim the weaker 
dualistic thesis that there are two or more parts which comprise the self, one 
of which deplores certain acts while the other carries them out. Indeed, it 
seems as if he is trying to absolve himself from responsibility when he 
associates his sinful actions with sin itself. 
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It would be problematic, however, if this latter thesis were the only 
alternative reading of Paul's dilemma, because it is not without difficulties. It 
is a fundamental theological and moral difficulty if Paul is understood to be 
disclaiming responsibility for his own actions. C. H. Dodd deals, in particular, 
with this concern. In his defence of Paul, Dodd claims that Paul is not 
attempting to 'shuffle out of responsibility' but is instead pointing out the 
difficulty he encounters, being under the 'thraldom of sin' .11 Dodd continues to 
argue that what is actually happening when Paul does what he hates is that, 
while a part of him is under the thraldom of sin, another part-the ecrco 
av6pC07tov-resists. 
In his reading of the passage, Dodd attributes to Paul the view that the 
human person is comprised of at least two parts. Dodd's view is open to 
question because Paul does not seem to be suggesting that the tension 
arises because there are different parts of him at work. Instead, he claims 
that it is he himself rather than another part of him which both initiates and 
abhors sin and sinful acts: I can will what is right, but I cannot do it (v. 18); I 
delight in the law of God (v. 22) ... but I see in my members another law (v. 
23). It seems that what Paul is doing is merely referring to various aspects of 
his existence as a human being-for he identifies himself (eyco) with each of 
these aspects-rather than ascribing to himself a dual nature. 
Furthermore, it does not seem that Paul is trying to disclaim 
responsibility for his sinful actions. Indeed, the tension he encounters in 
facing up to sinful acts which he thinks he himself committed is expressed in 
the phrase "Wretched man that I am!" (v. 24) Clearly, in this agonising 
introspective exercise, Paul is claiming ownership of what he considers are 
sinful acts. 
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Given that Dodd's view is rejected, the problem still remains, of how we are 
to understand the comment, " ... it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells 
within me". If the claim is that Paul is not attempting to shuffle away 
responsibility, then it could be the case that he is simply dealing with an 
instance of akrasia: I do not do the good I want but the evil I do not want is 
what I do (v. 19). Gareth Matthews, who argues against Dodd's interpretation, 
rejects, as well, the thesis that Paul is trying to deal with akrasia. Instead, 
Matthews contends, the issue here is that of motivational opacity: 
The wicked actions are motivated by impulses and desires that St. 
Paul cannot, for whatever reason, recognize as his own. Since the 
motivation is opaque to him, the action it motivates is not, according to 
a familiar philosophical picture, really his own action. 12 
Matthews substantiates his reading of Pauline thought by referring to Locke's 
memory criterion of personal identity. According to this criterion, Matthews 
claims, if a person cannot remember having performed a certain action then it 
is not s/he who committed it. Thus, Matthews ascribes to Pauline thought a 
Lockean thesis of personal identity. 
Matthews acknowledges that his understanding of Pauline thought is 
problematic because it might allow for a self-righteous hypocrisy which 
represses the memory of the commission of a particular act while claiming 
that the righteous self is distinct and separate. In fact, Matthews seems to be 
accusing Paul of this 'second order' hypocrisy while at the same time saying 
that such a view is unjustifiable: 
... St. Paul is right to point out that sometimes one cannot recognize as 
one's own the motivation for what one does. The question is whether 
such motivational opacity, perhaps coupled with a conscious 
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condemnation of the sinful deed, justifies one's saying, "It is no longer 
I that do it. "13 
According to Matthews, too, Paul in his deliberation, is" ... pretending that 
[his] righteous self is distinct and separate, when such distinctness as it has 
rests on repression."14 Matthews' account is, however, problematic in a few 
ways. First, it assumes that Paul subscribes to a Lockean conception of 
personal identity: to 'the philosophical picture of the self as a self-transparent 
agent'. 15 Paul does not, however, allude to this thesis elsewhere in the other 
epistles nor in the Romans epistle itself. 
Secondly, Matthews' understanding of Locke's theory is simplistic; he 
claims that Locke's conception of personal identity encompasses the 
picturing of oneself as a self-transparent agent and, by extension, that" ... one 
has performed only those actions whose motivation one can recognize as 
having been one's own". 16 1t needs to be noted, though, that Paul is at one 
level conscious that the action is his even though it is motivationally opaque: 
there is guilt involved and this is one of the reasons why Paul is wrestling with 
'himself. As with the case of memory, if guilt is understood to be constitutive 
of one's self awareness-which, in Lockean terms, constitutes personal 
identity-then Matthews' thesis which aims to combine Pauline and Lockean 
views fails on its own terms because it could be argued that Paul does 
remember and does recognise those particular actions as his own. According 
to Matthews' analysis, it is unclear why either Locke or Paul should be 
understood as subscribing to the view that motivational clarity is constitutive 
of personal identity. 
The third and related objection to Matthews' thesis is that, contrary to 
what Matthews claims, Paul is grappling with the issue of volition and not of 
memory. Even if he is correct regarding the alleged motivational opacity of 
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Paul's sinful actions, Matthews inappropriately applies Locke's memory 
criterion of personal identity as an explanation of Paul's struggles. 
Finally, Matthews' explanation does not accommodate the larger 
context within which Paul's problem is situated. It is important that the 
difficulties Paul is facing with regard to volition and action are understood as 
part of his views on the requirements of the Jewish law and their relevance to 
the moral life of the believer. In his discussion of this larger issue, Paul 
attempts to nullify the requirements of the Torah. Even in this endeavour, 
there is indecisiveness, perhaps reflecting Paul's view on the predicament of 
life during the in-between time. While he says that the believer is already 
'discharged from the law' (Romans 7:6), at points, there is a marked 
ambivalence regarding this: "the law is binding on a person only during that 
person's lifetime" (7:1). Again, while Paul claims to be living 'in the new life of 
the Spirit' (7:6)-the antithesis to life according to crup~-he later states that 
'nothing good dwells within me, that is, in crap~' (7:18). 
In his study of Paul's anthropological terms (especially, in this case, of ecroo 
av8p001tov), Robert Jewett makes the point that the concept itself, as well as 
Paul's struggle, needs to be understood in the larger context of Paul's 
discussion of the Jewish law and sin.17 According to Jewett, Paul is, in this 
section, highlighting the possibility of how a law-abiding Jew could come into 
conflict with God's righteousness. Jewett interprets Paul's struggle as a sign 
of the frustration of a person's aim to gain life through the law. 
Jewett's thesis finds support in Paul's comment that obedience to law no 
longer works in this new atoov begun by the work of Christ; indeed, from the 
law arises both the concept and the possibility of transgression (against that 
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law) or sin (7:8-10). According to Jewett's account, therefore, Paul's problem 
is not a problem of the dualistic self but one which arises because of the 
circumstances of existence within this age (mrov) and time. 
In line with Jewett's proposal, an important idea that needs to be 
examined is the connection between sin and crap~: Paul claims not only that 
sin dwells within him (7:20), but specifically that the law of sin dwells in his 
members (iJ.eA.os) (7:23) and in crap~ (7:25). That the law of sin is operative in 
crap~ is an idea that has not been explored fully in connection with this 
paragraph in the Romans letter. In this context, crap~ has commonly and 
mistakenly been aligned both with the self in 7:20 and with iJ.eA.os in 7:23; the 
three together being understood to refer to bodily existence as contrasted 
with the life of the inner man. What, furthermore, gives rise to this 
interpretation of crap~ is its apparent symmetrical usage in discussing the 
connection between the law of God and vous. While the law of God is 
operative in vous, Paul writes, the law of sin is operative in crap~ (7:25). In 
this statement, Paul has often been interpreted to mean that the connection 
between the law of God and vous is symmetrical to that between the law of 
sin and crap~. 
It needs to be noted, however, that the connection between the two is 
not symmetrical because, in the first place, vous and crap~ are not parallel 
concepts. Some accounts of the sin-crap~ relation, including those of Dodd's 
and Matthews' discussed above, misconstrue Paul's problem in the sense 
that they conceptualise crap~ as, in line with vous, referring to a certain 
portion or aspect of the human person. Dodd's account, for example, does 
not properly understand Paul's conception of crap~ and thus interprets Paul's 
problem as being based on a dualistic conception of human nature. 
Matthews' thesis does not attempt to investigate or explain crap~ and 
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bypasses that important concept to account for Paul's problem in terms of 
motivational opacity. The point made here is that both Matthew's and Dodd's 
accounts fail to capture the crux of Paul's problem in Romans 7 because 
while Dodd misconstrues crap~. Matthews does not even attempt to deal with 
it. 
fup~ can only be properly understood within the context of its most frequent 
usage: as antithesis to 1tVEt>J.La. While both crap~ and 1tVEt>J.La could be 
understood as constituents of human nature, the more adequate framework 
within which to conceptualise them is Paul's eschatological characterisation 
of the concepts as domains of power which impact on human life and 
existence. 18 Indeed, crap~ and 1tVEt>J.La are not merely antithetical, there is an 
antinomy between them: they are conflicting normative systems. 
Thus, within this particular discussion, crap~ is a dominating force in an 
age, or framework, in which the law of sin is the primary operating principle. 
This means that Christian existence in the present mrov is riddled with the 
dominance of the law of sin. Accordingly, Paul moves on to conclude that he 
is, at least, not fully responsible for his sinful actions. This does not mean that 
existence is itself sinful, nor that one is deterministically bound to sin. Rather, 
Paul expresses the difficulties of living in a time period in which the forces of 
evil reign supreme. This idea has to be understood in the context of its 
contrast to 1tVEt>J.La, in which the spirit of God reigns supreme. The antithesis 
between crap~ and 1tVEt>f.La, therefore, is not between immoral or sinful flesh 
and obedient vous but, rather, between the sin-ridden realm of flesh and the 
preferred and imminent realm of spirit. 
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In addition, it needs to be noted that Paul is not necessarily proposing a 
universal thesis about human agency. He could be understood, instead, to be 
simply articulating a type of psychological experience that moral agents 
experience from time to time: I couldn't help myself; I don't understand my 
actions; wretched man that I am. This does not mean, however, that Paul is 
expressing symptoms of akrasia and that it follows that the interpretation of 
Paul as having internalist views is nullified. Instead, Paul's difficulty arises 
because of his intema/ist assumptions. His very predicament itself, especially 
his statement that he cannot understand his own actions, reveals his 
frustration with the fact that there should be an internalist connection between 
a person's perspective and his/her behaviour but there seemingly is not when 
s/he still commits sinful acts. 
Paul's internalist views figure most prominently in what Bultmann terms the 
indicative-imperative connection. According to Bultmann, Paul attempts to 
persuade the believers that, given that their perspectives on life have 
changed since their conversion, what should follow is an accompanying 
change in their behaviours and ways of living. In emphasising this 'be what 
you are' dictum, Paul is not merely assuming that the imperative is based 
upon or proceeds out of the indicative. Rather, the imperative is fully integral 
to the indicative. 19 In other words, what Bultmann seems to be pointing out is 
that Paul, in reasoning with the believers, uses the following naturalistic 
argument: given that their ontological status is changed because of Christ's 
work, then there should be an accompanying moral change in their 
behaviours. 
According to Bultmann, this accompanying moral change is not merely 
another event connected with the ontological change. The two 
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transformations are, rather, two aspects of the same event. The believer is a 
'new creation' (II Corinthians 5:17) and the perceptible changes brought 
about by that new creation are manifest in the believer's behaviours (Romans 
3:24; 12:2; 12:9-15:6; I Corinthians 4:1-13; II Corinthians 4:1-16; Galatians 
4:8-9; 4:31-5:1). Paul's reasoning strategy often involves reminding the 
believers of Christ's work and then drawing the conclusion that their lives and 
behaviours should reveal this event. Thus, it seems that Paul's indicative-
imperative is a cognitivist theory. What he is asserting is that the appropriate 
response on the part of the believer, on his/her recognition of the Christ-
event, is to become like Christ. 
A cognitivist understanding of the indicative-imperative construction is upheld 
by Morna Hooker who, in discussing the Romans epistle, remarks that Paul's 
concepts of divine grace and human response are so intimately intertwined 
that the latter is a consequent imperative of the former. 20 Hooker writes: 
Paul's logic holds divine grace and human response firmly together: 
without the mercies of God, men are not able to respond to God in true 
worship; when they experience them, then response to the demand to 
acknowledge God and to give him glory becomes both imperative and 
feasible. 21 
Hooker's reading captures the cognitivism which Paul presupposes. 
However, as Hooker points out, although Paul assumes the indicative-
imperative construction, he does not rely only on the idea of the interchange 
in order to urge a change of life. Rather, he backs up his indicative-
imperative, all through the epistles, with encouragement, with warnings of 
future judgment, and even with demands for obedience. As much as Paul 
would like to maintain an internalist connection between attitudinal 
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perspective and behaviour, he finds, even in his own personal experience, 
that the implied connection is not as internalistic as he assumes it to be. 
Paul's statements in Romans 7 could simply express his struggle to be moral 
or, more specifically, to be obedient to the will of God.22 He alludes to 
instances in which moral or appropriate behaviour does not come easily to 
the agent, even to those who have adopted a new attitude and perspective. 
He is discussing a feature of the human predicament: he desires to be moral 
but at times is not; he feels almost as if he were powerless, almost as if there 
were another agent at work independent of himself and beyond his control, 
working through his body. He almost wants to say he is not responsible 
because he cannot reconcile his attitude-which he considers to be positively 
affected by the law of God-with his sinful actions. In these sinful acts, Paul's 
internalist assumptions come under scrutiny and are proven to be 
questionable. Paul, without disclaiming responsibility, names the source of 
the problem as a factor beyond his control: the fact of his existence within a 
particular realm of power. 
In doing so, however, Paul does not then take the line that his bodily 
existence itself, or his bodily existence within the present auov is evil, sinful, 
worthless or to be repressed. On the contrary, he affirms the importance of 
living out the present life as it is in its bodily manifestation and, indeed, of 
doing that well; Paul proposes what would then have been an unusual idea: 
that the body should be presented, holy, as part of one's spiritual worship 
(Romans 12). Paul's belief in the moral neutrality of the body or of bodily 
existence, as contrasted with the then contemporary gnostic views as well as 
with the views held by some of the enthusiastic believers, is the topic of the 
next section. 
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3.1.4 Body: ~COJ.la 
Paul's most frequent usage of the concept O'COJ.la is in morally and 
theologically neutral reference to human bodily existence. For Paul, physical 
bodily existence is, in itself, without significance for the moral or theological 
life of the believer in the sense that the physical body, being inanimate and 
without intention, did not or could not, either positively or negatively, affect 
those aspects of the believer's life. While the term is used in phrases such as 
"Body of Christ" to designate the collection of believers and their corporate 
life, crroJ.la used on its own refers to the physical, this-worldly aspect of the 
human being. 23 In other words, it is used to establish otherness, not only from 
God, but also from other human beings, and, in addition, from other species. 
Unlike other contemporary views of human nature in his time, Paul's 
concept of human nature was not a dualistic one in which the body, as 
opposed to the mind, the spirit or the soul, was depreciated. This belief of 
Paul's led to frequent debates with the libertinists and the gnostics, both of 
which upheld dualistic conceptions of human nature. The enthusiastic 
believers believed that, given that the spiritual dimension of human existence 
was most important and significant, and that since the body was mortal and 
the spirit immortal, it followed that the former was morally indifferent and 
incapable of affecting the pneumatic core of the person. This belief led to 
serious ethical and other practical difficulties as, for example, with some 
enthusiasts in Thessalonica who, in expectant hope of the day of the Lord, 
decided that it was unnecessary to work for a living (II Thessalonians). 
The other group that Paul had to deal with in regard to the concept of 
O'COJ.la were the gnostics. They not only emphasised the spiritual existence 
over the bodily, some of them believed that the body was evil or was 
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associated with sinful deeds. Such depreciation of bodily existence had 
several undesirable practical consequences for the early Christian 
communities. For example, some of these gnostic Christians engaged in 
sexual immorality on the grounds that the body was necessarily associated 
with such acts. Paul felt the need to deal with this situation and, in doing so, 
drew a disanalogy between food meant for the stomach and fornication that 
was not for the body (I Corinthians 6:12ff). 
There was also, amongst these gnostic Christians, some suggestion of 
bodily mutilation in the quest for the spiritual life. In I Corinthians 9:27, Paul 
writes as if he himself was involved in such activity: 
I punish my body and enslave it, so that after proclaiming to others I 
myself should not be disqualified. 
This statement, however, is followed immediately by its rejection. Referring to 
the wanderings of the Jews in early Jewish history, Paul claims that although 
they participated in appropriate spiritual activities, most of the Jews were not 
accepted by god (I Corinthians 10:1-5). In spite of their fulfilment of the 
necessary requirements with regard to spiritual activities, these people were 
disqualified; this event, according to Paul, should serve as a warning to 
gnostic Christians regarding their warped conceptualisations of the physical 
body. 
This pattern of reasoning-whereby Paul first states a view and 
subsequently rejects it-is utilised as well in the Romans epistle with regard 
to conceptions of crro!J.a. Debating with the gnostics here as well, Paul refers 
to the body in association with death and sin: body of sin (6:6); body of death 
(7:24); dead body (8:10); mortal body (8:11). Following each ofthese 
conceptions, however, Paul offers a competing, often positive, alternative 
understanding. In the case ofthe body of sin, Paul makes the point that it is 
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the sinful body rather than the body itself which is to be subject to death. In 
addition, although the body is mortal, neither materiality nor embodiment are, 
in themselves or in combination, sufficient conditions for sin or death (8:10-
11). Furthermore, Paul construes death positively, as a necessary stage in 
the believer's life: one dies with Christ so that one can be raised with him 
(6:5-11). Indeed, the redemption of the body does not entail release from 
croo1.w. but rather its positive transformation (8:23). 
From the Pauline perspective, embodied existence was a necessary 
feature of life. For Paul, this belief led to the view that, although the body was 
intentionally inert, what one did to and with one's body was important and 
significant in that bodily activities were a reflection, as well as an expression, 
of one's attitudes and beliefs or, in other words, of the inner spiritual and 
moral aspects of the individual. For Paul, the expression of oneself in and 
through one's embodiment is not merely a revelation of the thinking and 
intentional self but is to be understood more integrally as an important aspect 
of one's worship of God (Romans 12:1 ,2; II Corinthians 7:1; Philippians 
3:21).24 Jewett expresses this idea succinctly: 
"Body" here [in Philippians 3:21] is the necessary constitution which 
enables one to re-enact in the life of faith the destiny of Christ. 25 
In Romans 12, Paul presents what would then have been a new dimension of 
Christian ethics: the (holy) body is to be presented in response to God's 
divine righteousness; to "offer your bodies" is but one and the same process 
with "the worship offered by attitude and heart" (Romans 12:1; also II 
Corinthians 7:1). With regard to the aspect of moral behaviour, the body is to 
be kept unblemished and sanctified for God (I Thessalonians 5:23); being 
moral is expressed in terms of "glorify[ing] God in your body" (I Corinthians 
6:12-20) and of making oneself acceptable to him (II Corinthians 5:6-10). 
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What emerges from this discussion of Paul's conception of crro~om is Paul's 
innovative construction of the concept which allows not only for the 
expression of the person through the body but, more significantly, for that 
expression to be seen as relevant to, and as an integral part of, one's spiritual 
worship. More generally, it can be seen that Paul maintains a holistic 
conception of the human person: attitude is connected internalistically to 
one's behaviour and actions; intention, belief, emotion and affection derive 
from the one source, Kapau:x. In addition, embodied existence is both 
necessary and integral to human existence. For Paul, thus, the human being 
is an intentional, responsible agent held accountable for his/her behaviours 
and acts as well as for the kinds of activities he/she engages in. 
At a more fundamental level, Paul holds the agent responsible for his 
choice between two possible, contrasting modes of life. Because, for Paul, 
perspectivity is important in that it is the ground of all intention, motivation, 
affection and emotion which are, in turn, sources of human action and 
behaviour, he urges the believers to make a change in their perspectives by 
making a determinate choice to live a Christ-like life or, in other words, a 
choice for life in the spirit. Paul sets up a dualistic conflict, using two sets of 
metaphors, to express these modes of life. The first is the dualistic contrast 
between the lives of Adam and Christ, used respectively as exemplars of 
mortality and sin, on the one hand, and of immortality, righteousness and 
obedience on the other. The second dualism is the contrast between life in 
the spirit and life in the flesh, a dualism, it is argued, not of human nature but, 
instead, of human existence within these respective realms of power. These 
dualisms are dealt with in the following section. 
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3.2 Modes of Life 
The contrasting ways of life which Paul sets up as options for the believers 
are based, in large part, on his eschatology and his theology. The believers 
have to make their choices because new possibilities for human existence 
have arisen as a consequence of Christ's work. Paul emphasises, in a variety 
of ways, that Christ's death and resurrection have effected an ontological 
change in the conditions and statuses of the believers in a variety of ways: 
(a) the old man has died (Romans 6:5-6); 
(b) the believer is a new creation (II Corinthians 5:17); 
(c) there is freedom from slavery to sin (Romans 6:15-23); 
(d) there is freedom from the requirements of the Jewish laws 
(Galatians 5:1-16); 
(e) believers are servants of Christ (I Corinthians 4); and 
(f) believers are sons of God (Galatians 4:4-5). 
In recognition of their changed status, the appropriate way in which the 
believers are to respond is to manifest the set of actions and behaviours that 
are defined in the epistles as being Christ-like and as exhibiting, most 
prominently, the quality of love (aya1tll). 
On the other hand, however, in spite of his/her newly-defined life, the 
believer, in his/her very existence in the current time and age, is confronted 
by opportunities and options offered and dominated by the powers which are 
operative in that realm of crap~. The convert to Paul's Christianity was not 
merely in between two times but actually in two times.26 This meant, for Paul 
and his converts, that human existence during that time was fraught with 
tension: the tension of choice between contrasting and conflicting powers and 
loyalties. While Christ's work marked the beginning of a new oo.rov, the 
change had yet to come to its completion-its 1:eA.os. This was the difficult 
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time of the 'already but not yet'.27 In this period, transformation had begun but 
was not complete, and its result was still outstanding (Romans 6:3-8)28• 
The new had begun for the believers; yet, it was not realised because 
the forces of the old O:tolv still ruled. While Christ had completed his work, the 
possibilities of conducting an Adamic life were still available. The two modes 
of life, as Paul presented them, were incompatible and inconsistent with each 
other. The dynamics of these two lifestyles are discussed in the following 
section. 
3.2.1 Dualism: Christ and Adam 
In the dualistic contrast he sets up between Adam and Christ as exemplars of 
contrasting modes of life, Paul repudiates any possible suggestion that 
Adam, for the Jews the father-figure of all humanity, was an adequate 
example of Christian life.29 1n doing so, Paul was rejecting any Jewish claim 
to the religion and to special rights to interpret Christ's death and 
resurrection. 
In setting out (in Romans 5:12-21) the respective characteristics of 
lives modelled upon the lives of Adam and Christ, Paul claims that because 
of Christ's work, the Adamic life and its values are no longer relevant and are, 
indeed, inferior to the values and characteristics of the Christ-like life. He 
reiterates the Jewish concept of the pervasiveness of original sin and names 
Adam as the representative of sinfulness and disobedience (Romans 5:12; 
18; 19). In contrast, Christ's work is an act of grace, freeing all from death 
due to sin. Freedom from condemnation to death implies life: Paul refers to 
death and life as metaphors of the two possible modes of existence. Because 
to live 'in Christ' ('in newness of life': Romans 6:4) is to embody a particular 
set of values-a set drastically different from and incompatible with all 
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previously existing ones-the believer has first to 'die' to previous modes of 
life incompatible with those of the coming age (Romans 6:6-11). The 
difference in the two modes of life could be represented tabled thus: 
ev Aoau 
death 
sin 
judgment (realm of law) 
condemnation 
disobedience 
EV 3ptrum 
life 
righteous 
free gift of grace 
justification 
obedience 
In Paul's exhortation of the believers to choose to live a life inspired by Christ, 
he again uses an indicative-imperative construction: Christ's work has been 
done and grace abounds (Romans 5:20,21). It follows that the appropriate 
response of the believer, in practical terms, is to stop indulging in acts of sin 
(Romans 6:1-2): "How can we who died to sin go on living in it?" 
Although Paul presents two modes of life to the believers, it is implied 
by the indicative-imperative construction that there is only one real option for 
their existence: life in Christ. Paul's point is a prescriptive one; he believes 
the converts should choose life in Christ although, existentially, there remains 
the possibility of living the Adamic life. The possibility of reverting to an 
Adamic life is implied in Paul's statement that: 
... you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in 
Christ Jesus. Therefore, do not let sin exercise dominion in your mortal 
bodies, to make you obey their passions. No longer present your 
members to sin as instruments of wickedness, but present yourselves 
to God as those who have been brought from death to life, and 
present your members to God as instruments of righteousness. 
(Romans 6:11-13; italics mine) 
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Paul's encouragement to the converts places the responsibility of choice on 
the converts themselves. The idea of choice, in turn, implies the availability of 
options. There is ongoing debate, however, regarding the connection 
between the two options, and the nature of the choices available. Karl Barth, 
a major interpreter of Pauline theology, was of the view that although Adam 
and Christ are representative figures of human life, they do not, in Pauline 
thought, represent equally possible options.30 According to him, the special 
anthropologies of Jesus Christ and of Adam are both representative of 
human nature but there is no symmetry between the two because the 
relationship of the believer to Adam is only secondary whereas that to Christ 
is primary and fundamental. Because essential and original human nature is 
embodied by the Christ figure, it follows that Adam's humanity is a 
provisional copy of the real humanity that is in Christ. 
In explaining Paul's construction of the Adam-Christ dualism, Barth felt 
the need to ground moral superiority in essential priority: life in Christ is the 
preferred option because ontologically, or essentially, our identity is with 
Christ rather than with Adam. Barth considers the believer's relationship with 
Adam as a 'secondary truth' which "depends for its reality on [one's] 
relationship to Christ."31 He bases this reasoning upon the statement that 
Adam is "a type of the one who was to come" (Romans 5:14)-although it is 
not clear what Paul means by 'type' ('runos). Barth's interpretation of the 
Adam-Christ connection and of the believers' choice between the two rests 
on his interpretation of 't'llnos. For him, the notion of type-of being a type-
involves standing in a particular relation to that of which one is a type. 
Specifically, the type is not merely ontologically derivative of (and existentially 
dependent upon) that of which it is a type, it is also evaluatively inferior to the 
original. 
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It seems that Barth is imposing on Pauline thought a conception of 
human nature built upon too tight a connection between human nature and 
Christ-like nature. A problematic implication of Barth's reading is that with his 
assertion that the believer's relationship with Christ is 'original' and 'essential', 
he appears to be excluding the possibility of the convert choosing to revert to 
an Adamic way of life. There is, on his account, the idea that the believer 
chooses not between two equally opposing systems embodying contrasting 
values but rather between what is primary and secondary; and it seems that 
the believer has no choice but to choose that which is primary. Thus, as 
Barth states: 
We have come to Christ as believers and Christians, because we had 
already come from Christ, so that there was nothing else for us to do 
but believe in Him.32 
Although Barth's statement takes the form of a logical conclusion, it states 
what is merely and trivially true: choice for the primary (Christ-like life), as 
opposed to choice for the secondary (Adamic life), is a foregone conclusion. 
In seeking to understand this dualism, Barth has confused and conflated the 
evaluative and the ontological: in effect, he has assumed ontological priority 
from evaluative superiority. For Barth, the preferred option is also, at the 
same time, the only possibility. 
Because he conflates the two issues, Barth's account presents a 
particularly deterministic interpretation of Pauline theology and ethics. The 
idea that there is 'nothing else for [the believer] to do' is problematic in that it 
does not account for tensions in human motivation and action as expressed, 
for example, by Paul in passages such as Romans 7. 
Another difficulty with Barth's account is that he fails to place the 
Adam-Christ connection within Paul's eschatology. Indeed, he evades the 
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whole issue of the believer in this in-between time when the believer seems 
to be living in two times. The only sense of time his reading encompasses is 
in the idea that the Adamic life is now past and believers should live a life in 
Christ. This understanding of the temporal sequence, while not incorrect, is 
inadequate and thus reduces Pauline theology. The Adamic and Christ-like 
lives are not to be simplistically construed in terms of one being obsolete and 
the other current. Rather, both modes of life are available while the believers 
await the full realisation of an auov in which the law of sin no longer operates. 
Kasemann, another prominent scholar of Pauline thought, captures the 
difficult predicament of the believer in Paul's time: 
Apparently, Paul viewed his own time as the hour of the Messiah's 
birth-pangs in which the new creation emerges from the old world. 
Spirits, powers and dominions part eschatologically at the crossroads 
of the gospel. We thus arrive at the dialectic of 'once' and 'now', which 
is absorbed into anthropology in the form of 'already saved' and 'still 
tempted'.33 
The same predicament in human existence is expressed in the dualistic 
tension between crap~ and 1tVEUila. a tension which, it seems, Barth's 
account cannot accommodate. While the representative figures of Adam and 
Christ are used metaphorically to signify modes of human existence, the 
crap~-1tVEUila dichotomy applies more widely to encompass tension in 
human existence as well as the conflict of forces in which all of creation is 
trapped. 
3.2.2 Flesh and Spirit: fup~ and nveulla 
That crap~ and 1tVEUila refer, in Pauline thought, to competing spheres of 
power is an idea almost unchallenged.34 Apart from various points in the 
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epistles in which crap~ is used in place of crroJ.La35, crap~ and 1tV£UJ.La are most 
frequently presented as forces in opposition operative at a cosmic, extra-
personal level; trapped in this opposition is the whole of creation, including 
humankind (Romans 8:19-23).36 
The crap~-1tV£UJ.La tension, like the Christ-Adam dualism, is necessarily 
situated in Pauline eschatology: the realm of 1tV£UJ.La, a phenomenon of the 
future, has begun since Christ's death and resurrection. Given, however, that 
the dominion of 1tV£UJ.La is not yet fully realised, what it co-exists with (and is 
in tension with) is the power of crap~. The difficulty, from the point of view of 
human existence, is that of conflicting loyalties to these domains of power. 
From a socio-ethical point of view, life according to JtV£UJ.La yields behavioural 
characteristics such as love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, 
faithfulness, gentleness and self-control, while life according to crap~ 
manifests itself in deeds including fornication, impurity, licentiousness, 
idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissension, 
factions, envy, drunkenness and carousing (Galatians 5:16-26). 
From an existential point of view, what had to be determined were the 
implications for human agency of being caught in between the conflict of two 
competing powers operating at the cosmic level. This is important because, 
in the two significant sections dealing with the crap~-1tV£UJ.La tension (Romans 
6-8; Galatians 3-5), Paul relates law and sin with the realm of crap~ and, in 
contrast, justification and (certain senses of) freedom with the realm of 
1tV£UJ.La. Paul's conception of sin-with its important implications for human 
agency-needs to be examined within the frameworks of the crap~-1tV£UJ.La 
conflict. 
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In each of his letters to the Galatian and the Roman churches, Paul 
questions the believers' adherence to the Mosaic law, specifically with 
respect to its requirement for male circumcision. Paul not only challenges 
attempts to fulfil the requirements of the law (Romans 7:5-7; 8:3; Galatians 
5:2); even more forcefully, he emphases that doing so has negative 
outcomes in that it leads to condemnation (Romans 7:9-13; Galatians 3:10; 
5:4). This issue had arisen because of the nomistic tendency of certain 
groups of believers who felt the need to express their faith in observable 
ways through adherence to the Jewish law. In connecting the operation of 
law with the sphere of crap~ (Romans 7:1; 7:5ff; Galatians 5:18), Paul claims 
that, whereas the fulfilment of the criteria of the law was once a necessary 
condition of (Jewish) life (Romans 7:1-13; Galatians 3:19-4:31), it is now 
obsolete because the sphere of crap~ has been replaced by the sphere of 
1tVEUJ.l.a: 
... the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the 
law ofsin and of death ... so that the just requirement of the law might 
be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to 
the spirit. (Romans 8:2,4) 
In passages such as this, Paul interprets the cosmic crcxp~-rrvewa tension in 
terms of its implications for the daily lives of the believers. The present 
situation is presented as an unsatisfactory one: because the law of sin is a 
dominating force within the realm of crap~ (Romans 7), what is necessary to 
deal with it is the application of rules (Judaic laws) to behaviour. Referring to 
law as the 'old written code', Paul is keen to point out that it is not law itself 
which is the source of sin or which causes sin, although it creates the context 
for sin (Romans 7:6-8): " ... if it had not been for the law, I would not have 
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known sin." Indeed, Paul at times seems to draw and necessary and 
sufficient connection between law and (the possibility of) sin. 
From the perspective of human agency, the human being is situated, during 
the period of the early Christian church, in an atrov within which both the 
forces of crap~ and 1tVE"Il~a are active. There is, therefore, a choice to be 
made: the choice to live according to the dictates of the Jewish law which, 
according to Paul, are operative in the sphere of crap~, or according to faith in 
the salvatory effects of Christ's work. In this choice, the believer is a fully 
responsible agent. S/he is asked not to present her/his members to sin but 
rather to present oneself to God: you present your members (Romans 6:13-
19). 
In that connection, it could be argued that what Paul constructs as sin 
is belief in the effectiveness and necessity of obeying the dictates of law in 
spite of the recognition and acknowledgment that the Christ event has 
brought about both ontological and moral changes in one's life. Paul asks the 
Galatian converts: "Having started in the spirit, are you now ending in the 
flesh?" (Galatians 3:3). What the newly-converted believers are supposed to 
do, according to Paul, is to live a life that has been transformed by the Christ 
event and not to revert to a life in conformity with Jewish law-which, Paul 
suggests, is a human and merely cultural construct (Romans 7:7). In the 
Philippians epistle, too, when Paul gives as an example his personal 
experience, he claims that his own achievements according to the 
requirements of the law-born a Jew, circumcised, a Pharisee, blameless 
under the law-are, in the light ofthe Christ-event, to be considered loss' ... 
because of the surpassing value of knowing Christ Jesus' (3:8). He asks the 
converts to 'forget what lies behind' in order to '[strain] forward to what lies 
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ahead' (3:13). In these sections of the epistles, the crux of the problem, in 
Paul's view, is the commitment of the believer to both systems, the new as 
well as the old. 
In line with the construal of crap~ and nveulla described above, Robert 
Jewett, who emphasises the necessity of analysing the crap~-1tVEU!la conflict 
in the Galatians and Romans epistles in terms of Paul's need to deal with the 
nomistic believers, believes that Paul is, in these sections, dealing with the 
issue of allegiance: 
The key to the "flesh" concept is not that it weakens man's will to do 
the good, but that it lures him to substitute his own good for God's. The 
''flesh" is Paul's term for everything aside from God in which one 
places his final trust. 37 
Jewett's analysis throws light on why, although the law itself is not sinful, 
allegiance to it leads to sin. In Paul's view, it is not merely inconsistent, but 
sinful, to be committed to both systems. For the convert to Paul's Christianity 
to seek salvation through obedience to the law is reflective of an attitude 
which is confident in the effectiveness of obedience to the law and, with this, 
a lack of confidence in the potency of the Christ event. This is important for 
Paul because a fundamental commitment to the effectiveness of obedience 
to the law as bringing about the believer's salvation necessarily results in law-
dictated behaviour:" ... those who live according to crap~ have perspectives 
which are focussed on or controlled by (<l>povoumv: from vous) crap~ 
(Romans 8:5). To live according to crap~. however, is directly in opposition to 
how Paul conceives of Christian life: certainly, it should not be lawlike and, 
specifically, not restricted to the laws of a particular cultural tradition. In this 
connection, Paul stresses that those who rely on the works of law (e~ epyrov 
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VOJ.lOU etmv) are in fact under a curse (Galatians 3:10) because what is a 
requirement of Christian life is that one be obedient from the heart (Kapota) 
(Romans 6:17).38 
What emerges from this discussion of Paul's crap~-1tVEUJ.1U conflict as well as 
the Adam-Christ contrast is, among other things, a clear demonstration of 
Paul's conception of human life and agency. He holds the human being fully 
responsible for his or her action and behaviour. In this connection, what 
bothers Paul about aberrant and disruptive behaviours and actions-more 
significantly than their consequences-is that they are manifestations of 
one's beliefs and attitudes. 
Regarding the substantive content of these modes of life, Paul upholds a 
series of community-building and community-sustaining values. 39 1n 
upholding these values, Paul presents the early church communities not with 
rules but rather with principles and values for acting and behaving. These 
principles and values are derived from Paul's conception of the ideal life-life 
as a believer within a community of believers. The problem of the believers 
not abiding by Paul's principles and values was not the only problem for Paul. 
Apart from motivational issues, some of Paul's ideals were extremely radical 
and there were, therefore, difficulties associated with their realisation. He 
believed, for example, that certain existing social categories should be 
abolished. Advocating the rejection of established and accepted social 
conventions, Paul makes remarks such as: "There is no longer Jew or Greek, 
there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of 
you are one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28). This is the ethic which governs 
the life to come, the life which is, on the other hand, available for the 
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believers now. However, Paul seems to back away from this progressive 
ideal and advises the converts to, during this in-between period, 'remain in 
whatever condition you were called' (I Corinthians 7:24). This dilemma is 
discussed in the next section. 
3.2.3 Slavery, Womanhood and Marriage40 
Part of Paul's concern as the apostle to the Gentiles was to define a new set 
of values and beliefs that, he believed, marked the difference between a life 
that was affected by the Christ event and one that was not. The value system 
constructed by Paul to guide the life of the early church community was, in 
some ways, a critique of existing contemporary practices, beliefs and 
attitudes. Among some of the values and practices he questioned were those 
of slavery and those relating to the status of women. 
The issue of slavery is mentioned only occasionally in the epistles. Apart from 
his letter to Philemon, Paul's two other references to slavery are in I 
Corinthians 7:21-24 and Galatians 3:28. In each ofthese instances, Paul 
seems to be challenging either the slave-master distinction or the institution 
of slavery itself, or both. There is no doubt that Paul was aware of the 
predicament of the slave.41 However, to postulate that Paul construed slavery 
as social injustice is merely conjectural. There is, for example, much debate 
concerning Paul's letter to Philemon and what he intends to achieve through 
the letter.42 
In this letter, Paul encourages through love (CX)'(X1t11)-though he later 
commands obedience in v. 21-that Philemon should treat Onesimus 'no 
longer as a slave, but more than a slave' (ouKE-n ros oouA.ov a).J,: U1tEp 
oouA.ov: v.16). What Paul actually meant by 'more than' or 'above' a slave is 
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difficult to interpret. A weak interpretation (of what Paul is seeking in the 
Philomen letter) is that Paul is simply claiming that he disapproves of the 
subordination of slavery. Stronger readings of Paul's intention include the 
manumission of Onesimus. 
One aspect of Paul's directive to Philemon is, however, clear: Paul 
wants Onesimus to be treated as a brother.43 The very fact of this epistle 
demonstrates Paul's concern, though perhaps more for Onesimus than for 
the institution of slavery. The larger issue of slavery as a social institution is 
only indirectly addressed and it is not clear whether Paul is indeed concerned 
with it. Barclay, who deals with Paul's treatment of slavery expressed in the 
letter to Philemon, offers the following reasons for Paul's failure to deal with 
the issue more thoroughly: 
If we are right to detect in this letter a sense of tension in grappling 
with the question of Christian brotherhood and slavery, we cannot 
conclude that Paul was wholly uninterested in the social realities of the 
master-slave relationship or considered that the gospel had nothing to 
do with the social structures of the world. To ask why he did not 
advocate the abolition of slavery in its entirety is perhaps to pose an 
anachronistic and inappropriate question: no-one in the ancient world 
could imagine the social economy operation without slaves ... and, in 
any case, Paul shows little concern with social questions beyond the 
boundaries of the church.44 
Barclay's analysis is right on several counts: 
(a) it is inconclusive, from the letter to Philemon, that Paul as not 
interested in the social realities of the master-slave relation; 
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(b) it is inconclusive, from the letter to Philemon, that Paul considered 
that the gospel had nothing to do with the social structures of the 
world; and 
(c) to ask why Paul did not advocate the abolition of slavery in its 
entirety is to pose an anachronistic and inappropriate question. 
Barclay's analysis presents some of the difficulties involved in attempts to 
unravel Paul's intention. In addition, an examination of the sections of the 
Galatians and I Corinthians epistles on slavery reveal that the understanding 
that Paul was seeking to abolish the institution of slavery is not the only 
possible interpretation of Paul's stance. 
In the letter to the Galatians, Paul reminds the believers that the conditions of 
their lives are now different: "There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no 
longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one 
in Christ Jesus" (3:28). In I Corinthians 7, Paul discusses issues pertaining 
exactly to these three topics; he deals with slavery, marriage and 
circumcision. The Corinthian letter itself reveals the difficulties Paul had in 
attempting to define the practical manifestations of the new life. With regard 
to marriage, for example, he deals with the fundamental issues including the 
concept of and the rationale for marriage within the framework of the new life 
of the believers. With circumcision, he advocates that those who are 
circumcised remain so, and that those who are uncircumcised remain so as 
well. Affirming his stance on the impotence of circumcision as a means of 
salvation, he asks that the believers" ... remain in the condition in which [they] 
were called" (I Corinthians 7:20). Similarly, with slavery, Paul first overturns 
existing attitudes and expectations: " .. whoever was called in the Lord as a 
slave is a freed person belonging to the Lord, just as whoever was free when 
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called is a slave of Christ" (I Corinthians 7:22). His views on these topics in 
this letter are, however, somewhat diffuse for he writes, in I Corinthians 7:24: 
"In whatever condition you were called, brothers and sisters, there remain 
with God." With each of the three issues in I Corinthians 7, Paul first 
advocates a new condition of life which involves a rejection of previous 
modes and subsequently-and surprisingly-moves on to ask the believers 
to accept and to remain in their existing conditions. 
There are at least two ways in which Paul's apparent indecision could 
be understood. Clearly, he is bringing into question the categories associated 
with the social divisions of culture, status and gender. The first possible 
understanding of Paul's stance is the simpler interpretation that Paul is 
merely asserting the invalidity of these distinctions and, accordingly, 
questioning the use and usefulness of the categories associated with the 
distinctions, within the community of believers. Paul's remark in Galatians 
that" ... all of you are one in Christ Jesus" could serve to indicate that his 
remarks on slavery are applicable made within this frame of reference. In this 
connection, Paul's statement in I Corinthians 7 for the converts to 'remain' in 
their existing conditions could be understood to mean that, given that these 
categories are irrelevant anyway, it did not make a difference to their 
membership in the community whether they were Jew, Greek, slave, master, 
male or female. This conception of Paul's attitude toward existing norms and 
values is not inconsistent with the idea that Paul was attempting to outline 
and define a new set of values and codes appropriate to the new lives of the 
believers.45 
A second, and stronger, interpretation of Paul's attitude toward slavery 
is that considered by Barclay: that Paul seems to be urging the abolition of 
slavery. This reading leaves it as an open question, though, whether Paul 
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was addressing only the communities of believers or whether he intended his 
statements to apply to the larger community. 
Regardless of what conclusions are drawn regarding Paul's intended 
audience, Paul's difficulties and seeming indecision regarding the abolition of 
slavery could be attributed to the fact that, given that I Corinthians was one of 
his earlier epistles, Paul, was still hoping that the 'day of the Lord', 
(7ta.poucna) was imminent. If Paul believed that the napoucna was at hand, 
he may have thought to avoid social and political confusion and unrest-
within the community of believers as well as the larger community-brought 
about by overturning social structures. It could be said that Paul, being 
idealist as regards the obliteration of social structures, is also realist in 
wanting to avoid social conflict and tension, especially since this community 
was a newly-formed one and given that it was expected to change again 
soon. 
In summary, therefore, the fact that Paul writes against the slave-master 
distinction could mean any of the following: 
(a) that the categories are irrelevant with respect to membership in the 
communities of believers; or 
(b) that the institution of slavery should no longer be accepted. In other 
words, the forms of existence pertaining to the institution of slavery, 
whether as master or slave, are irrelevant and obsolete. This abolition 
should take place either 
(i) within the believing communities; or 
(ii) for all people, both within and outside the believing 
communities. 
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Paul's approach to culture and gender is similar to his approach to slavery. 
Specifically with regard to the status of women, Paul seems to have, in I 
Corinthians, conservative views. He affirms the custom that women should 
wear veils when praying or prophesying while men should not. He justifies 
this practice by asserting that, whereas man's glory is in the Lord, woman's 
glory is in man (11:1-16). Another section in which Paul condones the 
maintenance of gender inequality is when he argues that it is according to the 
law that women should not speak in church because it is shameful for them 
to do so (14:33b-36).46 
With respect to the former issue, Paul's discussion of the need for 
women to wear veils when performing an active role in church turns on his 
view of the respective glories of men and women; he justifies the custom by 
appealing to the more fundamental issue of a difference in respective glory. 
Paul simply states that man reflects the image and glory of God, while 
woman reflects the glory of man (11 :7).47 
While Paul's concept of glory (lio~a) is unclear, it would be especially 
problematic if lio~a is understood to mean some kind of attainment and/or 
excellence.46 This is because woman-Paul shifts between woman qua 
gender category and woman qua wife-does not have or is unable to have a 
glory apart from man or her husband. Whichever sense of woman Paul 
means in this discussion, the implications are problematic. 
What Paul specifically concludes from the distinction between the 
respective glories of men and women, or wife and husband, is that if woman 
or wife does not wear a veil, then she disgraces her head-man or husband, 
respectively. It is not clear, given the ambiguity in the meanings of the terms 
'head' and 'glory', how the notion of headship is connected to that of glory. 
The term head (KE«)laAT)) is used equivocally: there is, first, the concept of the 
170 
physical head itself (veil on head or shorn head); secondly, head is used 
symbolically to represent a relation (man as head of woman, God as head of 
Christ, Christ as head of man). 
Hooker, who attempts to explain the concept of authority in this passage, 
argues that making a clear distinction between the two meanings of head will 
illuminate the differences in the glory of male and female.49 From the two 
meanings of K£$aA11, she concludes: 
(a) head being covered or shorn: distinguishes between the man and 
the woman; 
(b) head being disgraced: distinguishes between the glory of Christ 
and the glory of man. 50 
Hooker argues that Paul is concerned to show that, given that woman's 
uncovered head reflects man's glory, it must be covered when she is in the 
presence of God. This act, she contends, symbolises the (proper) effacement 
of man's glory in the presence of God. However, as Hooker herself is aware, 
her analysis does not account for the silence in the epistles regarding the 
situation of unmarried or widowed women; nor does it explain how a married 
woman works out her relationship with God and her relationship with her 
husband. 
What further frustrates analysis of this passage is that it is unclear 
whether for man to be the head of woman, or God to be head of Christ, or 
Christ to be head of man, sets up a relationship of dominance and 
subordination. Furthermore, the larger unresolved question remains: that if 
Paul was seriously questioning the roles of gender categories (in Galatians 
and I Corinthians 7), why then was he still subscribing to the various 
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distinctions between males and females, especially with regard to the 
requirements of worship (in I Corinthians 11 and 14)? 
Paul discusses three different practices pertaining to the maintenance 
of gender distinction in worship: women wearing veils; male and female hair 
lengths; and women speaking in church. With regard to veils and speaking in 
church, Paul falls back to Old Testament norms: woman was created for (or 
because of) man (v. 9)51 ; women should not speak in church because that is 
what the 'law says'. With regard to the issue of different hair lengths, Paul 
presents it as if it were rooted in the metaphysical makeup of the world-he 
writes that nature (<!>ums) teaches that men should have short hair and 
women long. Paul appeals to a naturalistic justification for different hair 
lengths. 
It could be said with regard to these issues that Paul is uncertain or 
confused and so falls back on exactly those practices and values which he, at 
other points, claims are defunct or irrelevant. Thus, on the one hand he 
derives standards from Judaism and from the social mores of his time, on the 
other, he questions practices and structures such as circumcision and 
slavery. Whether the inconsistent ideas arise as a result of the inability to 
transcend preceding Jewish standards or simply from confusion, the appeal 
• 
to Jewish norms and values reflects the general difficulties Paul faces in 
setting up a new community with a new value system.52 
Also interesting in the context of Paul's attitude to women are his views on 
marriage. Paul deals with various aspects of marriage from a range of 
different perspectives. From the point of view of the commitment normally 
required or expected of one to the marriage partner or to the marriage itself, 
Paul advises the unmarried and widows to remain single. He reasons that, 
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especially in light of the imminent 1tapoucna, it is important for people to be 
"anxious about the affairs of the Lord, how to please the Lord" (I Corinthians 
7:32). This is, Paul claims, what the unmarried or widows would be 
committed to: 'unhindered devotion' to the Lord (7:35). The married, on the 
other hand, have divided interests because they are concerned to please 
their marriage partners and are focussed on the anxieties related to family life 
(7:26; 28; 32). 
It is interesting that, in his assessment of the practicalities of 
commitment to the 'affairs of the Lord', Paul, in line with his statement that ' ... 
there is no male and female ... ', does not distinguish between the work and 
commitment of men and women. This idea is inconsistent with the section in I 
Corinthians 11 that deals with the differing glories of men and women. It is, 
however, consistent with Paul's constant reminders to the converts that the 
functions and responsibilities of all members of the communities are equally 
valuable and that no one member is more important or significant than 
another (Romans 12:3-8; 15:1ff; I Corinthians 12; 13; Galatians 3:28). In this 
connection, it is important to note that Paul had many female co-workers: 
Prisca (Romans 16:3-5); Phoebe, a deacon (Romans 16:1); Euodia and 
Syntyche (Philippians 4:2) and a number of other women (Romans 
16:6,7, 12, 15). Although it is difficult to clearly ascertain the roles of his female 
co-workers, his acknowledgment of their significant efforts and roles is no 
less enthusiastic than that for his male co-workers. 53 
The second aspect of Paul's views on marriage is his focus on sexual 
immorality. Constructing sexual immorality as a problem of incontinence, he 
writes that one should have his/her 'own desires under control' (I Corinthians 
7:37) rather than to be 'aflame with passion' (7:9). Where the latter is the 
case, however, Paul argues, then "it is better to marry". 54 Focusing on what 
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he deems appropriate codes of sexual behaviour, Paul deals at length with 
the sexual needs both of men and of women (I Corinthians 7:3-4}, arguing 
not only that the husband 'rules over' his wife's body but also that the wife 
'rules over' that of her husband's (I Corinthians 7:4). According to Verhey, 
who examines ethics in the new testament, the suggestion to the first century 
Christians that the husband rules over the wife's body is hardly surprising. 
However, it would have been " ... quite surprising-indeed shocking-that 
Paul says the wife "rules over'' her husband's body."55 Just as surprising, too, 
would have been the idea, which Paul entertains, that a woman might divorce 
her husband (7:13). This kind of view of the relationship between men and 
women as marriage partners is hardly common either in the writings of early 
Judaism or in (the then contemporary) non-Christian social codes.56 For 
example, Paul's conception of the function of marriage differs radically from 
the Old Testament one. Instead of seeing marriage as primarily for 
procreation, he introduces the idea of marriage as 'no more than a defense 
against desire'.57 
In spite of sense of confusion or inconsistency in the ideas expressed in the 
epistles regarding slavery, issues pertaining to womanhood and cultural 
norms, it can be argued that there are clearly innovative or progressive 
strands in Paul's thinking on these subjects. In spite of his occasional 
reversion to conservative, traditional norms, Paul seeks, in general, to set up 
communities of believers founded upon equality and to recognise the equal 
value of each member's tasks and functions within the community. 56 
Paul's notion of equality within the Christian community is connected 
with his ideal of love (ap7tT]) as a community-building and community-
sustaining value. This ideal had to be emphasised because, apart from the 
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fact that these church communities were newly-formed, they were also 
culturally, morally and socially diverse. Added to this confusion of codes and 
values was Paul's eschatology. The implications of Paul's eschatological 
views for the lives of the believers was that they had to adopt a new and 
different perspective on life within the same environment while awaiting the 
full realisation of the forthcoming a.trov-yet without knowing when it would 
happen. Paul's eschatology thus created, both for himself and for the 
believing communities in the churches he set up, great confusion regarding 
the question of how one should live. The answers Paul gave were often far 
from definite. Paul attempted to design a new and different set of values. 
Thus, one of the features which marked his system as distinct from existing 
Jewish codes was the view that the attitude and perspective of the moral 
agent was the basis of all action and behaviour. To this effect, Paul 
emphasised both that the recognition of the effects of the work of Christ was 
internalistically connected to a change in behaviour and that the fulfilment of 
the requirements of laws was inconsequential in the life of the believer 
because laws merely required external compliance which Paul construed as 
leading necessarily to excessive formalism. What Paul sought as the basis of 
communal life was not behavioural conformity but, rather, the valuing of the 
community and of interpersonal relationships. It was upon such an outlook 
that Paul hoped the believers would establish their behaviours and actions. 
The themes of community and of personal relationships are taken up in 
Chapter Six, which analyses cxyo:7tT1 as a central concept in Pauline thought. 
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NOTES 
1
• There have been significant challenges to this theme, that Paul's task was in fact to 
mediate between the Jewish Christians and the Gentile Christians. Stendahl in Paul 
Among Jews and Gentiles, (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1976), for example, sets out 
this thesis, arguing that the only way to study the Pauline epistles is to understand its 
social context in the light of Paul's attempts to mediate between the two Christian groups. 
2
• Paul was not however, advocating nor practising Situation Ethics, as some might claim, 
because there were some themes and principles he adhered to consistently through the 
epistles; the most notable of these concepts was love (<X)Wtll). See Wolfgang Schrage, 
The Ethics of the New Testament (trans. David Green) T and T Clark, Edinburgh, 1982. 
Schrage argues convincingly that although Paul was not concerned to proclaim universal 
and/or a-historical ethical principles, his exhortations are not to be considered as being 
detenmined primarily by the situation. Rather, Pauline ethics addresses the whole person, 
places emphasis both on intention and on action and is thus aptly termed 'concrete ethics' 
(see especially pp.186-239). 
3
. The terms 'lnternalism' and 'lnternalist' denote a wide-ranging variety of views. lnternalist 
theories of moral motivation in general hold that motivation is in some sense inherent in 
moral obligations or judgments. Extemalists, on the other hand, believe that motivation is 
external to obligations, judgments or the justification of moral claims. For discussions of 
internalist and externalist theories of moral motivation, see W. D. Falk, "'Ought' and 
Motivation", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1948, pp. 111-138; W.K. 
Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy" in A. I. Melden (ed) 
Essays on Moral Philosophy, University of Washington Press, 1958; as well as the 
arguments of G. C. Field, W.T. Stace, Noweii-Smith and C.L. Stevenson. More recent 
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discussions of the debate include the works of Bernard Williams, Michael Smith, Rodger 
Beehler, Gilbert Harman, E.J. Bond and Mark Platts. 
4
• Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, SCM Press, London, 1956. The 
indicative-imperative is discussed in detail in Section 3.1.3. 
s Note, though, that the cognitive aspect of xapl>ux in I Corinthians 2:9 is compared 
negatively to !!VEUIJ.CI (spirit). 
6
. These are elements in an individual-oriented focus (familiar of course in Greek philosophy) 
while not incompatible of course with insistence on communal and relational 
considerations. 
7
• There are two uses of vous which seem out of place with this description of the concept: 
-I Corinthians 14:14; 19: vous is associated with understanding; this argument is used 
against the pneumatics. 
-Philippians 4:7: the human vous cannot understand the peace of God. 
•. This distinction that Paul draws between the vous of God and the vous of Christ is an 
expression of his general thesis that it is through Christ's work that the (up till then) 
distinctly Jewish beliefs and Jewish God have been made accessible to non-Jews as 
well. The deeper theological implications of the distinction will not, however, be dealt with 
here. 
9
. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. E.C.Hoskyns, Oxford, New York, 1933. 
10
• ibid., p. 266. 
11
. C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1932. 
12
• Gareth Matthews, "It is No Longer I that Do if', in Faith and Philosophy, Vol 1, Jan 1984, 
p. 47. 
13
• ibid., pp. 48-49. 
14
• ibid., p. 49. 
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1
'- ibid., p. 48. 
16
• ibid. 
"- Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings, 
E.J. Brill, Netherlands, 1971; pp. 391-401. 
18
. While these antithetical forces are expressed primarily in metaphysical and religious terms 
in Paul's epistles, they could be explained less mystically in terms of prevailing modes of 
life and ways of thought. Section 3.2.2 deals specifically with the concepts of crap~ and 
ltVEUI-ta, and the connection between them. 
19 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, op.cit. 
"'. Moma D. Hooker, From Adam to Christ: Essays on Paul, Cambridge University Press, 
1990, pp. 13-25. 
21
. ibid., p. 57. Paradoxically, notes Hooker, the behaviour which is required of those who are 
in Christ and who wish to be like him conforms to the attitude which he showed in 
becoming like us: obedient; emptied himself; humbled himself, became poor; identified 
himself with the sinful and outcasts. 
22
• The struggle between morality and God's will is expressed by Plato as well, in the 
Euthyphro dilemma. 
23
. The phrase 'body of Chrisf used as a metaphor for membership in the Christian 
community will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
24
. Alternatively, the (ungodly) self is revealed, too, in acts which degrade the body. Sexual 
immorality is, according to Paul, such an act (Romans 1 :24). 
25
• Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings, 
op.cit., p. 253. 
26
. See Albert Schweitzer, The Kingdom of God and Primitive Christianity, (tr. L. Garrard), 
New York 1968, pp. 167-8. 
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zt Robert C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ, Alfred Topelmann, Berlin, 1967, 
discussed in Jack T. Sanders, Ethics in the New Testament, SCM Press, 1975, London, 
p. 54. 
28
• Jack T. Sanders, Ethics in the New Testamen~ (ibid.) points out that further complication 
with this time overlap is that Paul's imperative loses its credibility-in fact, it appears to be 
nonsense-if and when the eschatological end loses its imminence. It is only the 
expectation of the imminence of the ecrxa~ov (Romans 12:1 -13:10) which makes the 
imperative possible (pp. 57ft). 
29
• Paul rejected, as well, the highly-regarded Jewish patriarch, Moses, as a suitable 
paradigm of Christian life. See Romans 4 and 5. 
"'. Karl Barth, Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5, (tr. T.A. Smail), Scottish 
Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 5, Oliver & Boyd, UK, 1956. 
31
. ibid., pp. 6; 24. 
32
• ibid., p. 43. 
33
• Ernst Kasemann, Perspectives on Paul, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1971, p. 67. 
34
. It was only in later Christian writing that the body was considered synonymous with flesh 
and both were construed negatively as sources of sexual and physical desire. This desire 
was seen to distract a person from the pursuit of the spiritual or divine life or life of the 
soul, and thus as rebellion against God. See, for example, Peter Brown, The Body and 
Society, Columbia University Press, 1988, USA, especially pp. 48-49. 
35
• See, for example, I Corinthians 15:39; 6:16; II Corinthians 7:1 (cf I Corinthians 7:34); II 
Corinthians4:11b (cf4:10 b); II Corinthians 12:7, Philemon 16. 
36
• For a comprehensive survey of interpretations of the crap~-ltvE"IlJ.1a conflict, see Robert 
Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings, 
op.cit., pp. 49-95. In addition, crap~ and ltvE"IlJ.1<X could be further elucidated through an 
examination of related terms such as Kocrj.1os (usually translated 'world'), apxm 
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(rulers), crtOtXEta (basic elements), apxov~es ~ou mrovos ~omou (rulers of this age), 
aytf).,ot (angels), and liuvaj.l£tS (powers). 
See Romans 8:38; 8:19-23; 12:2; 1 Corinthians 15:24; 2:6-8; 2 Corinthians 4:4; 
Galatians 4:3-9; 1:4. The characterisation of these forces and/or agents is even more 
vivid and various in the deutero-Pauline epistles to the Colossian and the Ephesian 
churches. Literature on the classification and interpretation of these forces/agents 
include: 
G. H. C. Macgregor, "Principalities and Powers: the Cosmic Background of Paul's 
Thoughf', (in New Testament Studies, Vol1., 1954-55) describes the crap/;-7tV£Wa 
tension in terms of the conflict between cosmic spirit forces controlling the course of the 
universe; in terms of earthly conditions, this manifests itself in the subjection of human 
beings to the rulers of this atrov (see especially p.18). 
George Johnston provides a comprehensive review of the different ways in which KOcr11os 
may be understood, in "otKO'llj.I£Vtl and Kocr11os in the New Testamenf' (in New 
Testament Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 352-60). 
Wesley Carr, in "The Rulers of this Age-l Corinthians II. 6-8" (New Testament Studies, 
Vol 23, pp. 20-35), argues that apxm refers to actual human rulers. 
Ernst Kasemann, (op.cit.), understands crap/; as being the sphere of demonic influence. 
Stephen Charles Matt's Biblical Ethics and Social Change (Oxford University Press, 
1982) points out that the term KO()I!OS refers to the order of the social world and this 
indicates that evil has a social and political character beyond the isolated actions of 
individuals. It is therefore unfortunate, he argues, that the term has been translated as 
'world', and thus often interpreted to denote a merely physical place. 
Leander Keck, Paul and His Letters (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 2nd ed, 1988); Keck 
argues that crap/; is a domain of power. 
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"'. Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: Their Use in Conflict Settings, op.cit., p. 
103. 
"'. See Section 6.1 for detailed discussion of Paul's rejection of Jewish law. 
39
• These are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
40
• A few of the important discussions by Paul on these topics also includes references to the 
Jew-Greek distinction. Paul's Jew-Greek distinction will, however, not be examined in 
detail here because it is intimately connected with the much larger issue of his views of 
Jewishness and Judaism. There is the obvious attempt by Paul, as mentioned in the 
Introduction of this thesis, to advocate that Jewish codes and practices are, in the light of 
the Christ event obsolete, in order to support his view that non-Jews can have access to 
the faith and beliefs that were once the special possession of Jews. For this reason, Paul 
has been criticised, as well as defended from the criticism, that his Christianity is anti-
semitic. This, debate is not a concern of this thesis, however. 
41
• There were a variety of ways in which freedom was available to slaves; Francis Lyall 
presents a scholarly discussion of the dynamics of those processes, and of their 
theological implications, in Slaves, Citizens, Sons: Legal Metaphors in the Epistles, 
Zondervan Publishing House, Michigan, 1984. 
42
• See John G. Barclay, "Paul, Philemon and the Dilemma of Christian Slave-Ownership", in 
New Testament Studies Vol. 37., 1991, pp. 161-186. 
"'. Barclay (ibid) points out that it is not clear what Paul is suggesting here: that the brotherly 
relationship supersedes the slave one; or that the brotherly relationship is superimposed 
upon the slave one. Given this, Barclay wonders about the practical difficulties that might 
arise in contexts of brotherly correction-wherein the slave would clearly be accused of 
insolence; and during the communal supper-for would someone like Onesimus then be 
allowed to join in? If so, who does the serving? 
44
• ibid. p. 183. 
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45
. In I Corinthians 7:29-31, Paul overturns certain existing conditions including: marriage, 
mourning, rejoicing, possession and 'dealings with the world'. With all these conditions, 
Paul asks the believers to live 'as though they were not' or 'as though they had none'. 
"'. Note the inconsistency between these two sections of I Corinthians. While the former 
section recognises the practice of women praying and prophesying (11 :5) but places a 
qualification on that practice that women should wear veils while engaging in such, the 
latter section, 14:33b-36, does not allow women to speak or to have any position of 
authority in the gathering of the co.mmunity. Whether this is an inconsistency on Paul's 
part, or whether one or both sections are non-Pauline, or if there is textual corruption, is 
open to debate. This issue will not be dealt with here. 
•'- In this connection, Mama Hooker (in "Authority on Her Head: an Examination of I 
Corinthians 11:10", in Mama D. Hooker, From Adam to Christ: Essays on Paul, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) points out that although Paul seems to be deriving his 
distinction from the creation story (Genesis 1 and 2), he in fact has changed the story in 
that while Genesis 1:27 reports male and female as being created in the image of God, 
Paul's statement does not allow for the idea that woman, too, to be in the image of God-
indeed, there seems to be an intentional exclusion of this possibility in the case of 
women. Thus, according to Hooker, in his discussion of the image of God theme, Paul 
has shifted the idea of man in the generic sense-av9p0l!tov-to that of man qua 
husband or male: <XVTlP· 
48
• See, for example, Romans 8:18; Galatians 6:14. 
49
• Mama D. Hooker, "Authority on Her Head: an Examination of I Cor 11:1 0", op.cit. 
"'· ibid .. pp. 113-120. 
51
. Incidentally, as Hooker writes, v. 10 seems to be nonsense: "for this reason a woman 
ought to have a symbol of authority on her head because of the angels"; ibid. 
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52
. See Gager (in Kingdom and Community, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1975, pp 35ff) who, in 
the context of discussing the dynamics of millenarian movements, argues that millenarian 
movements often fail with regard to the setting-up of a new system of morality, especially 
if the new system is to be a clear rejection of the previous one. Citing the work of Burridge 
(New Heaven, New Earth, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp. 166ff), Gager considers that 
Paul and his communities are going through the 'no rules' stage before the community 
moves to a 'new rules' stage. At this 'no rules' stage, old practices are overthrown and 
quickly superseded by new ones. Yet many of those new practices bear a striking 
resemblance to the old ones. This is clearly demonstrated, for example, in Paul's letter to 
the Galatian church in which he argues that the old law is no longer binding on the 
believers. Yet, on specifying the content of the new law, he cites Leviticus 19:18. 
53
• For an interesting discussion of the ministries of women in the Pauline epistles, see 
Susanne Heine, Women and Early Christianity: Are the Feminist Scholars Right?, SCM 
Press, Great Britain, 1987, Chapter Five: Paul the Scapegoat. 
54
. It needs to be noted that Paul is addressing the Corinthian enthusiasts who were 
considering, among other things, nullifying their marriages on the basis that their partners 
were unbelievers (I Corinthians 7:12-16, 27). See also, Peter Brown, The Body and 
Society, op.cit, pp. 53-55. 
55
. Allen Verhey, The Great Reversal: Ethics and the New Testament, William B Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., Michigan, 1984, p. 118. 
56
• See Ben Witherington Ill, Women and the Genesis of Christianity, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990, p. 137. 
"'. Peter Brown, The Body and Society, op.cit., p. 55. Brown also comments that what was 
notably lacking in I Corinthians was the idea that the sexual urge " ... was capable of 
socialization and of ordered, even wanm, expression within mariiage." Rather, for Paul 
" ... the dangers of pomeia ... were allowed to hold the center of the stage." Thus, Paul 
183 
" ... had left a fatal legacy to future ages ... ln the future, a sense of the presence of "Satan," 
in the form of a constant and ill-defined risk of lust, lay like a heavy shadow in the comer 
of every Christian church." 
58
. Unfortunately, none of Paul's progressiveness was taken up either by the early churches 
or even in the deutero-Pauline texts themselves: Colossians and Ephesians advocate the 
subjugation of both slaves and women, arguing on the one hand that slaves and women 
be submissive and, on the other, that masters and husbands in love, should not cause 
hurt. Note, too, the classification of woman and man as different categories and, following 
from that, the difference in norms and standards applicable to their behaviour discussed 
in I Timothy 3 and 5. For discussions of this topic, see: 
John Gager's Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity, Prentice-Hall, 
New Jersey, 1975, pp. 35ff; David Verner, in The Household of God: The Social World of 
the Pastoral Epistles (Scholars Press, California, 1983), presents an analysis, among 
other topics, of the distinction between men and women in the I Timothy epistle. 
See also Margaret MacDonald's analysis in The Pauline Churches: A Socio-historical Study 
of Institutionalization in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Writings, (Cambridge University 
Press, Great Britain 1988). MacDonald provides an interesting analysis of the movement 
of ideas in the epistles as reflecting a socio-historical progression in church history. She 
classifies the epistles according to three church generations: 
(a) authentic epistles (written by Paul) 
(b) Colossians (written by a fellow-worker of Paul) 
Ephesians (dependent on the ideas in Colossians and written after Colossians) 
(c) pastoral epistles (written by apostolic fathers between 100-40 C. E.) 
MacDonald argues that whereas, in the authentic epistles, the concern was to build up 
the community, with the Colossian and Ephesian epistles, the concern was for 
community-stabilising institutionalisation. MacDonald discusses in detail the significant 
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changes between the thought pattems and the norms and ideals from the authentic 
epistles to Colossians and Ephesians in the first place, and, in the second, from the 
Colossian and Ephesian epistles to the pastoral epistles (MacDonald considers I Timothy, 
II Timothy and Titus as the pastoral epistles and places them in the stage of community-
protecting institutionalisation). 
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PART II 
RELATIONSHIPS AND CARE 
Filial piety rests in this: parents are 
concerned when their children are ill. 
(Analects 2:6) 
If I give away all my possessions, and if I 
hand over my body so that I may boast, 
but do not have love, I gain nothing ... 
(I Corinthians 13:3) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A MORALITY OF CARE 
Within the tradition of western moral philosophy, there has been significant 
criticism of moral theories which overemphasise (purely) formal principles 
and which lack moral content. In general, these criticisms highlight the view 
that moral agents are situated selves in the sense that they live within 
societies bound in some ways by social, historical and cultural constructs, 
insitutions and norms. Furthermore, it is within these frameworks that human 
persons qua moral agents live, work, have relationships with others, make 
choices about themselves and about others, and seek to resolve their moral 
problems and dilemmas. 
One of the most notable critics of formalistic formulations of morality 
was Georg Hegel (1770-1831). He argued, against Kant's morality, that the 
requirement that moral agents adopt some kind of objective, 'universal' 
standpoint was an impossible task for moral agents. This is because moral 
agents live within communities which operate according to certain customs or 
conventions specific to particular communities. Arising out of a critique of 
Kant, Hegelian ethics is based fundamentally on themes of relationship and 
the idea of community. 
Within contemporary moral philosophy in the western tradition, there 
have been significant criticisms of moral theories which uphold notions such 
as impartiality and universality as requirements of, or ideals in, morality. 
Significant work has been done, in this respect, by philosophers such as 
Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Charles Taylor, Alasdair Macintyre, 
Martha Nussbaum, Bernard Williams, Michael Walzer, Michael Stocker, 
Lawrence Blum, John Kekes and Susan Wolf.' The points of criticism made 
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by these philosophers vary according to a range of different themes such as, 
the demands of impartialist and/or impersonalist morality and their effect on 
the psychologies of moral agents, the connection, or lack thereof, between 
moral theories and human life, the proper contextualisation of morality within 
historical, social and cultural frameworks, and properly situating moral agents 
within such frameworks, the moral significance of human relatedness and 
independence, rather than dissociation and interdependence as ideals. 
It is within this context of dissatisfaction that some have voiced a concern that 
some conceptions of morality require that moral agents consider themselves 
essentially as detached individuals in their moral deliberation. It has been 
argued that such a conception of moral agency has, basically, two 
undesirable outcomes. The first is that moral theories with such emphases 
might rule out interaction within personal relationships as having moral 
significance. The consequence of a tendency to exclude personal or intimate 
relationships from morality could have the effect that interaction within those 
realms is regarded as unregulated and arbitrary. The corollary of viewing 
personal relationships as beyond the boundaries of morality is that such 
relationships might come to be viewed as non-moral and thus free of 
structures, principles or norms. For instance, certain principles or values 
upheld within contexts of close personal relationships-such as, for example, 
maternal affection-are perceived by some to be 'natural' rather than moral.2 
The categorisation both of morality as essentially impersonal and 
impartial and of personal relationships as non-moral is based on the 
presupposition that what counts as 'personal', on the one hand, and what as 
'impersonal', on the other, are clearly definable and are contrastive 
categories. As argued previously in chapter one, a classification of 
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relationships as either 'impersonal' or 'personal' could oversimplify important 
aspects of relationships. It could, for example, distort the nature of certain 
relationships (as, for instance, relationships between colleagues) by 
construing them simply as either personal or impersonal. 
Secondly, moral theories which promote impartiality and impersonality 
as fundamental criteria of moral deliberation might ignore morally significant 
features of relationships such as loyalties, responsibilities, affection and 
commitment. This, in turn, could negatively affect the moral agent's 
conception of himself. In this connection, the concepts of impartiality and 
impersonality need to be clarified. 
Of itself, the requirement for moral agents to put aside their 
attachments and particular loyalties is not unreasonable. For example, it 
would not be strange or unreasonable to suggest that I donate some amount 
of money to victims of war instead of spending that sum on a lavish birthday 
celebration for my father. 
If the example were modified, however, such that I had to choose 
between donating some amount of money to victims of war and paying for my 
father's hip replacement operation, it becomes somewhat less clear that I 
should choose to promote the best possible state of affairs in general (ie. the 
former). Clearly, the modified example is more difficult because here, the two 
cases of need involve different kinds of commitment, loyalty and 
responsibility and, ceteris paribus, are comparatively urgent and compelling. 
It would seem harsh and unrealistic to require that I should forego my 
father's health and comfort in order to procure the well being of others (whom 
I do not know). However, given existing literature on impartialist and 
impersonalist theories, it is not certain that the proponents of such theories 
would insist on the overridingness of impartiality.' In other words, an 
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impartialist is not necessarily committed to advocating that, in this case, I 
should donate my money to victims of war instead of paying for my father's 
hip replacement operation; an impartialist could in general uphold principles 
which promote global moral concern and, in addition, recognise the 
competing demands of relational attachment. 
From the preceding discussion, what a proponent of relational morality 
might correctly object to is not that impartiality theses eo ipso view all aspects 
of relational attachment as morally insignificant. Rather, what is problematic 
about impartiality and impersonality theses is their corresponding views of 
moral agency: the moral agent is to view herself primarily as a detached, 
atomistic self. It is the commitment to this view of the self, and the 
implications of such a conception for personal identity and moral psychology, 
which is unacceptable to most proponents of relational morality. 
The care ethic is a proposal for a moral theory which upholds the theme of 
human connectedness and which aims to deal with and account for 
relationships in which care and concern for the other's well-being is the 
primary operative principle. It is a proposal which arises from the feminist 
critique of rule- and justice-based moralities. From the point of view of 
feminist moral philosophy, criteria of impersonality, impartiality and 
universality are closely connected with notions of the individual as a 
detached, atomistic self. Within feminist philosophy, this notion of the 
individual is deemed to be male-oriented and biased against womens' 
experience of relationships and of morality in general. Proponents of care 
morality, in upholding the two concerns discussed above, suggest that are-
examination of the domain and content of morality as conventionally 
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theorised is required. For some others a more extensive renovation of the 
structures of morality is required. 
The first of two sections of this Chapter discusses the care ethic and its 
prominent features. It focuses primarily on the work of Carol Gilligan who 
carried out various empirical investigations of male and female subjects, on 
the basis of which she argued that the ways in which males and females 
respond to hypothetical moral problems is drastically different, both in terms 
of how they reason and what they deem to be morally significant.' 
The second section critically analyses various versions of the care 
ethic. It demonstrates that certain formulations of the care ethic are, for a 
range of reasons, inimical to womens' morality. In particular, it argues that 
while care morality provides a fresh and different view from justice- and rule-
based moralities, it is important to realise that certain norms and values 
which are operative within the latter forms of morality should be retained. The 
argument in this section cautions that proponents of care morality need 
carefully to address important notions such as autonomy, universalisability 
and caring affection in order that womens' interests are not compromised. 
Generally, one of the concerns of this Chapter is to establish that care 
morality provides valuable insights into the content, domain, forms and 
structures of morality. It at least offers persuasive challenges to essentially 
rule-based moralities and to conceptions of the detached self. It could be 
argued, too, that the values which care morality seeks to address and to 
promote-values such as connectedness, concern, trust, responsibility, 
commitment and loyalty-provide for a more robust conception of morality 
and moral agency than those which require detachment. Consequently, it is 
suggested that a significant re-examination of justice-, rights- and rule-based 
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morality, on the one hand, and care morality, on the other, needs to be 
carried out in order to ascertain how the systems might work together to 
promote the good life of all concerned. 
4.1 The Care Ethic 
The rejection of principles of impartiality, impersonality and universality as 
overriding concerns in moral deliberation is a significant and fundamental 
motif of the care ethic. Arising from psychological studies first carried out by 
Carol Gilligan, the 'care perspective' has been clearly distinguished from what 
Gilligan terms the 'justice perspective'. The justice perspective is 
characterised primarily by a concern for personal liberty. In accordance with 
this primary concern, values such as individual autonomy, formal equality and 
human rights are emphasised and upheld. On the other hand, the care 
perspective views morality as being defined by relational attachment On this 
account," ... the relationship becomes the figure, defining self and others. 
Within the context of relationship, the self as a moral agent perceives and 
responds to the perception of need. The shift in moral perspective is manifest 
by a change in the moral question from "What is just?" to "How to respond?""' 
The difference between the justice and the care perspectives is, 
according to Gilligan, not merely a difference in the process of moral 
deliberation. Gilligan contends that the difference is more significant in that it 
involves moral, epistemological and metaphysical issues. She characterises 
the difference in terms of a 'shift in perspective from justice to care'-because 
our current ways of thinking are dominated by the justice perspective-and 
suggests that in this shift: 
" ... the organizing dimension of relationship changes from 
inequality/equality to attachment/detachment, reorganizing thoughts, 
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feelings and language so that words connoting relationship like 
"dependence" or "responsibility" or even moral terms such as 
"fairness" and "care" take on different meanings. To organize 
relationships in terms of attachment rather than in terms of equality 
changes the way human connection is imagined, so that the images or 
metaphors of relationship shift from hierarchy or balance to network or 
web. In addition, each organizing framework leads to a different way of 
imagining the self as a moral agent."6 
The differences in the two perspectives are connected to differences in the 
categories and concepts of morality as well as in definitions of what 
constitutes a moral problem and, more fundamentally, in conceptions of the 
self, personal identity and moral agency. Gilligan's work is significant, to say 
the least, in drawing attention to the fact that, up till very recently, 
conceptions of moral excellence in Anglo-American philosophy have tended 
to emphasise a limited range of ideals and values which, Gilligan argues, are 
based on an ignorance or underrating of the difference between male and 
female perceptions and experiences. Emphasis on equality, justice and rights 
is-as the results of Gilligan's studies have been used to demonstrate-
generally characteristic of man's moral reasoning and they therefore 
disadvantage and tend to downgrade women's moral reasoning. 
In spite of the value and relevance of Gilligan's conclusions in the area of 
feminist ethics, there have been a range of criticisms of her thesis. One of the 
most commonly-made and general criticisms is that Gilligan's analysis of 
women's morality is a system which simplistically complements Kohlberg's 
moral developmental theory and, as such, inherits many of the problems in 
Kohlberg's analysis. In this regard, three specific criticisms of Gilligan's theory 
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will be examined here. The first is Gilligan's adoption of several features of 
Kohlberg's methodology and categories. The second deals with the 
specification of the connection between the kind of moral response, on the 
one hand, and gender, on the other; it examines the concept of the 'different 
voice' of women's morality. The third and final criticism analysed here follows 
on from the first two: given that there is a different voice, how might that be 
incorporated into moral theory? Is the different voice merely complementary 
to existing dominant moralities, or does it necessitate a reconstruction of 
morality? 
With regard to the first point that Gilligan has adopted too readily 
Kohlberg's methodologies and categories, a notable shortcoming of Gilligan's 
test samples is that the subjects were predominantly from middle- and upper-
class, white and educated backgrounds. Kohlberg's sample was similarly 
skewed, except that he worked with male subjects instead of female ones. 
His choice of subjects is not merely gender-biased but also, and just as 
importantly, class- and culture-biased.' Similarly, Gilligan's moral paradigm 
draws on data from the lives typical of Western professional women. Her 
models of moral reasoning therefore disadvantage and exclude non-Western, 
non-white and non-middle-class women. Linda Nicholson writes succinctly 
that Gilligan's views of morality are open to the same set of problems " ... as 
was Kohlberg's, only now minus the sexism."• In particular, the cultural 
specificity and narrowness of both Kohlberg's and Gilligan's analyses have 
been noted. Diana Baumrind questions why Kohlberg takes what is 
measured by his categories as indicating real moral development if all the 
subjects are asked to do is to think about hypothetical dilemmas, where 
ability to think hypothetically is taken as a universal given.• Because 
Kohlberg's schema of measurement is based on one's ability to manipulate 
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cognitive judgments, there is a significant amount of presupposition regarding 
the level of sophistication in thinking through these hypothetical problems. 
Baumrind argues that Kohlberg's use of hypothetical moral situations reflects 
an ignorance of cultural differences in the social construction of the individual. 
This oversight, it has been argued, is apparent in Gilligan's studies as well. 10 
Another example of Gilligan's neglect in questioning Kohlberg's 
structures of analysis is seen in her adoption of Kohlberg's construction of 
developmental stages in morality and his notion of rationality. Gilligan's 
classification of moral responses and sensitivities is based, as is Kohlberg's, 
essentially on stages in moral development corresponding to Piaget's 
account of cognitive development." In noting that Kohlberg has, in his 
developmental theory, obscured the distinction between cognitive value-free 
assessments and moral, value-laden assessments, John Broughton 
comments that Gilligan has inherited Kohlberg's framework in classifying the 
moral decision-making process in terms of degrees of competence. 
Broughton also argues that instead of questioning Kohlberg's definition and 
use of 'rationality', Gilligan simply assumes that it is the correct one and 
proceeds to reject that notion; a more careful approach would be to examine 
Kohlberg's usage of rationality and to seek to redefine the term.12 
The second criticism of Gilligan's thesis is her lack of clarity regarding 
the connection between gender and moral reasoning. For example, she 
claims that her articulation of the two perspectives is based on theme and not 
on gender, thus denying any affinities with biological determinism. On the 
other hand, it is important and undeniable that Gilligan's different-perspective 
theory is derived from empirical studies of different responses to moral 
problems from male and female subjects. Clearly, while rejecting the view 
that these perspectives are gender-based in a biologically determinate way 
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(especially in her later analyses), Gilligan's position is that the two 
perspectives are characteristic of male and female perception and 
experiences and that there is an association (though Gilligan does not clarify 
the nature of the association) between moral orientation and gender. 13 ln a 
study asking subjects to describe a moral conflict the subjects had faced, 
Gilligan noted that people do tend to focus their attention on one set of 
concerns (care or justice) and to minimally represent the other: 
The men and women involved in this study (high school students, 
college students, medical students, and adult professionals) were 
equally likely to demonstrate the focus phenomenon (focus being 
defined as 75 percent or more of the considerations raised pertaining 
either to the justice or the care perspective]. There were, however, sex 
differences in the direction of focus. With one exception, all of the men 
who focused, focused on justice. The women divided, with roughly one 
third focusing on justice and one third on care.•• 
From these data, three conclusions that Gilligan draws are: 
(i) " ... if women were eliminated from the research sample, care focus 
in moral reasoning would virtually disappear." 
(ii) " ... the fact that the women were advantaged means that the focus 
on care cannot readily be attributed to educational deficit or 
occupational disadvantage." 
(iii) " ... the moral domain is comprised of at least two moral 
orientations ... The present findings further suggest that men 
and women tend to lose sight of different perspectives."'5 
In her analysis of data from her studies, Gilligan classifies the care and 
justice perspectives as different orientations. Whilst she acknowledges that 
there might in fact be more than just these two perspectives(' ... the moral 
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domain is composed of at least two moral orientations''"), her construction of 
the care perspective as being typically female and of the justice perspective 
as typically male is problematic given that the connection between gender 
and moral orientation is generally unclear due to the number of variables that 
might be involved. 
The transposition of this opacity to the domain of feminist ethics could 
be inimical to a feminist conceptualisation of morality in that the care 
perspective might be construed as a mere adjunct to the justice perspective. 
This is the third criticism of Gilligan's work alluded to above. It is an important 
criticism which deserves serious consideration given that the construction of 
a feminist morality is closely interrelated with conceptions of the female self. 
Gilligan's interpretation of her data and her construction of a feminist 
morality on empirical foundations has been a point of concern for some 
philosophers who feel that her conception of women's morality is merely 
compensatory. On a particular reading, Gilligan could be understood to be 
upholding the 'different voice' morality as a mere complementation to morality 
dominated by male ideals. Thus, it has been commented that her work could 
be interpreted to involve the trivial" ... discover[y of] a different voice that 
complements the long-known male moral chorale."17 Such a conception of 
morality will have similar deficiencies to views of the feminine self as a mere 
appendage of the male self; of the female as merely the 'other'. A feminist 
morality that construes women's moral thinking in such fashion is problematic 
"[b]ecause morality is deeply about what people do, this approach carries 
presuppositions about what men and women do""-and that what women do 
is merely complementary to what men do. 
Addelson's comments reflect a concern that a construction of feminist 
rationality, epistemology or ethics as merely complementary to existing male-
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biased constructions in these areas simply fits into the structures and 
frameworks of the latter; there is no attempt to analyse critically nor to 
challange existing structures. Conceptions of femininity and, in that 
connection, of female virtues and values should involve more than mere 
complementarity (of male values and virtues): 
Unless the structural features of our concepts of gender are 
understood, any emphasis on a supposedly distinctive style of thought 
or morality is liable to be caught up in a deeper, older structure of male 
norms and female complementation. The affirmation of the value and 
importance of 'the feminine' cannot of itself be expected to shake the 
underlying normative structures for, ironically, it will occur in a space 
already prepared for it by the intellectual tradition it seeks to reject ... 
Making good the lacks in male consciousness, providing it with a 
necessary complementation by the 'feminine', is a large part of what 
the suppression, and the correlative consitution, of 'womankind' has 
been all about. An affirmation of the strengths of female 'difference' 
which is unaware of this may be doomed to repeat some of the sadder 
subplots in the history of western thought."'9 
A failure to challenge existing frameworks may even lead to a theory which is 
in fact pernicious to women in the sense that it defines the moral excellence 
of women in a way that is already limited by these existing frameworks. 
Discussing this criticism within the framework of the private-public dichotomy, 
Joan Tronto demonstrates that because "[t]he contours of public morality in 
large part determine the shape of private morality ... ""', what Gilligan might in 
fact be proposing is a conception of women's morality as 'moral leftovers': 
... questions that gain significance only because they are left 
somewhat open-ended by the commandments and boundaries of 
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public morality ... In other words, the requirements of justice have 
traditionally set the boundaries of care ... insofar as the boundaries of 
the private (in this case, private morality as expressed by care) are set 
by the categories and definitions of the public (in this case, public 
morality, i.e., the ethic of justice}, that which is relegated to the private 
is not judged on its own terms. Private morality is not perceived as 
independent of the "more important" public realm. It is by nature 
dependent and secondary•' 
In the light of comments such as these, it has to be realised that Gilligan's 
data is only the first phase of a construction of feminist morality. The analysis 
and interpretation of these data needs to transcend existing structures and 
frameworks which are faulty and/or inadequate; the care perspective need 
not be construed as a mere addition to the justice perspective. If Gilligan is 
offering a women's morality that is merely added on to men's morality, she is 
not doing justice to her test results. The problem remains even if the care 
perspective is held to be more significant or important than the justice 
perspective. Gilligan does, indeed, hold this view: "The promise in joining 
women and moral theory lies in the fact that human survival, in the late 
twentieth century, may depend less on formal agreement than on human 
connection."22 
The arguments presented in this section demonstrate that Gilligan's results 
are used much less effectively and adequately than they might be and that 
this is because of the limits of her analysis. The next section of the Chapter 
considers the plausibility of various proposals for morality deriving from the 
morality of care and attempts to highlight some valuable insights that a care 
ethic might offer to moral philosophy. 
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4.2 Caring Relationships 
One of the important conclusions of the previous section is that proposals for 
a morality of care must focus not only on the substantive content of morality 
but also on how the system might be placed amongst existing moral systems. 
Gilligan, for example, argues that the two perspectives cannot be integrated 
because the assumptions, ideals and procedures asociated with each 
perspective are dramatically different; they operate on 'different logics': 
... one seeking grounds for agreement, one seeking grounds for 
understanding, one assuming separation and thus the need for some 
external structure of connection, one assuming connection and thus 
the potential for understanding. These assumptions run deep, 
generating and reflecting different views of human nature and the 
human condition." 
It seems that Gilligan's classification of the two perspectives as mutually 
exclusive is arbitrary."' Gilligan's data at best demonstrate that different 
people do adopt different perspectives in their perception and judgment of 
moral issues. The data do not show that the two perspectives cannot be 
integrated. The data which Gilligan cites merely indicate tendencies, based 
either on differences between individuals or on the issue in question, toward 
one or the other of the perspectives. 
A primary difficulty associated with Gilligan's assertion that the two 
perspectives cannot be integrated is that it renders the care perspective 
unstructured and arbitrary: the substantive content of a care ethic becomes a 
matter of determination by the individual given the kinds of relationships she 
has. 
It is not a point of contention that a morality based on care would focus 
on aspects of particular relationships and, following from this, that universally-
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applicable principles or rules will have to be adapted or modified according 
to, or overriden by, considerations of these particulars. It is, however, a 
matter for debate whether, and to what extent, principles and rules figure in a 
morality of care. This issue is important because it points to the content of 
care morality. Thus, for instance, when Gilligan asserts that the care and 
justice perspectives are mutually exclusive, she does not allow that elements 
of the justice perspective play a role in care morality. 
In her discussion of the care and justice perspectives, one of the key 
elements of the justice perpective that Gilligan understands to be irrelevant to 
care is that the former looks at solving moral problems in the style of solving 
a mathematical problem: characterising problems at a high level of generality 
so that rules and principles can be applied to each pc;~rticular case as an 
instance of the general case.25 A morality of care developed along such 
lines-rejecting rules and principles as irrelevant in care morality-could lead 
to undesirable outcomes. This is especially important in cases in which the 
relationship between the carer and the cared-for involves power hierarchies: 
the carer, seen as the mentor, decides on behalf of the cared-for what is best 
for the latter; the cared-for, seen as weaker and dependent, seeks to oblige. 
Proponents of care morality need carefully to consider if moral 
decision-making should be fully independent of rules and principles. If there 
are no rules or principles in such a system to guide interaction between 
myself, say, and another person, the justification for my refusal to consider 
the other's interests could lie simply in the fact that that person and myself 
are only distantly related, or not related at all. On that view, I could also argue 
that the significantly more trivial interests of others more closely related to 
me, and whom I prefer, should be given consideration and priority over those 
of the distant other. 
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Such bias, it seems, is a feature of Nel Noddings' account of the care ethic. 
She argues that there should be different priorities in caring for people 
because some people are more closely related to us (which is not per se 
objectionable). The conclusion she draws, however, is questionable because 
she claims that we have a more 'natural' obligation to them. Her conception 
of caring based on appeals to naturalism implies, she feels, that she is not 
obliged to care for starving children in Africa, nor for other animals: 
I am not obliged to care for starving children in Africa, because there is 
no way for this caring to be completed in the other unless I abandon 
the caring to which I am obligated. I may still choose to do something 
in the direction of caring, but I am not obliged to do so. When we 
discuss our obligation to animals, we shall see that this is even more 
sharply limited by relation."' 
What is alarming about Noddings' conclusions is not that there are certain 
persons-in-relation that one is more directly responsible for but rather, that 
the criteria for moral deliberation are ultimately determined by the nature of 
the relationship. The arbitrarily-allocated tribalist sentiments are one of the 
characteristics of human action and behaviour that utilitarian, contractarian 
and deontological moral theories have been attempting to deal with. Such 
arbitrary allocation of moral sentiment is not the only contingency in 
Noddings' account. Indeed, the fundamental distinction between 'right' and 
'wrong' is treated with disdain by her: 
[In opposing capital punishment] I do not begin by saying, "Capital 
punishment is wrong." Thus I do not fall into the trap of having to 
supply reasons for its wrongness that will be endlessly disputed at a 
logical level. I do not say, "Life is sacred," for I cannot name a source 
of sacredness. I may point to the irrevocability of the decision, but this 
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is not in itself decisive, even for me, because in many cases the 
decision would be just and I could not regret the demise of the 
condemned!' 
The implications of Noddings' theory seem chaotic. She even suggests that, 
in the end, it is up to the free choice of the agent whether one wishes to be 
caring to another and, therefore, to be moral: "Everything depends, then, 
upon the will to be good, to remain in caring relation to the other."28 
Clearly, something as important as morality cannot be subject to the 
whims and the subjective desires and interests of each individual. There 
needs to be a degree, at least, of unconditionality in the responsibilities 
humans as moral agents have to each other-for example, the responsibility 
to dissuade, and perhaps to counsel, someone comtemplating suicide-even 
in the case of someone we intensely dislike. Noddings' version of the morality 
of care is practically unworkable. 
The aversion to rules and principles in Noddings' and Gilligan's proposals for 
a morality founded upon caring and responsibility could prove detrimental to 
care morality. A particularly pressing concern is that a care morality totally 
dissociated from rules and principles could leave hierarchies in relationships 
unchecked and, additionally, could overlook modes of subordination which 
are, ironically, one of the concerns of feminist ethics. Virginia Held articullates 
her concern that: 
On ethical views that renounce principles as excessively abstract, we 
might have few arguments to uphold the equality of women. After all, 
as parents can care for children recognized as weaker, less 
knowledgeable, less capable, and with appropriately restricted rights, 
so men could care for women deemed inferior in every way. On a view 
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that ethics could satisfactorily be founded on caring alone, men could 
care for women considered undeserving of equal rights in all the 
significant areas in which women have been struggling to have their 
equality recognized. So an ethic of care, essential as a component of 
morality, seems deficient iftaken as an exclusive preoccupation. 29 
The lack of principles or structure leads to a compromise in the significance 
of the care ethic. Precisely because the care ethic upholds the ideal of 
relational tie and affection as fundamental, there needs to be safeguards 
preventing the exploitation of the person-in-relation; whether the person-
caring, or, more likely, the person cared-for. Held discusses how the lack of 
principles in the articulation of a care ethic might be connected to the 
exploitation of certain persons: 
Caring may be a weak defense against arbitrary decisions, and the 
person cared for may find the relation more satisfactory if both 
persons, but especially the person caring, are guided, to some extent, 
by principles concerning obligations and rights. To argue that no two 
cases are ever alike is to invite moral chaos. Furthermore, for one 
person to be in a position of caretaker means that that person has the 
power to withhold care, to leave the other without it. The person cared 
for is usually in a position of vulnerability."' 
Held's comments highlight the possibility under the care ethic of the 
determination of the self by others given that it is based upon a relational 
conception of the human person. If it is true that women tend to focus on 
personal concordance and self sacrifice rather than on autonomy and 
individual rights31 , then the care ethic, if not properly constructed, would leave 
women, in particular, open to determination by others. 
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A possible way in which the self could be determined by another in a 
(supposedly) caring relationship is when, by virtue of her role, the carer acts 
in an authoritarian way and, correspondingly, the cared-for's subjection or 
obedience to the carer's directives is seen as normative for one in her role. In 
essence, in spite of the ideals of affection, concern, responsivity and 
responsibility associated with the care ethic, a care ethic poorly constructed 
could easily lead to domination based on hierarchy. 
There are, in this connection, several elements integral to morality in 
general that care morality should address. Three of them will be discussed 
here: autonomy; universalisability and caring affection. The concept of 
autonomy needs to be dealt with because, being construed often in terms of 
detached and disinterested self-governance, it plays a significant role in the 
definition of personal identity and of moral agency in justice- and rights-based 
conceptions of morality. In this regard, given that care morality emphasises 
relatedness rather than detachment, careful analysis needs to be made of the 
concept of autonomy within care morality: whether it is important to maintain 
the concept; whether it has to be forgone; or if it can be modified in a manner 
consistent with the ideals of the care ethic. Secondly, the possible 
significance and role of universalisability within care morality needs to be 
examined because it appears that care morality, emphasising the special and 
irreplaceable features of particular relationships, must discard the 
universalisability criterion as a feature of moral consideration. Thirdly, the 
notion of caring affection and its place within care morality are important 
issues that need to be addressed particularly in the case that caring affection 
is the motivational source of caring actions and behaviours. 
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4.2.1 The Care Ethic and Autonomy 
The notion of the moral agent as an autonomous individual figures 
prominently in moral theories, most notably in those which emphasise 
detachment, impartiality, and agent-responsibility and accountability as 
important aspects of moral agency. Such a construal of autonomy is brought 
into question in the context of care morality which stresses connectedness 
rather than detachment and impartiality, and responsiveness rather than 
individual accountability. Indeed, if impartiality is seen as an important 
constituent of action then the inconsistency between autnomy and the project 
and ideals of the care ethic will be obvious. 
One possible way of resolving this inconsistency is to assert that 
autonomy has no place in care morality. Such a move is, however, somewhat 
impetuous because there are aspects of moral agency connected with the 
notion of autonomy which are critical in accounting for personal identity. For 
example, Gilligan articulates a concern that, given that connectedness rather 
than individuation is the primary motif in self development, it might be 
(mistakenly) inferred that the related self is not a subject, but merely an 
object.32 In other words, if the self is understood to be defined solely or mainly 
by others and/or by its relationships, a possible outcome might be that the 
self is viewed as a 'selfless object'.33 
In the light of this difficulty, it is essential that care moralities are not 
perceived as fostering a conceptions of the cared-for or person-caring as 
being without a self. For this reason, while it might be important to 
demonstrate that care morality is consistent with notions of autonomy 
associated with impartiality and with rights to autonomy34, what seems to be 
of fundamental importance insofar as the definition of the self is concerned is 
the idea of self regulation or self governance. On most accounts of moral 
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agency-whether the moral agent is seen as an individuated self or a 
connected self-moral action and deliberation necessarily presupposes an 
extent of volition and choice initiated and owned by the moral agent. 
From this discussion, it follows that proponents of care morality should seek 
to maintain a paradigm of the moral agent as a related, yet self-governing, 
individual. This is the view, for example, of Diana Meyers who constructs a 
notion of autonomy that serves as a viable alternative to autonomy 
characterised essentailly as impartial reason.35 She argues that autonomy 
qua self governance has an important place in care morality. More 
specifically, the thrust of her argument is that the caring ideal is consistent 
with and, indeed, yields a convincing account of autonomy that is quite 
different from those derived from Kantian conceptions of moral agency. 
Meyers' proposal arises from the context of criticisms that the care ethic is 
inconsistent with ideals of autonomy because the former focuses on 
relatedness while the latter on actions based on freely and rationally chosen 
moral principles. 
Meyers argues that there is at least one other way (other than in terms 
of impartial reason) to conceptualise autonomy. Meyers draws here on the 
concept of responsibility reasoning. While reflective equilibrium is the 
measure of moral competence for impartial moral reasoning, responsibility 
reasoning is the measure of moral competence in care morality. Meyers' 
account is not only consistent with the care ethic, it provides a paradigm of 
moral reasoning which provides safeguards against exploitation. 
This latter issue, referred to in the previous section, is an important 
concern in care morality because the carer I cared-for relationship could be 
misinterpreted or misrepresented as a power hierarchy which subordinates 
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the cared-for. In Meyers' account the responsible reasoner exercises 
'imaginative introjection'. In other words, she imagines herself in a range of 
situations, asking herself questions such as "Could I bear to be the sort of 
person who can do that?"; she also examines a range of solutions open-
mindedly, being attuned to self-referential responses guided by moral 
emotions such as shame and pride. All these skills, according to Meyers, are 
complex ones which allow the individual to consult herself. It is in this sense 
that one might say the responsible reasoner is self-governing. 
On this account of responsibility in moral reasoning, the source of 
value is one's self or, more specifically, one's perception of one's self. 
Meyers' characterisation of personal identity and moral agency are promising 
in that they take into account agent autonomy. Moreover, caring need not be 
servile or self-sacrificial. Indeed, in subordinating oneself to others one 
would, in Meyers' terms, be compromising on or undermining one's self-
respect; the moral agent who is capable both of self-referential assessment 
and of self-governing would not allow this.36 
It needs to be noted that the point of Meyers' argument is not to 
demonstrate that all carers are responsible reasoners but that there is at 
least one plausible conception of autonomy that is consistent with the care 
morality and different from the Kantian approach. The next section discusses 
the dynamics of universalisability and of particularity, as they might figure in 
care morality. 
4.2.2 Universalisability and Particularity 
Some proponents of care morality-Noddings, for example-have sought to 
undermine the universalisability criterion as overriding in moral deliberation. 
That the universalisability criterion is subject to such scrutiny is not new; for 
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instance, even a justice- or rights-oriented approach to morality such as the 
one Kohl berg subscribes to in his research does not idealise 
universalisability; indeed, Kohlberg upholds as paradigmatic a form of moral 
reasoning which involves the agent's exercise of self-governance in his 
choice of which principles to apply in particular situations.37 
It needs to be kept in mind, however, that if a critical appraisal of the 
universalisability criterion is seen to entail an aversion to all kinds of norms or 
standards in moral reasoning, such a move could be detrimental to care 
morality because it leaves the person being cared-for in a position of 
vulnerability; it is in this way that the issues of universalisability and autonomy 
are connected. In other words, if it is felt that behaviours and actions are not 
open to more public and objective standards of scrutiny and that morality is 
sufficiently and wholly defined by a particular relationship, then there seems 
to be little one could do-especially the one in the position of the cared-for-
to question the unfair, inappropriate or wrongful treatment of oneself by a 
particular other, within the context of a relationship. For example, although 
the care ethic wants to say that the mother-child relationship is a distinctive 
one and is quite different, say, from an employer-employee relationship 
(there is nothing really controversial about this point), it should not hold, as 
well, that whatever a mother does with her child falls entirely within the 
boundaries of that special relationship and therefore that there are no norms 
or standards that apply universally to instances of maternal caring. 
Universalisability is important in care morality because it at least helps 
in curtailing arbitrary moral decision-making based solely on how one 
happens to feel for another. In this respect, it should be noted that because it 
is sometimes assumed that caring for another is nothing more than a feeling 
that it cannot be regulated in any systematic or universal way. Such an 
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assumption is, however, simplistic because it fails to consider other morally 
significant factors of relational attachment such as, for example, duties or 
obligatons specific to particular roles within relationships. In this connection, 
the proponent of a care morality needs at least to make a distinction between 
caring affection on the one hand, and responsibilities pertaining to caring 
relationships, on the other. The responsibilities to another within a particular 
relationship are quite different-and are largely independent-of how one 
might feel about that other person from time to time or even all of the time. 
For example, as those who have had the experience of caring for children will 
know, there are many moments when the feeling of outflowing love and care 
as a parent seems remote; even at such times, however, caring acts still 
need to be performed because the responsibilities of the caring relationship 
need to be met. On such a view, both the affection and the responsibilities 
arising from personal involvement and commitment are integral to the 
relationship itself. 
In the case of responsibilities specific to particular caring relationships, 
it is clear that at least certain responsibilities can be specified and can be 
held to be universally binding. (For example, in a parent-child relationship, 
caring about the physical, emotional and mental well-being of one's child is 
typically expected of parents.) This does not mean that all parents must 
necessarily feed their children the same kind of food, say, nor that some 
person other than the parent-say, a teacher-cannot care for a child in the 
way parents normally do. A teacher, or someone other than the child's 
parents, might indeed care for a particular child in the way a parent normally 
does. It is, however, neither required nor typical for a teacher to do so; nor, in 
all respects, is it normally appropriate. 
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In the area of parental care, certain forms and expressions of caring-
such as monitoring the child's social and moral development, getting the child 
to eat nutritional food, and, more generally, ensuring as far as possible that 
the child leads a happy life-are paradigmatic and, one could say, 
universalisable obligations. It follows from this that if a particular parent does 
not see these as crucial aspects of the parent-child relationship, we want to 
say "There's something not right here", rather than 'Well, it's basically up to 
her; after all, she's the child's mother." 
An emphasis on particularity need not be inconsistent with the specification 
of some principles or norms which limit what is not applicable or undesirable 
in care moralities. On the other hand, it is insufficient merely to address these 
limits because they provide the boundaries, but not the content, of caring. 
The issue at hand is how a person in a relationship might, in taking 
into consideration certain aspects of a relationship, express care and concern 
for a particular other in ways that are morally desirable. Given the 
uniqueness of each relationship and of individuals involved in the 
relationship, there is an unavoidable arbitrariness when the content of care is 
discussed. 
While noting these difficulties, some philosophers have attempted to 
articulate how caring persons might act or behave in certain contexts and, in 
that connection, have discussed the dynamics of paradigmatic forms of 
caring. For instance, Sara Ruddick38 discusses a range of aspects of 
maternal caring (often considered paradigmatic of care morality), 
demonstrating how particular features of the mother-child relationship might 
figure in the mother's moral reasoning. She argues that good maternal caring 
requires sensitivity as well as cognitive grasp of both the mother-child 
210 
relationship and the character of the child itself: 
A child is itself an "open structure" whose acts are irregular, 
unpredictable, often mysterious. A mother, in order to understand her 
child, must assume the existence of a conscious continuing person 
whose acts make sense in terms of perceptions and responses to a 
meaning-filled world. She knows that her child's fantasies and 
thoughts are not only connected to the child's power to act, but often 
the only basis for her understanding of the child and for the child's 
self-understanding."" 
Ruddick's depiction of the resources required of the mother qua carer 
in the context of a real, lived relationship, captures the amount of 
commitment and involvement that is required in mothering. In addition, it 
reveals that the dynamism inherent in relationships in part creates new and 
often unexpected situations which exact spontaneous responses."' 
The assessment of how appropriate or desirable a particular response 
is, will depend in part on the ability and willingness of individuals to grasp the 
morally salient features of a particular relationship in a given circumstance. It 
will, as well, depend on the ability and willingness of individuals to take these 
factors into account when constructing a response. In other words, it needs to 
be acknowledged and recognised that a moral system that emphasises 
particularity is just this vague. 
An important aspect of the ethic of care that has not been dealt with 
thus far is that of caring affection. In general, the emotions that operate within 
relationships further add to the complexity of taking particulars into account. 
Some of these emotions such as love and caring affection are most often 
construed positively both in motivational and consequentialist terms: a 
mother tending to a sick child might, for example, take great pains to 
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encourage her child to maintain his intake of fluids, and to ensure that he 
does. 
The role of caring affection in care morality is, however, not always as 
straightforward or simple as portrayed in the preceding example. For 
instance, in dealing with mothering and 'letting go', a dialectic of control and 
'letting go' is constantly at work, 41 and for some this process is marred by the 
intensity of emotional attachment to the other. 
While 'letting go' is most often used within the context of parent-child 
or carer-child relationships, questions regarding control of the other and 
respect for (the autonomy of) the other do arise in many other relational 
contexts. The role of caring affection in care morality is discussed next. 
4.2.3 Caring Affection 
The issue of caring affection as an important motivational source of acts of 
caring is important in discussions of the content of care morality as well as its 
structures. In relation to content, what needs to be considered is how the 
different kinds of caring or, in other words, the different ways of expressing 
care, might figure in moral practice. For example, caring for a child is a 
different kind of activity and involves different sentiments, sensibilities and 
responsibilities from caring for a close friend. Or, to use a more striking 
example, the way I cared for my father when he was 51 years of age and I 
was 19 (insofar as someone at 19 years of age does care for his parents) is 
different kind of caring which calls for a range of different sentiments, 
sensibilities and responsibilities when father is 72 and myself 40. 
To some extent, Nel Noddings attempts to discuss expressions of 
care. She models caring upon the paradigm of motherly concern and 
affection, elaborating that paradigm in terms of ideals of responsibility, 
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responsiveness, emotional attachment etc. Two criticisms of Noddings' view 
are discussed here. The first is a lack of clarity regarding how the paradigm 
of motherly concern might differ from other forms of caring. Thus, as pointed 
out previously, care expresses itself in different ways in different 
relationships, and it seems naive to assume that maternal caring is 
appropriate and paradigmatic in all relationships. 
The second problem with Noddings' paradigm of maternal caring is 
that it is based on an empirical claim (that mothers often care in 
supererogatory and admirable ways for their children). Because this is the 
case, she seems at a loss, at one point, regarding what might be said or 
done about mothers who do not exhibit appropriate maternal care. 42 Noddings 
appears to be unaware that she is, in effect, utilising independent criteria to 
assess that some mothers are caring ones and others are not; she does not 
at any stage attempt to specify these criteria, apart from stating that they are 
'natural'. 
The remarks made above are not meant to suggest that a morality 
based on empirical claims is untenable. The point is, rather, that Noddings' 
treatment of empirical data is inadequate. Her theory does not seek to justify 
why certain expressions of care, and the emotions and affection associated 
with them, are appropriate, others inappropriate and still others, perhaps, 
impermissible. 
From the preceding discussion of Noddings' proposal for a care ethic, it 
appears that it involves a primary confusion between the emotions and the 
duties associated with caring. Noddings seems to be saying that there are 
certain things mothers do for their children which are morally praiseworthy 
and which arise from emotional attachment. While this assertion is empirically 
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sound, her thesis that caring affections are natural and thus nonmoral43 is 
based on the questionable assumption that emotions do not belong to the 
moral realm. 44 
Thus, Noddings' construal of caring affection as natural rests on two 
mistakes: the first is the failure to distinguish between the duties and the 
emotions relevant to relational interaction; the second, arising from the first, is 
that she does not adequately represent the role of caring affection in care 
morality. As argued in the previous section, there are certain features of 
caring relationships which ought to be regulated. There are, for example, 
duties associated with caring which are subject to rules, norms and standards 
which are non-subjective and universal. These duties to another in a 
particular relationship are quite different from, yet intimately intertwined with, 
the feelings one might have for that other person. For example, the concept 
of moral blame is applicable in judging a mother's neglect of the health of her 
child as morally reprehensible. Even if it were, up till this instance, convincing 
that the mother was in general a loving and affectionate mother, such neglect 
of the child-the failure to fulfil her responsibilities to the child-could 
understandably be construed as a symptom of a failure to love her child 
(which, in itself, might be seen as morally reprehensible). Implicit in this 
picture of maternal caring is the view that, while caring affection is seen as an 
important motivational source of relational attachment, either the lack of 
caring affection itself or the failure to perform acts of care are moral 
shortcomings of the carer. 
The connection between caring affection and the duties of care can be 
illuminated by examining Michael Stocker's views of friendship and duty as 
contexts and forms of moral reasoning ... In his attempt to demonstrate an 
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interconnection between rights-based morality and responsibility-based 
morality (contra Gilligan), Stocker discusses the above mentioned 
components of caring. Using the example of friendship as an instance of 
responsibility-based morality, and duty as an instance of rights-based 
morality, Stocker argues, first, that friendship and duty are not as different as 
they are often thought to be and, secondly, that they are in fact connected in 
important ways. He contends that responsibility-based morality, in the 
instance of friendship, provides an important vantage point from which to 
assess a rights-based morality. Thus, he claims that because friendship 
offers a corrective for contemporary accounts of duty and duty-centred ethics, 
a theory of duty that leaves no room for friendship is an inadequate theory of 
duty. More generally, he proposes a synthesis of the two moralities, noting 
that traditional ways of conceptualising friendship as a natural category in the 
sense that it is premoral or extra moral imply that friendship is a natural good 
and not a moral good.'" 
Stocker acknowledges that his proposal is at a preliminary stage in the 
sense that it does not investigate the content of friendship or of duty, and, 
thus, how they differ; he simply points out that there are general norms and 
standards regarding how friends should or should not treat each other. On 
the other hand, he does demonstrate that friendship may give rise to duties of 
friendship such as certain special forms of care and consideration that are 
different from what is owed nonfriends. Stocker maintains a clear distinction 
between relating to people as friends and relating to people from duty. He 
argues, making a distinction between the duty offriendship and duties of 
friendship41, that much of what is constitutive of, and importantly valuable 
about friendship is not a duty, not even a duty of friendship; an example of 
this is spending time together. 
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In his conception of friendship, Stocker includes both the emotions 
associated with caring48 and the duties associated with caring as integral 
elements. The fulfilment of duties of friendship, he argues, are necessary but 
not sufficient for friendship: while a good friend will take care not to violate 
any duties of friendship, a friend who is concerned only to fulfil such duties is 
not much of a friend. This is because, Stocker believes, "[d]uties of friendship 
are at once constitutive of, and grounded by the friendship".49 
It is not only in the case of friendship but in other intimate relationships 
as well that both the affection and responsibilities arising from personal 
involvement and commitment are integral to the relationship itself. One of the 
important contributions of the care perspective is its emphasis on the 
recognition of the moral status of such involvement in intimate relationships. 
The preceding discussion points to a need for the clarification of concepts 
and issues pertaining to the nature and dynamics of personal relationships; 
two of the issues in question will be discussed here. 
First, the distinction between caring affections and external acts of 
caring needs to be maintained. As demonstrated in the discussion above, a 
failure to distinguish between the two aspects of a caring relationship could 
lead to the conceptualisation of caring which is unnecessarily subjective, feral 
and not subject to regulation-as per Noddings' account. The distinction is 
crucial, too, in maintaining the interdependence between acts of caring and 
the emotional involvement in a caring relationship. While the appropriate 
caring affection might not have generated nor accompanied particular caring 
acts, relational attachment characterised primarily or solely by the fulfilment 
of duties or responsibilities, and devoid of personal attachment or 
commitment, are not the interactions we associate with personal 
relationships. In the case of friendship, Stocker remarks that: 
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... it is clear that a good person who is, in all senses, a good friend will 
take care not to violate any duties of friendship. But it is equally clear 
that much of what is constitutive of, and importantly valuable about, 
acts of friendship is not a duty, not even a duty of friendship."' 
The complexity of the interdependence between acts and emotions of caring 
deserve detailed examination which the scope of this discussion does not 
allow. However, what could minimally be said is that it cannot be assumed 
that there is a necessary causal connection between particular caring 
emotions and particular caring acts. Because of the subjective nature of 
emotions, it is idealistic to hold that all caring action within intimate personal 
relationships must be generated by caring emotions. In the context of 
particular intimate relationships, while one might be praised for feeling 
appropriate caring emotions which are motivationally generative of admirable 
actions-for example, the paradigm of maternal sacrifice-it would be 
questionable to hold that a mother who fails to call forth loving and self-
sacrificial emotions is culpable and morally blameworthy. 
How caring emotions might figure in a morality based on care is the 
second issue that needs to be clarified. What has so far been discussed 
regarding affection for another in a personal relationship is merely 
preliminary, in part because of the subjective, personal and inscrutable 
nature of emotions in general. In addition, there are certain general standards 
and norms that apply to caring affections such that a particular affection 
might be deemed inappropriate in a particular caring relationship; these 
standards and norms are largely empirical, depending heavily on socio-
cultural norms of appropriateness in relational interaction. The multifaceted 
aspects of these norms add to their complexity, reflecting the richness and 
depth of human relationships within specific socio-cultural frameworks with 
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shared modes of life. In a liberal context, for example, the concept of 
paternalistic caring has acquired a sense of negativity and is distinguished 
from (appropriate) paternal care of a father for a child. 
The precise specification of appropriate emotions of care in particular 
caring relationships involves a complex combination of factors including 
sociocultural norms and accepted forms and modes of life in one's moral 
community, as previously mentioned. It also involves the particular 
characteristics of each of the participants in the relationship, whereby the 
historical narratives of their lives, their moral maturity, their sensitivities, 
needs and interests, and their involvements with other persons and projects. 
In summary, care morality is not different from other moral systems or norms 
in terms of requiring structures of justification. For even if it is acknowledged 
that the material and concrete content of caring relationships is sociologically 
and culturally variable, there needs to be frameworks and structures which 
allow the assessment of these forms. 
In conclusion, while this chapter is critical of certain proposals of the care 
ethic (for a variety of reasons), it should be noted that its aim is not to dismiss 
the care ethic altogether. Rather, an important theme is that although the 
care ethic is essentially a feminist critique of contemporary moral theory, it 
nevertheless has important implications for moral philosophy in general. In 
other words, the motif of human connectedness is important not only for 
women (in how they construe themselves and their lives), but for all persons. 
Relatedly, a theory which attempts to capture morally-salient aspects of 
connectedness is more realistic and robust than one which sees the moral 
agent as an atomistic individual. In particular, because the care ethic 
emphasises affectionate concern as an important motivational source of 
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moral action, it is able to give theoretical recognition to a range of behaviours 
which would generally be regarded as praiseworthy (or blameworthy) but 
which are not taken account of by rule- or justice-based theories. Indeed, the 
commitment required of carers, as well as those cared-for, by care morality, 
properly construed, is much more exacting and intense than what most rule-
or duty-based moralities in general require of moral agents. For example, 
instances of caring such as one's spending many hours with a friend who has 
lost her job, or concern that one's child is exhibiting aggressive behaviours, 
and dealing with that, call for a significant amount of time, energy and other 
resources that many moral theories would classify as supererogatory. 
Furthermore, there have been interesting issues raised by feminist moral 
philosophers, regarding the relative status of care- and justice- or rule-based 
moralities. The general thrust of these arguments suggest that many aspects 
of the care ethic-content, process, affection, moral deliberation and 
attention to particularity-are indeed fund mental and integral to the proper 
functioning of human lives. In that connection, proponents of the care ethic 
have advanced a range of proposals regarding the place of care moralities in 
contemporary ethical practice. 
While Gilligan speculates on the possibility of the care perspective 
superseding the justice perspective in importance51 , others such as Held and 
Walker have put forward somewhat more restrained views. Held argues for 
pluralist ethics in the context of which maternal nurturing, rather than 
marketplace, contractual ethics, is central.52 Walker contends that particularity 
should procedurally and conceptually precede universality, in moral 
deliberation.53 In other words, moral deliberation should not be conceived of 
as a process whereby one applies a general rule to a particular situation. 
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Rather, " ... moral adequacy falls off in the direction of generality .. ."54 because 
focusing on the details of a particular situation is the 'best case', given that 
one is able to grasp 'fully and directly' the morally salient features of the 
situation. On the other hand, resorting to the application of general 
standards-Walker terms these 'surrogates' for paradigmatic caring-to a 
particular case is a 'degenerate instance' of moral reasoning. 
The following two chapters analyse, respectively, Confucian and Pauline 
views of human relatedness. Both traditions construe personal involvement 
with particular others as an integral part of the life of the community. 
Confucianism emphasises differentiated attachments, loyalties ands 
responsibilities to particular others as the basis of a communitarian socio-
political structure, stressing the necessity of maintaining a hierarchy founded 
upon differential loyalties and obligations. Pauline Christianity, on the other 
hand, upholds a relatively egalitarian community in which love (aya1tT]) is 
considered the primary motivational source of other- and community-directed 
actions and behaviours. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONFUCIAN COMMUNITY 
An important theme in Confucian thought is that the self can only properly be 
defined with reference to other individuals. The notion of a connected self.-is 
opposed to that of an atomistic individual-is a dominant motif in Confucian 
views on personal identity, morality and political and social structures. Within 
the framework of Confucian thought, the human person is in part defined by 
the nature of the different relationships he or she has with particular others. It 
follows from such a conceptualisation of the individual that a critical aspect of 
being human rests in the cultivation of meaningful relationships; thus the 
question of whether the individual can actualise himself or herself apart from 
other individuals within society is absurd in the context of Confucian 
philosophy. 
The classical Confucians placed significant emphasis on the socio-
political aspects of the community as the framework within which the 
cultivation of the self would occur. The political structure of society upheld by 
Confucius in the Analects is based on hierarchical order, the ideal structure of 
society being derived from Confucius' idealisation of Chou feudalism 
(Analects 3:14, 2:23, 7:19, 8:18-21). According to this picture, people within 
the upper levels of the hierarchy (the elite minority) should have greater 
political and social power because of their capabilities-and, accordingly, 
greater responsibility-while those at the lower levels of the hierarchy were 
the common peoples whose roles were much more restricted. Confucius 
expressed this in the following passage: 
When good government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music and 
punitive military expeditions proceed from the son of Heaven ... When 
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these things proceed from the princes, as a rule, the cases will be few 
in which they do not lose their power in ten generations ... When right 
principles prevail in the kingdom, government will not be in the hands 
of the great officers [but in the hands of the son of Heaven]. When 
right principles prevail in the kingdom, there will be no [politicaij 
discussions or causes for complaint among the common people. 1 
This passage expresses an authoritarian viewpoint. Negatively interpreted, 
the hierarchical structure imposed by Confucius may be considered a tool for 
government oppression of the common peoples. However, it will be 
demonstrated in this chapter that certain passages of the Analects 
presuppose a more generous and less power-oriented approach to 
government. Thus while there are authoritarian elements in the Confucian 
notion of government, there is, at the same time, insistence on the increased 
responsibilities of those at the top of the hierarchy. 
One of the responsibilities of the Confucian gentleman ( chun tzu) was, 
in cultivating his relationships with others, to extend his sphere of influence 
by providing paradigmatic forms of relational interaction upon which other 
people (the common people) could model their own relationships (Analects 
13:10,11 ). In other words, as Confucius saw it, the chun tzu was obliged to 
foster norms and structures conducive to the formation and maintenance of 
meaningful relationships within the community. In this connection, statements 
in the Analects such as the following reveal the significance of the communal 
context in an individual's moral development: 
It is jen which constitutes the excellence of a neighbourhood 
(community). If one, in selecting a residence, does not seek one where 
fen prevails, he is not wise. (Analects 4:1) 
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It is clear that Analects 4: 1 refers to the notion of neighbourhood not merely 
and trivially in terms of spatial proximity but, more crucially, in terms of the 
values and norms upheld by a community. This passage, together with 
Analects 1:8.3: "Have no friends not like yourself', reflect the Confucian 
conception of the self as necessarily relational and, accordingly, of moral 
development as a process of learning to cultivate meaningful relationships 
with others in the community. 
This chapter considers the classical Confucian account of the nature and role 
of relationships as the basis of social, political and moral order. As pointed 
out previously, moral development, in Confucianism, consists in working out 
one's relationships with particular others. More precisely, the cultivation of 
relationships involves, centrally, the performance of accepted actions and 
forms of behaviour motivated by appropriate affectionate concern for a 
particular other within a relationship. On this view, moral concepts such as 
responsiveness and responsibility are crucial in moral evaluation. Similar 
themes also play a a central role in the articulation of the care ethic. Because 
the care ethic has sometimes been characterised as an ethic of the 
oppressed in the sense that it marks a feminist move from an exclusive focus 
on autonomy, universalisability and impartiality (characteristic features of 
masculine moral reasoning) as primary considerations in moral deliberation, it 
is interesting that Confucian philosophy, which has unmistakable patriarchal 
tendencies, espouses an account of morality that has important features in 
common with the care ethic. 
The discussion in this chapter focuses on the range of structures and 
norms operative in human relationships in the ideal Confucian community. To 
this effect, the first section of the chapter analyses the Confucian concept, 
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cheng ming (correcting [usage of] names), a concept fundamental to the 
Confucian emphasis on relationships. For the Confucians, a person has 
certain obligations arising from his or her position in a particular relationship 
with a specific other (eg. father and son, chun tzu and subject). A useful way 
to illuminate the notion of obligations arising from one's position within a 
relationship in Confucian thought is to compare it with the concept of roles 
within role morality (ie role of father, role of chun tzu etc). In this connection, it 
needs to be stated at the outset that in Confucian philosophy, a person's 
having related well with particular others is deeply intertwined with issues of 
personal identity. By contrast, the concept of moral agency in contemporary 
Anglo-American moral philosophy appears to be closely linked to a marked 
distinction between private and public spheres of life. Confucian philosophy 
does not make this distinction; there are no clear boundaries in Confucianism 
between cultivating relationships with others and the development of the self. 
There is indeed, in Confucianism, a marked absence of distinction between 
the private and public selves and, at a connected but different level, between 
individual good and the common good, distinctions which are fundamental to 
the more individualist conception of the human person and of morality. The 
connection between the concept of a person as a related self and the 
structures of a society in which these related selves live and function is 
another important focus in this first section. 
The second section analyses the dynamics of three different 
relationships which are significant in Confucian philosophy. These are: 
husband-wife; father-son; and chun tzu-subject. In examining the structures 
and norms of these relationships, this section aims to demonstrate the 
distinctive features of the Confucian system and to point out its merits and its 
difficulties. 
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The themes articulated in the first two sections are drawn together in 
the final section. The thesis of the final section is that while the Confucian 
emphasis on relational attachment to particular others is a fundamental and 
irreducible aspect of morality, relational attachment, if it is based simply or 
primarily on affectionate concern, is not in itself sufficient to constitute a moral 
system. To assume that it is, it is argued, is one of the failings of Confucian 
philosophy. The argument in this section proceeds to stress that an emphasis 
on relational attachment needs to be situated within a framework of 
somewhat more objective norms and principles. A problematic-and 
subjectivist-stance whereby morality is dependent on the feelings one 
happens to have (or not to have) for a particular other is thereby avoided. It is 
suggested that this naive conception of relational morality needs to be 
avoided as well by those proponents of the care ethic who seek to promote 
clear discontinuities between the care perspective on the one hand and 
rights- and justice-based perspectives on the other. 
5.1 Role Relationships Within the Community: Cheng-ming 
That the Confucian view of morality is essentially relational is obvious from an 
examination of the important Confucian concepts such as jen, li, chung, shu 
and hsiao (as discussed in chapter two). Another Confucian concept, cheng 
ming [lit. correcting names], even more readily exemplifies a conception of 
morality which stresses relational attachment. Cheng ming, broadly speaking, 
refers to the view that specific requirements and/or obligations arise within 
the context of relating to others, the requirements varying according to one's 
position within particular relationships. In other words, fulfilling the 
requirements of one's role in a particular relationship is a necessary condition 
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of one's standing in that relationship and, connectedly, of one's suitability to 
bear a particular title (eg, 'chun tzu'). 
The term 'ming' in cheng ming is literally translated 'name', although 'title' 
better captures its Confucian usage. In emphasising the correct usage of 
titles, Confucius was making the point that titles used to designate the range 
of roles in human relationships are not merely indexical or referential but also 
have normative significance (Analects 13:3.1-5). It is stated, for example, in 
Analects 4:5.2 that the chun tzu without virtue cannot fulfil the requirements 
of his title. The concept cheng ming is best illustrated by analogy as in an 
example Confucius himself used: 
A cornered vessel without corners; a strange cornered vessel indeed, 
a strange cornered vessel indeed. 
[lit. A ku that is not ku; a ku alas, a ku alas.] (Analects 6:23) 
The ku was a drinking vessel used in pre-Confucian times.2 According to the 
symbolism of the separate characters which make up the term 'ku', the 
character on the left, jiao, means 'corner'. In Confucius' time, the shape of 
that particular kind of drinking vessel (ku) had changed (presumably, the 
corners were eliminated), while the name 'ku' remained. The distinctive 
characteristic of the object specifically highlighted in its name was no longer a 
feature of the object but, despite that, the name meant specially to pick out 
that distinctive feature was still in use. In making this remark, Confucius was 
criticising existing socio-political structures: while titles from a previous age3 
(such as chun tzu) were retained, Confucius felt that they had empty 
referents because existing governments were not fulfilling their 
responsibilities (see, for example, Analects 13:20.4; 6:27; 8:18; 4:6 and 2:7; 
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the Analects itself is rife with Confucius' comments regarding the follies and 
wrongs of named people involved in government). 
Expounding on the theory of cheng ming was one way in which 
Confucius sought to bring for the leaders of the community a realisation of 
their responsibilities. The first step toward political reform lay in the moral 
self-cultivation of these people (Ta-hsueh 1 0:6; Chung-vung 20:4; Analects 
13:6, 13). Such reform, beginning with the government, would filter through to 
the lives of the people.4 The view of classical Confucianism is that a ruler who 
has successfully attained some level of moral development can influence his 
subjects, and that positive changes toward an ideal Confucian society would 
thereby be made in the ways of thinking and modes of life of all within the 
community {Ta-hsueh 3:5; 9:1-4; Analects 2:1; 8:2; 13:1, 11, 16; 12:19). 
Expressed somewhat more abstractly, Confucius is reported to have 
said that if titles are not correctly used (ie, people in particular roles are not 
fulfilling their responsibilities), then language itself cannot be properly used; 
this in turn leads to the situation whereby deeds cannot succeed: 
Tzu-lu said, "If the ruler of Wei left the administration (government 
[cheng2]) of his state to you, what would you do first? 
The master said, "If something has to be put first, it is (instilling) the 
correct usage of titles (cheng1 ming). 
Tzu-lu said, "What a roundabout way you take! Why even refer to 
correction (cheng1)?" 
The master said, "Yu, how boorish you are. A chun tzu, in regard to 
what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve. 
If titles (ming) are not correct (cheng1), language will not be in accord 
(with reality}. 
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If language is not in accord (with reality), the affairs (of the state) will 
not be accomplished. 
If the affairs (of the state) are not accomplished, li and music will not 
flourish. 
If li and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly 
administered. 
If punishments are not properly administered, the common people do 
not know even how to move hand or foot [ie, there are no guides for 
acceptable behaviour]. 
Therefore, a chun tzu considers it necessary in his usage of titles that 
these titles, when referred to in speech, can be realised. The chun tzu 
is anything but casual where his use of language is concerned. 
(Analects 13:3) 
There is a pun in this passage on the terms government (cheng2) and correct 
(cheng1). In Chinese, the character for 'governing' is made up of two other 
characters, the one on the left being the term 'correct' (cheng1). For 
Confucius, to govern (politically) is to bring about order. Confucius' concern 
here is not with metaphysical theories of how titles function as signs or 
symbols nor with how those symbols are connected with reality.5 Rather, 
titles have evaluative force: one who does not act according to the 
requirements implied by the particular title he holds should alter his attitudes, 
behaviours and actions to bring them into conformity. 
To some extent, this idea is articulated by Chad Hansen. Commenting 
on cheng ming, he argues that this Confucian doctrine was intended to have 
a regulative function: 
The terms and names involved in the rectification of names [cheng 
ming] are those that function in the traditional code: man, king, brother, 
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son. The purpose of the rectification is to create an ideal language for 
moral discrimination, evaluation and action ... Thus while in early 
Western philosophy there is a kind of assumption that the primary role 
of language lies in describing the world and communicating ideas or 
beliefs about the world, Confucian ... 'rectification of names' operates 
on the presupposition that the primary function of language is to instil 
attitudes guiding choice and action. Language use should be 
manipulated as a means of social contro1."6 
It is debatable whether, as Hansen suggests, one can read into Confucius' 
use of cheng ming an intention to manipulate the use of language 'as a 
means of social control'. This seems to be a one-sided and unjustified 
interpretation of cheng ming because Confucius proposed codes of 
behaviour not only for the common people but for those in government as 
well. In fact, as pointed out previously, the first phase in the process of cheng 
ming is the regulation of the behaviour of the latter. Hansen's reference to 
'social control' seems to imply that cheng ming is a tool for socio-political 
oppression: while this might have in fact happened in the course of Chinese 
history, to read it as Confucius' intention is inconsistent with many of 
Confucius' views expressed in the Analects (see the discussion of Analects 
6:23 above). 
Hansen's other proposal, the idea that Confucius emphasised a 
regulative function, is a less controversial one: Confucius is insisting that 
individuals have to live appropriately according to the titles by which they are 
referred to. These titles have evaluative content and thus have practical 
implications for human behaviour. They prescribe how values upholding the 
various roles are to be realized within the fundamental reality of the lived 
human world. For Confucius, what is central to these titles is not the simple 
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naming function of the terms, but the normative codes associated with certain 
socio-political positions. Confucius never quites contemplates the form or the 
functionality of these titles but instead emphasises their semantic content. 
Indeed, at the semantic level, Confucius conflates the meaning of titles with 
their morality; the question "What does the title 'son' mean?" is, for him, the 
same question as "What should a son do?": one arrives at the same answer 
for both these questions. Thus, anyone having a title should ponder these 
questions; the subject as well as the chun tzu, the father as well as the son. 
The discussion above highlights Confucius' use of cheng ming as a 
rhetorical device-as alluded to above in the discussion of the term 'ku'-to 
criticise, first, inefficient or evil rulers and, secondly, the undesirable 
frameworks and structures in their societies which have eventuated as a 
result of their inability to rule properly. 
Another important feature of Confucian thought, and of the concept cheng 
ming, is that Confucius does not make a clear distinction between the socio-
political and the personal domains. This point is made not to suggest that 
Confucian philosophy should have included such categories but in order to 
note that the absence of such reveals interesting aspects of the philosophy. 
As discussed previously, cheng ming applies not only to the obligations of 
those who take on the more public socio-political roles, but to obligations in 
relationships which have a distinctly more personal and private aspect as 
well. This is manifest in two ways: the first is that while cheng ming begins 
with the moral self-cultivation of those involved in government (especially the 
chun tzu), moral self-cultivation, in more practical terms, refers to the 
cultivation of one's relationships: 
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The administration of government rests in getting the right kind of 
person. These men are available only because the ruler has cultivated 
himself well; the ruler cultivates himself according to tao; the 
cultivation of oneself according to tao rests, in turn, in jen. Jen is the 
defining feature of humanity and is most centrally manifest in relational 
attachment to one's relatives ... The chun tzu may not neglect his self-
cultivation. (Chung-yung 20:4-5a; 7a) 
What emerges from this picture of the chun tzu is the fusion of the different 
spheres of his life. An interesting contrast can be made between this feature 
of Confucian morality and role morality in Anglo-American philosophy. Role 
morality asks questions like: are roles like hats, to be 'put on' whenever one 
is acting, or to be seen as acting, from a particular position, and 'cast off' 
otherwise; how important are roles in the formation of one's character and, 
thus, of personal identity; and, if roles are professional codes dictating how 
incumbents should perform certain functions, how is professional 
competence related to personal integrity. 
In Confucian philosophy, such questions do not even arise. The 
fundamental point here is that such questions are critical only when there is 
an assumption of difference between the public and the personal aspects of 
life.7 The absence, in Confucian philosophy, of distinction between public and 
impersonal, on the one hand, and private and personal, on the other, has two 
important and interesting implications. The first is that while the notion of the 
requirements of a role is not specific to Confucian thought, what is distinctive 
in cheng ming is that certain role-like requirements apply in the domain of 
public, as well as of personal relationships. Contrastively, within a system 
which maintains the distinctness of the modes of life and moral codes within 
the public and the private domains, and which views rles as being specifically 
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applicable to the more 'public' domains of behaviour and action, it would 
seem odd to suggest that there are roles, and role requirements, operative in 
more 'personal' arenas such as father-hood, mother-hood, husband-hood, 
and son-hood. Secondly, this absence of a sense of carrying or crossing over 
from public to personal life operates in the other direction as well: the 
classical Confucians, because they did not distinguish between 'public' and 
'personal' spheres, simply assumed that a subject was or could be 
relationally attached to the ruler, just as a child might be to his parent. 
The second and connected way in which cheng ming is understood to 
apply both to public and private domains of human life goes beyond the life of 
the chun tzu to the lives of the common people. Thus titles such as 'son', 
'elder brother' and 'wife'-titles signifying relationships often thought to be 
personal and belonging to the domestic realm, as opposed to the public 
arena-are open to some sort of scrutiny by the larger community because 
the ways the members of the community relate (as son, elder brother or as 
wife) are seen as having discernible social and political effects: 
From the Son of Heaven (the divine ruler) to the common people, all 
must consider the cultivation of themselves as fundamental. It cannot 
be the case that when the root (ie self-cultivation) is neglected that that 
which eventuates from it will be well-ordered ... (Ta-hsueh ''The Text of 
Confucius", 6; 7a) 
In Analects 12:11, Confucius describes a well-governed society: 
chun chun (chun tzu), chen chen (official), fu fu (father), zi zi (son) 
(Analects 12:11). 
There are various translations of this passage into English. Translation is 
difficult, however, as the original saying in Chinese is itself vague. A most 
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plausible interpretation consistent with other themes in the Analects is to 
consider the first term of each pair as the title or noun, and the second as 
verb; each noun-verb pair signifies that the people filling the various positions 
carry out their responsibilites in a way fitting their titles: the minister ministers, 
the father fathers, etc. The second term of each pair describes an activity: 
that of being a son, a father, an official or a chun tzu; titles carry normative 
content such that the person referred to by the title acts and behaves, 
necessarily, according to his designation. These are signs of good 
government; indeed, one could argue that a situation where all the members 
of the community fulfilling the responsibilities arising from their relational 
attachments is synonymous with good government. 
Analects 12:11 assumes that the well-governed polity is synonymous 
with the well-ordered society in which the members understand their specific 
obligations arising from their positions in particular relationships. There is 
overwhelming emphasis, in many Confucian texts, on not behaving in ways 
which are considered 'out of place' given one's status. This idea of acting 
appropriately-say, as wife, son, or younger sibling-was a theme deeply 
entrenched in Confucian philosophy. For instance, the Analects records an 
case when Confucius commented that the adult-like abilities of a child were 
indeed inappropriate: 
A boy from the village of Ch'ueh used to come with messages. 
Someone asked him saying, Is he improving himself? The master 
said, "Judging by the way he sits in grown-up people's places and 
walks alongside other people older than himself, I should say that he 
was bent upon getting on quickly rather than upon improving himself." 
(14:47) 
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This negative example of development describes the boy acting 
inappropriately through his attempts to 'walk alongside', or, in other words, to 
assume equal status with people older than himself. The behaviour calls for 
reproach because such violations have the potential to undermine the finely-
balanced homeostatic model of the ideally ethical society. A particular phrase 
in the Analects sums up the undesirability of such attempts: "He who works 
on a different strand destroys the whole nature" (2:16). The connection 
between good government and the conditions of life of the people in a 
community is intimate: while the well-regulated society is essential for the 
good life of the individuals that make up the society, society is possible only 
when people carry out their responsibilities appropriately according to their 
particular places in the social structure; it is only with the cooperation of each 
individual within the community that the common good can be attained. 
This way of thinking about the the connections between members of a 
community is akin to-one could even say paradigmatic of-structures within 
the Gemeinschaft community, as opposed to the Gesellschaft one, a 
distinction made by Tennies in 1887.8 The Gemeinschaft society is one built 
upon relational ties; it stresses notions of kinship, friendship, family and 
neighbourhood. It has a feudal, village-type focus, in which personal affection 
and attachments are emphasised. According to Tennies, the Gemeinschaft 
relationship finds its paradigm in marriage. In contrast, the Gesel/schaft 
society is run along legalistic, contractarian principles, with a clear means-
end distinction centering on personal profit. Kamenka,9 commenting on 
Tennies' conceptualisation of the two separate and distinct organisational 
structures, suggests that Tennies derived the structure of the Gese//schaft 
society from the Hobbesian idea of war of all against all. Apart from the 
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strong sense of commercial gain, in Tonnies' conceptualisation, of this model 
of society, one of the principles which is emphasised is equality. 
Writing on the conception of law and the connection between law and the 
ways of life of the ancient Chinese, Ch'u T'ung Tsu captures well the sense of 
Gemeinschaft structures when he expresses the different statuses and their 
implications within ancient Chinese society which were articulated in the 
Confucian system: 
The distinctions between noble and humble, superior and inferior were 
... based upon the talent and virtue of each member of the society, and 
constituted a type of social selection conditioned by social success. In 
addition further differences found expression in the kinship system. 
These were based on criteria of generation, age, degree of 
relationship and sex. Status and modes of behavior in the larger 
society were determined by the fact of superiority and inferiority, in a 
family, by the degree of nearness and remoteness, superiority and 
inferiority, and seniority and juniority. The primary rights of 
consumption belonged to the father as against the sons, to the elder 
brother as against a younger brother, all types of labor or services 
being demanded from the junior groups, thus establishing 
relationships of subordination and superordination. The so-called rules 
of filial piety and brotherhood, and also of feminine behavior, were 
based on this."10 
The idea of a public, impersonal and autonomously-acting self, a concept 
presupposed by Gesel/schaft structures in which individuals are of more or 
less equal standing and an important element of moral reasoning is the 
universal application of rules and norms, runs counter to Confucian ideals. 
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Depending on one's interpretation of the Analects and its projecUs, 11 it might 
be argued that the finely-tuned intricacy which underlies the establishment of 
such a communal structure does not allow for variations based on individual 
differences; to assert the autonomy of the individual in any of the senses 
described above (personal responsibility, personal gain and self-regulation) is 
to threaten the web-like structure. To 'work on a different strand' is to assert 
the importance of the self over the familial and/or the communal. Thus, the 
son conceals the father's crime-and vice-versa (Analects 13: 18)-because 
working on a different strand would upset the whole (family system). 
Analogously, and on a much larger scale, to assert the importance ofthe self 
within the communal context would have the effect of upsetting the moral, 
social and political fabric of society. 
The Gesellschaft picture of society is founded upon a conception of 
the human person as an atomistic individual-thus emphasising concepts 
such as personal responsibility, personal gain and self-regulation; 
Gemeinschaft structures are based on a conception of the human person as 
being irreducibly interrelated. 
In the case of Confucian thought, the related self is the basic social 
unit and, thus, of moral deliberation. Within Confucian philosophy, to clearly 
identify and define a self is to isolate it and to remove it from the concrete 
reality of webs of interdependence. Motifs of the embeddedness and 
connectedness of human beings in webs of relationships are made 
emphatically; human persons cannot be decontextualised and 
superordinated in any final sense. The human person is interdependent with 
others to whom she is related, simultaneously shaping these others and 
being shaped by them. 
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This account of the self differs in important respects from conceptions 
of the self, and of morality, which identify and isolate the discrete agent 
responsible for a particular event. It is clear that in Confucian thought, notions 
of appropriate behaviour vary according to status and to relationships. 
Connectedly, different accounts of responsibility and accountability arise from 
such fundamental differences in the conceptions of the self and of action. 
If responsibility is an issue in Confucian thought (it is debatable 
whether it is), the point that needs first to be resolved is not that the notion of 
responsibility varies across relationships (for instance, the responsibilities 
one has as a father is different from those one has as a ruler) but, rather, who 
is (are) a/the bearer(s) of responsibility? 12 In other words, given that it is a 
basic tenet of Confucian thought that the self is a self-in-relation, does it 
follow that the concept of responsibility takes on a more fluid character? If the 
related self, rather than the (individual) moral agent, is the locus of agency 
and hence, of responsibility, then perhaps causal explanations that seek to 
identify individual agency are inappropriate and need to be replaced by 
explanations that take into account the whole range of relevant causal 
conditions and the relations that obtain among them as they come to sponsor 
any given occurrence.13 
The fluid character of the self and of responsibility described above is 
predicated on the hierarchical differentiation of society based on social, moral 
and political features: a 'division of labour' hierarchy is suggested, with some 
having more responsibility than others, and with some having responsibility 
for others. It was previously argued that the Confucian system does at points 
(in the Analects) seem to call for the maintenance of the superior -inferior 
balance of power in relationships. A clear drawback of such an ideology is 
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that individuals within such frameworks could emerge as mere cogs in the big 
machine of mass coercion. 
The next section extends the examination of the dynamics of moral behaviour 
in Confucian thought. In particular, it analyses the issue of subordination with 
regard to requirements for the inferior person in a particular relationship to 
subject his or her moral judgments, and even moral development, to the 
maintenance of the relationship. 
5.2 Relationships 
There were five kinds of relationships which the classical Confucians held to 
be fundamental in that they are foundational in social life: chun tzu-subject; 
father-son; older brother-younger brother; husband-wife; and friendship 
(Chung-vung, 20:8). Of these five, the first three-especially the first two-
receive most emphasis in the Analects. There is considerably less, though 
still a significant emphasis on friendship.14 The case of the husband-wife 
relationship is, however, hardly mentioned. 
As discussed in chapter two, the father-son relationship is characterised by 
hsiao, one of the values deemed fundamental in Confucian thought. The 
Confucians considered the family context as the first training ground for 
relational interaction and, in addition, believed that the cultivation of emotions 
and affections within the structures of family relationships would equip the 
moral agent with the necessary skills to develop other relational ties in extra-
familial contexts. This can be contrasted with the chun tzu-subject 
relationship which is not articulated in terms of a basic moral principle (cf. 
hsiao in the father-son relationship). Indeed, it seems that learning to be filial 
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and being filial has implications both for social and political life such that 
hsiao is the action-guiding principle for the chun tzu-subject relationship as 
well. Thus, hsiao is fundamental in the young man's cultivation of himself 
(Analects 1 :6) and in his involvement in the life of the community either as a 
subject (Analects 1 :2) or as chun tzu (Analects 2:20; 8:2.2). In the case of 
one's involvement as a subject, Analects 1 :2 describes the connection 
between filial piety, fraternal submission and participation in the community: 
Yu Tzu said, "It is rare for a man whose character is such that he is 
filial and respectful of his older brother(s) to offend his superiors; it is 
unheard of for one who has no such inclination to be inclined to cause 
social and political unrest ... Filial piety and fraternal submission are 
the roots of a man's character." 
The desirable effects of filiality are not confined to the domestic sphere; they 
are tangible within the context of the larger community insofar as indiviudals 
within the community have cultivated their characters according to hsiao. 
It is, however, not merely the effects of hsiao that are perceptible-
hsiao is applicable as the guiding principle such that, for example, one treats 
a chun tzu according to the principles of hsiao. A passage from the Ta-hsueh 
affirms the fundamental significance of hsiao in the social and political life of 
the community: 
What is meant by "In order to properly govern the state, it is necessary 
first to regulate one's [ie the chun tzu's] own family," is this: If one 
cannot teach one's own family, one will not be able to teach others. 
Therefore the chun tzu [if he handles the affairs of his family well) can 
attain success in teaching the country without stepping beyond family 
boundaries. The chun tzu should be treated according to the principles 
of hsiao; elders should be treated according to the principles of 
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fraternal submission; the people of the country should be treated 
kindly ... Indeed, when the ruler as a father, a son and a brother, is an 
exemplar, the people imitate him. This is what is meant when it is said, 
"The government of a country depends on the ruler's management of 
family affairs. "15 
One of the striking features of this picture of the ideal community is the 
absence of a distinction between what constitutes common good (good for 
the society as a whole), and what individual good. One of the emphases in 
this section is that the conflation of common and individual goods leads to 
certain awkward structures and norms in the Confucian construction of the 
ideal community. 
As we shall see in the following sub-sections, there are problems with 
the Confucian emphasis on the five relationships because of the power 
structures inherent in the relationships (excluding friendship because it is the 
only one of the five relationships amongst equals). The following sub-sections 
deal with three of these relationships and their definitions, often seen to be 
particularly problematic. 16 They are the husband-wife relationship, the father-
son relationship and the ruler-minister relationship. Three types of 
subordination are present here: gender (ie. male) superiority; authority of the 
parent; and political subordination, respectively. 17 Each of these types of 
subordination will be dealt with in turn. 
5.2.1 The Status of Women 
Within regard to the status of women and attitudes toward women, Confucius' 
thoughts seems to reflect the thinking characteristic of the culture of his time. 
Within the context of a patriarchal and patrilineal society, Confucius sketched 
an ideal polity in which only men were involved in government. Given that 
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Confucian theory accords to those involved in government the highest ranks 
of social status, power and authority, the significance of women within the 
community was almost completely neglected. 
In Confucian thought, social differentiation between persons in their 
various relationship roles involves corresponding norms that override any 
notion of gender equality. In other words, gender difference is coded into 
norms of social appropriateness, biased against women. The female person 
is recognised only in her roles as wife, and/or as mother. In her role as wife, 
the status of the woman is inferior to that of her husband. There are different 
codes of appropriateness which apply to the wife and to her husband, even 
within the context of their personal relationship. 
From the moral perspective, Confucius made little allowance for the 
development of character or individual achievement in women. Values 
appropriate to womanhood were explained solely in terms of the woman's 
relationships and of her place within the family. The wife excels insofar as 
she fulfils her wifely obligations; the mother, her mothering obligations; the 
daughter, her daughterly obligations. Women not having any of these 
abovementioned roles were not accounted for in Confucius' philosophy. In 
the case of women, social and moral excellence are explained in terms of 
their respective successes as daughters, wives and/or mothers. However, 
even the role of the mother is marginalised. Little, if anything, is mentioned in 
Confucian writings about the role of the mother and of her relation to her 
child, although much is made of the father-son relationship. The exclusion of 
women is also obvious in Confucius' articulation of the primary principle of 
relational attachment, hsiao, solely in terms of the father-son relationship. 
Although one was required to be filial to one's mother as well as to one's 
father (see, for example, Analects 4:18), exemplary conduct and wisdom are 
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explained in terms of the father-son relationship. The idea that a mother 
might serve as an exemplar and as a teacher to her daughter, or for that 
matter, to her son, is non-existent. 
One of the two references to women in the Analects, 17:25, seems to 
place women in a demeaning category: 
The master said, "In one's household, it is the women and the small 
men that are difficult to deal with. If you let them get too close, they 
become insolent. If you keep them at a distance, they complain. "18 
It has been pointed out, though, that the phrase translated 'women' (nO tzu) 
should be translated instead as "young women"; therefore, 17:25 was a 
statement about young women rather than a theory about women in 
general.19 
Li Chenyang, who argues against the view that the subordination of 
women was upheld in the Analects, remarks, regarding the passage, that "[it] 
probably reflects a social prejudice that already existed in his time. Given 
Confucius's later illustrious status in China, this short comment on (young) 
women may have considerably influenced people's view on women in 
general and probably reinforced people's prejudice against women. However, 
there is no reason for one to think that this view is an inherent or essential 
part of Confucius's thought or an inevitable consequence of his general 
philosophy."20 
Li's explanation of the passage is unconvincing and too readily 
excuses Confucius in the Analects.21 Futhermore, the explanation in itself 
fails to account for the other passage in which women are mentioned, 
Analects 8:20.2-3: 
King Wu said, "I have ten able ministers." 
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Confucius said, "Is not the saying that talents are difficult to find, true? 
Only when the dynasties of Tang and Yu met, were they more 
abundant than in this of Chou, yet there was a woman among them. 
The able ministers were no more than nine men." 
In this passage, King Wu (1027-1005 BC), who founded the Chou Dynasty, is 
quoted as having remarked that he had ten able ministers, the number ten 
apparently signifying the difficulty of finding able ministers. Confucius' 
comment, while it agreed with the view that talented people (as leaders of the 
community) were difficult to come by, contested that King Wu actually had 
ten able ministers, arguing that he in fact had only nine, given that one of the 
ten was a woman. 
In this passage, Confucius marks the boundaries of feminine 
excellence, excluding women, first and foremost, from the arena of political 
involvement. While men could excel according to the chun tzu paradigm, 
there was no feminine equivalent. This move is more insidious than it first 
seems because in classical Confucianism, moral social and political 
achievement and participation were irretrievably intertwined. Thus, the stance 
in the Analect~iven that there is a marked absence regarding the moral 
development of women, together with this last-quoted passage-is that 
women should be excluded from any such forms of participation. In 
Confucian thought, the concept of a worthwhile and meaningful life for a 
woman is defined largely in terms of, and thus restricted to, the above-
mentioned achievements. 
A similar kind of subjugation is present in the description of the various 
obligations of children to parents. It needs to be made clear at this point that 
references to 'child' or 'children' are almost always translations of the Chinese 
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term 'tzu', meaning 'son'. Secondly, it seems that what is significant about 
being a child or son is the biological fact itself; by contrast, neither the age 
(whether 4 or 40) nor the moral development of the child is seen to have 
moral significance. The fact that the biological offspring may have grown to 
adulthood and be an adult in his own right is not an acceptable basis for 
considering parent and child as equals in the moral sense (ie they have 
similar kinds of obligations or duties to each other and to others, they deserve 
equal moral consideration, etc.). The dynamics of parent-child relationships 
are discussed in the following section. 
5.2.2 Being Good as a Son (Hsiao) ... is the Root of a Man's 
Characte~ 
The discussion of hsiao in chapter two (Section 2.2.4) presents it in a positive 
light. In the Analects hsiao is held to be fundamental to moral development. 
Many passages support the view that the family context serves as an ideal 
starting point for the developing individual in that it provides the primary locus 
of meaning and care; the family context provides a sense of the dynamics of 
relating to others (including obligations and caring affection) which, for the 
developing person, serves as the preparatory basis for relationships in extra-
familial contexts. It is in this way that the man of jen loves all (Analects 4:3). 
The process of cultivation begins at home; relating to others will be easy if 
one is well-equipped with such skills. This seems to be fairly straightforward: 
theoretically, the boundaries of the family are merely widened to include 
others. Accordingly, non-familial relationships are modelled upon family 
relationships such that eventually, all become brothers (Analects 12:5.4). 
There is, however, an inherent inconsistency in this position: while it 
seeks to emphasise the special and fundamental status of the family, it yet 
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advocates that all other relationships should be like familial ones. A society 
which aims to function in the Confucian sense as a large family is unworkable 
because it wants to maintain, at the same time, both a demarcation between 
family and non-family and the extension of family to non-family.23 On the one 
hand, hsiao marks the special bonding between, in particular, father and son; 
on the other hand, it is meant to provide the basis for extra-familial relational 
interaction. It seems inconsistent to maintain both that "hsiao ... is the root of 
a man's character" and that "the man of jen loves all". Antonio Cua, 
commenting on the tension involved in Confucian thought, expresses the 
situation thus: "The problem of jen-realization is thus a problem of equalizing 
the status of humanity without obliterating existing social distinctions."24 
This difficulty does not receive sufficient treatment in the Analects.25 
What further intensifies this problem is a different, but related one; namely, 
that hsiao is discussed almost solely in terms of the father-son relationship. 
Inherent in this idea is the assumption that the father-son relationship is 
paradigmatic of relational attachment, at least within the family. Indeed, 
Confucius held the father-son relationship to be of primary importance that at 
times, he appears to say that immoral means were justified in order to protect 
it. In discussing the case of sheep-stealing as an example, Confucius 
remarked that " .. the father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son 
conceals the misconduct of the father. This is uprightness." (Analects 
13:18.2). The notion of uprightness is obviously linked to the special 
relationship between father and son; reciprocal care, as well as obligation, to 
the other person dictates that they conceal the misconduct. Presumably, 
concern for the other (in this case, that the latter's interests is in not having 
the misconduct revealed) overrides other considerations such as the 
wrongness of stealing, or a duty to tell the truth. As Confucius notes, the 
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Kung mentioned in this passage, who was otherwise 'upright', inappropriately 
bore witness against his father. Perhaps most striking of all, in terms of moral 
reasoning, is the requirement of suspension of moral judgment as dictated by 
the relationship. Confucius' demand for children to suspend moral judgment 
of their parents' actions is specifically articulated in Analects 4:18: 
In serving your father and mother you ought to dissuade them from 
doing wrong in the gentlest way. If you see your advice being ignored, 
you should not become disobedient but remain reverent. You should 
not complain even if in so doing you wear yourself out. 
There is more than a hint of idealism in Confucius' expectation of parent-child 
relationships. Within such a system, given the power and authority parents 
have over the moral development of their children-and over their lives in 
general-the moral agent's success is a matter of luck, being contingent as it 
is upon whom one happens to get as one's parents. It cannot simply be 
assumed that the theory of cheng ming is inherent and operative in the 
definition of parenthood; in other words, there are no plausible grounds for 
assuming that all parents are caring in the right sorts of ways toward their 
offspring. Clearly, the theory of cheng ming has to be understood 
prescriptively rather than descriptively; that parents should be caring, and 
that their offspring are, accordingly, responsive to the care they receive from 
their parents is completely different from the assertion that parents are, in 
fact, caring. The former view is not unusual, nor is it specific to Confucian 
thought. 
It is a view which is articulated in Anglo-American moral philosophy as well. 
In discussing the notion of rights within the context of relationships, Abraham 
Melden makes the point that the term 'father' has a moral component such 
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that the mere biological connection whereby one person fertilizes the ovum 
from which another develops does not mean that the former is a father to the 
latter. More is required for the concept of a father, Melden argues, since it 
makes sense to say such things as "He was like a father to me." A paradigm 
case of a father is, therefore," ... a male parent who plays his social and 
moral role with respect to his offspring in the circumstances of family life. "26 
Melden makes a case for the rights of a parent and the reciprocal 
obligations of children. He argues that as a parent, one should have a right to 
be taken into account, if and when appropriate, in the child's deliberations. 
On this point, Phillips and Mounce object that the connection Melden draws 
between being a parent and having a right to special consideration begs the 
question: 
... since the concept of a father is in part evaluative, since by a father 
we mean someone who is entitled to special consideration, then 
anyone who understands the concept of father must also assent to the 
evaluations that go with it, must agree that those beings we call 
fathers are entitled to special consideration. If a man were to deny that 
fathers are entitled to special consideration then either he will have 
failed to understand what is meant by a father or he will have involved 
himself in a contradiction.27 
Phillips' and Mounce's criticism of Melden's construction of the notion of 
family role-relationships (specifically, that of fatherhood) is directly applicable 
to Confucius' conception of the father-son relationship. Both Melden's and 
Confucius' accounts reveal an idealism or, one could say, per Phillips and 
Mounce, they beg the question in presupposing that parents are entitled to 
special consideration based on their moral status. It needs to be noted that, 
in a later work, Melden, in responding to Phillips' and Mounce's criticism, 
255 
agrees that any theorisation of the morality of relationships needs to include 
processes through which appropriate behaviour of those in relationships can 
be assessed, rather than to simply presuppose that morality is already 'built 
into' the roles in question, or is already present in the incumbments 
occupying those role positions.28 
The assumption that parents are moral and caring persons is a manifestation 
of a deeper and larger problem: if there are no avenues or structures through 
which the behaviours and actions of parents can be assessed, then morality 
is reduced simply to parental authoritarianism.29 In discussing the difficulty 
with the Confucian conception of the father-son relationship, Tu Wei-ming 
poses the problem thus: 
... since "filial piety" is a cardinal value in Confucianism, a salient 
feature of the father-son relationship is the unquestioned obedience of 
the son to the authority of the father. For the son to cultivate himself, in 
this view, he must learn to suppress his own desires, anticipate the 
wishes of his father, and take his father's commands as sacred edicts 
... Understandably, the Confucian son, overpowered by the authority of 
the father, evokes images of weakness, indecision, dependency, and 
conformity. 30 
Tu goes on to vindicate the Confucian stance, arguing that this is a 'one-
sided interpretation' of the father-son relationship, and suggests that the 
social and historical context be taken into account: " ... it is the willing 
participation of the son, socialized by a long and strenuous education 
supported by the community and sanctioned by the political leadership, that 
underlies the whole enterprise."31 
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Tu's explanation has limited scope because his analysis-that in 
general these questions are perceived as problematic only by people who 
have been socialised differently-evades the larger problem that Confucius' 
system does not allow for redress of the system. It is not sufficient, as a 
defense of Confucius, merely to point out that one who is properly socialised 
into such ways of thinking (ie that parental authority is legitimate in all 
situations) will not deem the Confucian father-son relationship oppressive. 
The example quoted above of concealing wrongdoings, if extended to other 
situations, could lead easily to an unprincipled, subjectively-constructed, 
chaotic community-if it could be termed a community at all-infused with 
authoritarianism and subjection.32 The risks that children with uncaring 
parents, or from dysfunctional families could be subjected to within such a 
system is potentially limitless. 
The lack of assessment structures within the Confucian system is 
glaring especially given that fathers, and chun tzu, are meant to be 
paradigms of ideal relational interaction; the Analects seems to rely entirely 
on these paradigms as sources of value.33 
An associated but different problem with the use only of the father-son 
paradigm-and thus of the notion of hsiao-as foundational in moral 
development is the assumption that all relationships are, or should be, similar 
to family ones. Such a view ignores the empirical-and morally significant-
fact that family relationships involve a whole different set of values, loyalties, 
caring, feeling and closeness which are different from non-familial 
relationships. There is, therefore, the question of whether the same kind of 
loyalties, caring, feeling and closeness-which involve increased 
expectations and commitments-is possible on a wider scale, given the 
human lifespan and other practical restrictions.34 
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More centrally, values and feelings which are appropriate within the 
familiy context, for example, that between mother and child, are often 
inappropriate in others-such as that between employer and employee. From 
the moral perspective, it would be a peculiar kind of society indeed, if all 
people were related according to the prototype of family-type bonds. It 
questionable whether it is morally expedient for the individual to be subjected 
to these demands of obedience and to have his or her life determined to such 
a large extent not only by those within the family but by those outside it as 
well, given the kinds of obligations family relationships entail. 
Furthermore, as regards extending hsiao into the political context(" ... 
the chun tzu should be treated according to the principles of hsiao" (Ta-
hsueh, 9:1 ,3)), it is readily apparent that the idea that the moral, political and 
social leaders of the people are men who have been filial in the ways 
described in Analects 3:18 and 4:19 is open to challenge. Indeed, it seems 
somewhat incoherent to say that men who have subordinated themselves to 
parental authority can be expected to be fully and morally equipped to 
provide leadership. Above all, It appears simplistic to assume the applicability 
of paradigms across the range of domains. 
The concept of the chun tzu will be examined in the following section. 
5.2.3 When a Ruler's Character is Fitting, His Government is 
Effective Even without Having to Issue Orders35 
The idealism in the Analects concerning the moral uprightness of people in 
positions of power, such as parents and educators, is applied, with equal 
optimism, to the people involved in government. Book IV of the Shu Chin~. 
purportedly edited by Confucius himself, sets out in detail a(n ideal) model for 
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feudal government based on the perfect character of the sovereign and on 
his perfect administration of government. Section five of this book reads: 
The sovereign having established (in himself) the highest degree and 
pattern of excellence, concentrates in his own person the five (sources 
of) happiness, and proceeds to diffuse them, and give them to the 
multitudes. Then they, on their part, embodying your perfection, will 
give it (back) to you, and preserve and practise it. Among all the 
multitudes there will be no unlawful confederacies, and among men in 
office there will be no bad and selfish combinations ... Do not let [the 
sovereign] oppress the friendless and childless, nor let him fear the 
high and distinguished. When men (in office) have ability and 
administrative power, let them be made still more to cultivate their 
conduct; and the prosperity of the country will be promoted. 
This text describes a situation where the ruler is primarily responsible for the 
condition of the country. The good rule of the sovereign ensures well-ordered 
hierarchies not only in the political arena but also in the social and familial 
settings. That these different levels of order in a country were interconnected 
and interdependent is expressed in different ways by Confucius. Thus he 
says, for instance, that there cannot be order in the family and in the larger 
social setting if the emperor fails to order the state; a good ruler will, through 
his character and deeds, effect changes not only in the conditions but also in 
the behaviour of the peoples; a ruler who cannot play his role within his own 
family cannot rule the country well. 
One of the unjustified assumptions of the view just described is that 
people always respond positively to virtue. This assumption pervades much 
of Confucian philosophy and is especially prominent in Confucius' 
discussions of the style of government. Confucius he sought men of 
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developed characters (Analects 15:20; 13:24) who would influence the 
people, assuming that the people would, in turn, respond positively (Analects 
8:2; 9:13; 12:19; 13:16). Clearly, this assumption is an idealistic one that 
Confucius does not seek to justify in the Analects. Given that relational 
morality in Confucian thought is largely dependent on initiation and response, 
it seems surprising when Cua, commenting on the cultivation of the self, 
suggests that in one's evaluation of oneself, the response of others is not an 
important factor: 
My extensive concern for others is a concern for the mora/ being or 
condition on the whole. Whether or not another accepts this concern is 
not a relevant issue, nor is another's reciprocal regard an important 
issue in my own moral development. In Confucian language, the 
acceptance and reciprocation of others is a matter of fate (ming). So 
long as my other-regarding desire and conduct is exemplified in my 
own life, I have preserved my moral integrity. In establishing or 
developing my own moral character in light ofjen, I am also engaged 
in establishing or developing others' moral character, not in the sense 
of directly urging others to do so nor of asserting myself to be a moral 
paradigm; but in the sense that my own case serves as an 
embodiment of the possibility and actuating import of jen-realization. In 
this way I indirectly contribute to the development of others' moral 
character.37 
While Cua is correct in saying that for the Confucians, personal integrity does 
not rest on others' assessment of oneself (see, for example, Analects 4:14), it 
seems odd to say both that another's reciprocal regard is not important in 
one's own moral development and that one can, through one's cultivation, 
contribute to the development of others' moral character. If reciprocal regard 
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is not an important factor in self cultivation, then it seems unlikely that a 
person can or should contribute to another's moral development. In addition, 
it appears that Cua has forced a non-existent dichotomy between the 
developing self and others within the Confucian context. From the 
perspective of a person's moral development, it is also necessary to grasp 
that if the self is understood necessarily as a connected self-in other words, 
if the notion of the self is that it is irreducibly connected with others in 
relationships-it follows that moral agency, when understood within such 
frameworks, is a much more dispersed notion than individualistic approaches 
to the self suggest. In terms of political leadership, this notion is carried 
through in the view that the social and moral conditions of the people are a 
direct reflection of the personal character and success (or failure) of the ruler. 
This implies that the performance of the ruler is necessarily assessed through 
the kinds of responses he elicits from the people. 
Cua's analysis is also lacking in that it seems to be built upon a notion 
of equal selves. In other words, he seems to be suggesting that the response 
of others to oneself should not count as important in one's moral 
development. However, such an analysis fails to take into account the 
different statuses of the 'I' that Confucius in the Analects distinguishes. There 
are statements in the Analects differentiating people into different categories 
based on their capacities for moral cultivation (9:29; 15:39). For instance, 
Analects 8:9 states explicitly that "The (common) people may be made to 
follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it." 
Cua's account does not take into consideration the different kinds of 
individuals referred to in the Analects, some of whom are, presumably, more 
independent, in a variety of ways, than others. The last-cited passage reveals 
that while it may not matter to the chun tzu, say, that the common people-
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who could be misled or mistaken-do not hold him in high regard, it must 
matter to the 'common' person how his or her actions and behaviours are 
evaluated by someone of a higher socio-moral standing, say, the chun tzu. 
It is important at this stage to note that most of Confucius' statements were 
directed at the chun tzu and not at the people in general. The government, 
Confucius hoped, would be made up of men with moral insight, serving as 
models for the people. Confucius conceived of a government which would 
take on (intellectually and morally) qualified men who were not necessarily of 
noble birth to help rule the country. 38 The most important criterion was a 
certain level of moral achievement such that those involved in government 
could be models for the people (Analects 2:1 ;13:1), as well as facilitators in 
their development (Analects 6:28; 16:1). Certainly, one of Confucius' 
innovations-although he claims to be a transmitter and not a creator 
(Analects 7:1)-is the questioning, and rejection, of education (and thus of 
political and moral power and authority) as the sole prerogative of those of 
noble lineage. Benjamin Schwartz, outlining Confucius' innovation in the 
ancient Chinese context, points out that: 
It has been suggested that what is new in Confucius' conception of jen 
is precisely the notion that moral power is not the prerogative of those 
in authority-that commoners like himself may possess virtue. Yet 
even here, one can find in the pre-Confucian literature an adumbration 
of the idea that men of virtue, such as the ancestors of the Chou 
dynasty or noble ministers, prove their right to authority by the 
possession of virtue. What may well be new, however, is the notion 
that commoners such as Confucius may teach other commoners how 
to achievejen-how to become "noble men" ... Like "gens" or "nobilis", 
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it referred to high birth and high rank. Yet in the Analects it has 
unquestionably acquired its moral meaning_39 
In the light of the preceding discussion, it is not clear, that Confucius 
advocated oppression of the people by legitimating political authority. Indeed, 
if the Analects is understood from the perspective of a moral system which 
emphasises responsibility and relational attachment, it could be said that 
Confucius is reminding leaders of the immense responsibilities they have on 
their hands: Confucius never advocated that a necessary condition of the 
ideal world order was unwilling subjection to unreasonable and evil rulers.40 
While one might want to question the justification provided by 
Confucian philosophy for the interference with ordinary people by the elite, on 
the other hand, such reminders of responsibility are not always or entirely out 
of place, as De Bary notes: 
... the noble man is a model for anyone who might play a leadership 
role in society, a life of higher responsibilities (19:7) ... The distinction 
between gentleman and noble man, though both are combined in the 
chun tzu, is important because, without it, we may miss or misread the 
significance of much in the Analects that has to do with both inward 
qualities and outward appearances ... when Confucius speaks of the 
chun tzu as someone especially careful and restrained, one who is 
punctilious about not overstepping the bounds of what is right, it is not 
because he expects ordinary men to exercise the same 
circumspection or constrain themselves to the same degree, but 
because those he addresses have a heightened visibility and 
potentially more far-reaching influence on others, to say nothing of 
their role in directing others' labors (19:21) and in the distribution of 
material goods.41 
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For Confucius, (moral) responsibility is an irreducible component of social 
hierarchy and is directly proportional to it. From another perspective, the two 
elements, character and public service-or more generally, contribution to 
the common good-cannot be separately assessed because of the intricate 
connection between the two. As Hall and Ames suggest: 
Confucius did not replace with new moral qualifications the political 
ones that had previously defined chun tzu; what he did was to insist 
that political responsibility and moral development are correlatives. 
The cultivation of one's person necessarily entails active participation 
both in the family and in the sociopolitical order, not simply in service 
to others, but as occasions in which to evoke the compassion and 
concern that leads to one's own personal growth and refinement. 
Stated another way, it is inconceivable that full personal growth and 
disclosure could be achieved in the absence of political 
responsibility.42 
Implicit in Hall and Ames' statement is the suggestion that Confucius was not 
merely propounding a political theory which sought to instill social order by 
maximising social control (see, for example, Analects 11:23; 13:2; 13:15). 
Relatedly, it needs to be noted that what Hall and Ames term 'political 
responsibility' does not refer to direct involvement in the governmental 
process but, rather, in the Confucian sense, involvement in the sociopolitical 
order. Confucius in the Analects never sustained a difference between 
political involvement and personal life, and political responsibility in this 
context would be understood as a more general form of involvement in 
society. Thus while Confucius despaired frequently regarding the lack of 
opportunity for his own involvement in government (Analects 9:12; 11 :23; 14: 
39-42; 17:7; 18:3; 18:7.5), at other times he points out that such direct 
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involvement is not a necessary condition for participation in one's community: 
the common man, " ... simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers 
... can exert influence on government" (Analects 2:21); his character 
influences others through moral persuasion (see also Analects 3:24 and 
13:1). 
The ability to influence others through one's self cultivation seems to 
be the primary responsibility of the chun tzu, with respect to the duties of 
public office. Upon observing how the chun tzu relates to those within his 
family, the people gain moral inspiration (Analects 8:2; also 18:10). 
Meticulous in his self cultivation (Analects 1 :15; 14:45), the chun tzu seeks to 
facilitate the development of others (Analects 6:28). Confucius' vision of the 
chun tzu is marked by the latter's moral excellence, an ideal which, if 
realisable, would have in turn brought about the ideal Confucian society. 
Such idealism is a major flaw in the Confucian conceptualisation of human 
nature and of human community; it seems naive, above all, to think that such 
morally excellent paradigms of leadership (the chun tzu model), and 
accordingly, their beneficial and far-reaching influence on other people and 
on the structures of the community could in fact be actualised. 
The idealism in Confucianism regarding political leadership was one of the 
important issues in the debate between the Confucians and the Legalists. 
The Legalists were vehemently opposed to the Confucian ideal of rule by 
moral example. Commenting on the rarity of the Confucian sage kings, Yao 
and Shun, Han Fei Tzu, a Legalist, remarked that: 
If it is peaceful only when Yao and Shun come, this means that there 
will be one period of peace in a state which will be in disorder for a 
thousand years.43 
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Being primarily concerned with the maintenance of political power, the 
Legalists saw laws as instrumental and necessary to its preservation. The 
Confucians, on the other hand, upheld a system based on differentiation 
amongst individuals and, accordingly, rejected (penal) laws in favour of li. 44 
As discussed previously, it was assumed-rather naively-that feudal nobles, 
being highly educated, would act and behave according to proper modes of 
behaviour, and thus that it was not necessary to subject them to similar 
behavioural requirements to which the common people were subject. When 
in 513 B.C. the State of Chin publicly announced its penal laws, Confucius 
criticised, saying, "Chin is going to ruin. It has lost its (proper) rules (of 
administration) ... people will study the [laws], and not care to know their men 
of rank. And what profession can the superiors keep?".45 
Unlike /i, laws are relatively explicit and thus would have enabled the 
multitudes to question any unfair judgement; this in tum would remove the 
aura of uncertainty regarding wrongdoing and appropriate punishment, in 
which part of the power and authority of the ruling nobles lay. For Confucius, 
rule by penal laws alone is undesirable largely because such laws work on 
the basis that all human beings are socially and morally equal;45 penal law is 
criticised by the Confucians for showing no regard for the particular 
relationships between people. While law presumes and aims to maintain 
equality and universality, li demands recognition of hierarchically-structured 
relationships which involve expectations and obligations inherent in their 
structures, to be clearly understood by the participants in each relationship. 
Apart from their disagreement with the Confucians about whether 
government was best effected through institution or personality, the Legalists 
were sceptical of the chun tzu ideal. They were convinced that even if there 
were chun tzu, there would be so few of them that for long periods of time the 
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country would be in disorder. Tersely describing the disputes between the 
Confucianists and the Legalists, KK Lee writes: 
The Confucians and the Legalists were engaged in taking sides in 
what Aristotle called "an old and fundamental question-whether it is 
better to be ruled by the Best Man or the Best Laws". To the Legalists, 
as well as Aristotle, the quest for a benevolent father-figure, as sage-
king or philosopher-king is doomed from the outset ... The question for 
political philosophy ... is not 'Who is to rule?' to which the expected 
answer is the wise, the benevolent, the righteous. The question is not 
one of personality but of institution ... Exceptional men are few and far 
between, and it is ludicrous to hinge such a vital matter on the 
occasional and chancy appearance of a sage or messiah ... Charisma 
is too ephemeral and mediocrity is too endemic in man. The law, 
impersonal, enduring, immanent, yet capable of modification, should 
be the framework of civiUpolitical order.47 
In this passage, Lee portrays the Legalists' rejection of what is essentially the 
central focus of the Confucian concern. While it could be said that Confucius' 
views on political organisation and, more generally, his views on human 
nature are naively optimistic, some of the Confucian ideals have important 
implications for contemporary moral philosophy. For example, the Confucian 
emphasis on connectedness highlights a conception of the moral agent as a 
related, encumbered self. In contrast to the view of the paradigmatic moral 
agent as a detached, autonomous self, the former view provides for a more 
accurate, robust picture of the human person and of moral agency. These 
competing views of moral agency are, as well, connected with differing 
conceptions of morality; the next section critically analyses the features, 
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domain and structures of morality in Confucian thought, comparing it with 
certain features of the feminist care ethic. 
5.3 Caring in Confucian Morality 
One of the emphases of the feminist care ethic, as discussed in Chapter four, 
is its rejection of a conception of morality that is essentially and 
predominantly rule-based. This is associated with the view, held by a number 
of care ethicists, that rules apply only to general cases and that they gloss 
over the special and morally significant features of different moral situations, 
in particular, the relatedness of the moral agent to specific others. Associated 
with this latter view are important themes in morality and moral agency, three 
of which were discussed in chapter four. The first queries the 
conceptualisation of the moral agent as an essentially autonomous and 
disinterested self; the second questions the overridingness of moral rules and 
principles, and the insistence that these are universalisable; and the third 
affirms the significance of caring affection in morality. The focus of this 
section is to investigate how these three themes figure in Confucian moral 
thinking.48 
Autonomy 
With regard to the issue of autonomy, it was pointed out that care morality 
need not be antithetical to autonomy and that notions of connectedness and 
responsibility can be articulated in conjunction with an ideal of autonomy that 
sees the autonomous agent as one who is self-governing and who yet sees 
her connectedness with others and her responsivity to others as important 
aspects of moral agency and of personal identity. 
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In the Confucian case, it does not appear that there is a unified, 
homogeneous conception of autnomy-qua self-governance and 
independent moral judgment-in the Analects. For example, it seems, in 
some passages, that autonomy qua moral integrity should be preserved even 
in the case where a teacher (15:35) or minister for whom one is working 
(11 :23) demands otherwise. More integrally, because morality is perceived as 
being irreducible to existing social and cultural norms, the cultivation of 
oneself is clearly distinguished from the process of merely 'fitting in' or 
'interacting well' within the community. To this effect, Confucius remarks that 
Tsze-kung asked, saying, "What do you say of a man who is loved by 
all the people of his neighbourhood?" 
The master replied, "We may not for that reason approve of him." 
"And what do you say of him who is hated by all the people of his 
neighbourhood?" 
"The master said, "We may not for that reason conclude that he is 
bad. It is better than either of these cases that the good in the 
neighbourhood love him, and the bad hate him." (Analects 13:24). 
In this passage, as well as in a few others (Analects 2:3; 1:12; 9:27; 15:20), 
Confucius seems to be suggesting, with regard to moral independence and 
the cultivation of the self, that some level of detachment is necessary 
especially if there are pressures to construct oneself solely in temrs of the 
status quo. 
At other points, however, Confucius seems to demand that moral 
autonomy be forfeited in order to maintain a relationship. Specifically, such 
instructions apply within the domain of parent-child relationships and, it 
appears, only within that domain. 
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What emerges from the preceding discussion in Section 5.2 is that 
Confucian thought seems to restrict the individual's autonomy-especially as 
a child-within the domain of parent-child relationships; this could be for the 
reason that the Confucians felt that the family context is an essential locus for 
morality and for moral development such that the affection, the structures and 
the hierarchies within familial frameworks should always be seen as 
fundamental and never to be challenged. This, of course, entails that 
compromises to the integrity of sons and daughters have at times to be 
made. 
As commented previously, Confucius exhibits a naive optimism in 
upholding the family structures as overriding in morality and in assuming that 
those in the positions of parents, chun tzu and, generally, those in positions 
of carers, have morally developed characters. There is a strong sense of 
idealism in Confucian thought that carers are (in the Meyerian and Taylorian 
senses) strong evaluators of their moral stature (Analects 1 :4; 5:26, 27; 7:3) 
such that they can, in a disinterested and sincere way, evaluate their lives in 
connection with the lives of others such that exploitation of others does not 
occur. Indeed, at points in the Analects, Confucius seems to be aware of his 
idealism when he remarks that those who can be effective chun tzu are few 
(4:6; 6:20; 9:29; 15:39). 
It appears that autonomy is linked with self cultivation such that the 
two are directly proportional: the common people are not expected to be self 
governing (Analects 8:9) whereas the chun tzu are presented as being 
somewhat detached from existing norms. Such a view of socio-political 
organisation rests on the view that individuals within the community are not 
moral equals in the sense that moral agents are, ceteris paribus, not held 
equally responsible or accountable for their actions. Thus a 
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conceptualisatsion of the community as comprising equally volitional, 
responsible and autonomous moral selves-say, within contractarian or 
rights-based approaches-is antithetical to Confucian ideals. Although 
Confucius attempted to abolish access to education, and to moral excellence, 
as the exclusive prerogative of the ruling classes (Analects 7:7; 15:38), he 
established another hierarchy: that based on moral-political self cultivation. 
Within the framework of this hierarchy, his attitude to the common people 
(min)-in contrast to his expectations of the chun tzu and their 
responsibilities-is condescending. 
Such an attitude towards the moral autonomy of the common peoples 
is further intensified by and through the Confucian concept, li. As pointed out 
previously, li, in contrast to law, operate on the basis of particularity rather 
than universality of application. In this connection, if the common people are 
not expected to be self-governing, then it seems that the standards for action 
and behaviour are determined not by appeal to more or less objective or 
consensual values but to the chun tzu's deliberations in particular cases. 
Universa/isability and Particularity 
It is clear that Confucian morality does not deem either generality or 
universality as important criteria of moral deliberation. The particularistic 
focus of moral deliberation in Confucianism is clearly manifest in the 
Analects; Confucius gave different replies to three interlocutors on the same 
topic,jen: 
Yen Yuan asked aboutjen. 
The master said, "To control oneself according to li, isjen. If a man 
can for one day control himself according to li, everyone will consider 
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him to be jen. However, the practice of jen depends on oneself alone, 
and ot on others." 
Yen Yuan said, "I beg to ask the steps of that process." 
The master said, "Do not look at what is contrary to li; do not listen to 
what is contrary to Ji; do not speak what is contrary to Ji; do not move 
contrary to It" ... (Analects 12:1) 
Chung-kung asked aboutjen. 
The master said, "When you go abroad, behave to every one as if you 
were receiving an important guest. When you employ the people, 
behave as if you were officiating at an important sacrifice. Do not do to 
others what you yourself do not with done to yourself. Do not have 
murmuring against you either within the nation or within your family ... 
(Analects 12:2) 
Ssu-ma Niu asked aboutjen. 
The master said, "The man ofjen is cautious and slow in speech. 
Ssu-ma Niu said, ,"Is being cautious and slow in speech all thatjen 
consists in?" 
The master said, "When action is difficult, shouldn't it be the case that 
one be cautious and slow in speech?" (Analects 12:3) 
Indeed, in a specific instance, Confucius gave conflicting answers to two of 
his disciples, taking care to articulate that his answers were tailored to the 
respective characters of these two persons: 
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Tzu-lu asked whether one should immediately put into practice what 
one heard. 
The master said, "Given that your father and elder brothers are still 
alive (and to be consulted), why would you seek to immediately put 
into practice what you hear?" 
Jan Yu asked whether one should immediately put into practice what 
one heard. 
The master said, "Immediately put into practice what you hear." 
Kung-hsi Hua [overhearing these conversations] inquired, "When Yu 
asked whether one should immediately put into practice what one 
heard, you said, "Your father and elder brothers are still alive [and to 
be consulted)." When Ch'iu asked whether one should immediately put 
into practice what one heard, you said, "Immediately put into practice 
what you hear." I am puzzled. May I be enlightened?" 
The master said, "Ch'iu holds himself back; therefore I urged him on. 
Yuhas too much energy; therefore I held him back." (Analects 11 :21) 
Insofar as Confucian morality is particularistic, there is little or no attempt to 
generalise moral norms or standards such that what applies to a chun tzu, 
say, might apply to a common person as well. 49 1n this respect the amount of 
self-governance an individual is expected to have or is accorded varies with a 
few factors: the individual concerned (especially his moral status); and the 
relational and circumstantial contexts. This view would appear particularly 
detrimental to individuals who are, for some reason, not allowed, or not 
expected to exhibit, a reasonable extent of self-governace. The picture 
provided in the Analects of autonomy qua self-governance is not a consistent 
one; at many points, self reflection and self regulation are encouraged, at 
others they are held to be inappropriate. 
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The question that needs to be asked at this point is whether there are 
any mechanisms or structures in Confucian moral thinking which could act as 
safeguards against tendencies to subjectivism or arbitrariness in morality. As 
argued previously, it cannot be simply assumed that those in caring positions 
are adequately developed in their self reflectiveness such as to not exploit 
those cared for. In other words, particularly in the cases of the father and of 
the chun tzu, whilst the Analects provides examples of good moral and 
political guidance which could be effective in exemplifying morally and 
otherwise praiseworthy acts, it cannot be inferred that such paradigms are 
both necessary and sufficient in articulating a moral system. The view that 
paradigms of caring, as opposed to universally-applicable rules, are 
necessary in articulating a particularistic ethics based on relational 
attachment, is reasonable in that relational interaction, especially if it is 
understood to derive largely from emotional attachment, finds expression in a 
range of ways that cannot be encoded in precise formulae. The view that 
paradigms of care are sufficient in constituting a plausible moral system is, 
however, questionable in that there is little attempt to justify why and how 
certain such expressions, even within the context of particular relationships, 
are appropriate and others inappropriate or even impermissible. Even if it is 
held that the material and concrete content of ways of relating to particular 
others are sociologically and culturally sensitive, there needs to be a process 
for evaluting these forms which paradigms (as articulated in the Analects) 
cannot themselves provide. 
It does seem that some appeal to universalisability is required in order 
to sustain the concept of cheng ming. Confucius' use of cheng ming in the 
Analects suggests that there are requirements specific to one's role in a 
relationship and that these requirements are universally binding. The concept 
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cheng ming in the Analects occupies a more fundamental status than the 
specific moral deliberations of the chun tzu. Indeed, it is the rectification of 
the moral characters and behaviours of the chun tzu that Confucius sought 
primarily to address. If titles such as chun tzu, elder brother and father have a 
regulative function, then the evaluative content of these titles should, at least 
to a certain extent, be understood to be universalisable. For instance, if there 
are certain actions, behaviours or emotional dispositions which are seen as 
typically elder-brotherly, it follows that if a person does not demonstrate any 
of those toward a younger sibling that he is not acting, behaving or feeling 
toward the latter as an elder brother should. In view of the preceding 
discussion, the criteria for relating well should not be determined by what a 
chun tzu happens to decide but, rather, through somewhat less subjective 
means. However, the Analects does not venture to explain the sources of 
value for his theory of cheng ming. He takes it as given that the naturalistic-
organic conception of hierarchical social organisation, as embodied in the 
early Chou period, could solve the socio-political disorder of his time. 
Within Confucian thought, the combination of power structures within 
particular relationships, on the one hand, and highly-regulated norms of 
behaviour, on the other, could be deeply problematic in that the norms could 
reinforce existing power hierarchies. Thus, the person-caring could acquire 
control over the relationship concerned, as well as the person cared-for. In 
this regard, it is important that proponents of care moralities realise and 
recognise that caring relationships can involve power hierarchies. 
Accordingly, there needs to be mechanisms which properly deal with such 
structures in order that people in caring relationships are not exploited or 
forced to compromise themselves. 50 
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Caring Affection 
As with the case of appropriate actions and behaviours specific to particular 
relationships, Confucius seems to take for granted that the appropriate 
emotions in particular relationships are somehow obvious: he does not 
discuss their origin, nor does he attempt to justify them. 
Having appropriate emotional disposition does play a significant role in 
the Confucian approach to morality. Confucius does not view affection as 
being purely subjective and feral and thus as distinct and separate from 
morality and/or moral deliberation. Central to the notion of filial piety is that 
the appropriate feelings of caring affection, on the part of the parents, 
generates correlative appropriate feelings of reverence by children toward 
their parents. It is clear1 that Confucian thought places much stress on the 
significance of cultivating appropriate emotions in the moral and social 
development of moral agents. A sympathetic account of the place of 
emotional cultivation in moral development in the Analects is offered by Tu 
Wei-ming: 
A father, for example, has the duty to care for his children by providing 
resources for the satisfaction of their needs and education; and the 
son has the duty to care for his father when the latter is sick or 
disabled because of old age. Moreover, these reciprocal obligations 
are to be performed with an attitude of reverence or respect styled with 
an expression of affectionate concern. It is this caring attitude that lies 
at the heart of extensive moral concern. Other human beings, not in 
the status of being one's parent or brother, can also be cared for as 
one's parent or brother. This is possible because of the analogizing of 
one's affection and thought ... We can thus speak of extensive moral 
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concern as essentially a form of analogical projection of familiar 
relationship. 52 
Tu's rendition of the projected effects of moral concern does appear overly 
positive. It is, however, not entirely out of place because it portrays a sense 
of naive optimism palpably present in the Analects. One of the commendable 
aspects of Confucian moral thinking, in this respect, is that it rightly focuses 
on the family context as the primary locus of moral development for the child, 
in the cultivation of appropriate emotions, behaviours and actions. 
In conclusion, the discussion in this chapter, focusing on Confucian notions of 
relational interaction, forms of caring and emotions of caring affection, has 
revealed that while there are notable problems with Confucius' construction of 
the ideal community, some of the Confucian themes serve to illustrate that 
moral philosophy should not depreciate the value of relational interaction to 
the life of the moral agent. The Confucian emphasis on cultivating 
appropriate behaviours, responses and emotions to particular others within 
specific relationships has important implications for conceptualising moral 
agency as well as, more fundamentally, personal identity in at least two ways. 
First, the moral agent as a related self is at least a less fragmented individual 
than one who is required to be detached and impartial. The notion of the 
related self draws attention to and challenges certain biases in notions of 
personhood which construe autonomy not only as integral but also as 
inviolable. The challenge of relational moralities to rule-based or rights-based 
moralities is effective in demonstrating the need for moral theory to 
satisfactorily account for different psychologies associated with different 
personality types. It also adresses the necessity for moral philosophy to more 
accurately reflect empirical aspects of human nature. 
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Secondly, from the third-person point of view, what is central to a 
person's identity is the distinctiveness of the individual that renders her non-
intersubstitutable. Thus, notions of moral agency should not compromise on 
personal identity qua the distinctiveness of particular persons. While moral 
theory might seek, understandably so, an element of objectivity-and, in 
doing so, highlight common features of human personhood such as 
capacities for rationality, morality and self-reflection-it should not do so at 
the expense of individual distinctiveness. The view that the domain of 'others' 
with whom with interact is an homogeneous, undifferentiable mass is 
antithetical to how moral agents actually relate. While there might be some to 
whom our interaction is (best) guided by notions of rules, justice or rights, 
moral theory needs to recognise that there are particular others with whom 
one relates in a more personal and intimate way that cannot be captured in 
terms of rigid and generalised rules. 
The next chapter examines Pauline notions of morality from a relational point 
of view. It establishes that Paul was keen to articulate a relational ethic based 
on U"fU7tT\ (love) and analyses the important concepts and structures within 
the framework of such an ethic. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PAULINE COMMUNITY 
The newly-formed Christian communities were in a state of chaos with regard 
to behavioural norms and codes. Most of the converts were confused about 
which moral and behavioural codes were acceptable and/or permissible, and 
others which were not. Paul's epistles deal with the various confusions within 
the communities: the believers were confused about the continuing place and 
function of Jewish traditions and laws; some of the converted (Gentiles) did 
not know if their previous modes of life and values were valid and acceptable; 
and it was unclear to many others how and which aspects of their lives had to 
be changed. 
Paul's story involves a reconstruction of the existing Jewish view of 
history. God and salvation were now available to the non-Jew as well. 
Instead of assimilating the new story to the old, Paul grafts the old onto the 
new. He avoids inconsistency in weaving together these two stories by 
setting them within different time frameworks. In chronological perspective, 
Paul writes:" ... the gospel ... is the power of God for salvation to everyone 
who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the GreeK' (Romans 1: 16; italics 
mine).1 
While this time reference helped to eliminate some difficulties with the 
formulation of an ethic applicable to the new communities, the elements of 
Pauline morality-its ontology, axiology and its structures-were not well 
defined. There is an enormous amount of biblical scholarship on the subject 
of Paul's derivation of values from the variety of sources to which he was 
exposed. The fact that this debate is rife with different opinions reflects a 
certain amount of cut-and-paste technique by Paul with regard to moral 
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values and norms. He quotes variously from the pentateuch with regard to 
theological doctrine_(Galatians 3, 4); provides lists of virtues and vices 
(Galatians 5:19-23); appeals to the Torah for the content of the newly-
applicable norms (Galatians 5:14); sets up the value of love (aya1tll) as 
overriding all others (Romans 13:8-10); and encourages a breakdown of 
hierarchical social structures (Galatians 3:28). 
This chapter discusses moral reasoning in Pauline thought, focusing in 
particular on the connection between morality and the codes for relational 
interaction. In this regard, it examines two prominent features of Pauline 
communities as described by Paul in the epistles. The first is Paul's 
pragmatic approach to interrelational and communal harmony and, within that 
framework, the rejection of legalistic structures, particularly theses embodied 
in existing Jewish codes. One of the requirements of Jewish (moral) practice 
that Paul vehemently rejected was circumcision (Romans 4; Galatians 4-6). 2 
Paul reasoned that circumcision (m:pt'toi.111S) was not a necessary criterion of 
the believer's faith (m<ms), arguing that belief (emcrteucrev: Abraham 
'approached' God), instead, was necessary; this shifted the criterion for faith 
from publicly-verifiable ritual to a more subjective, personal conviction. Paul's 
rejection of circumcision as a necessary expression and manifestation of faith 
is part of a larger attempt to design a set of concepts for moral action and 
motivation applicable to the new Christian communities. At a number of 
points in the epistles, he discusses the limited applicability ofthe (Jewish) 
law, belittling its demands for outward show only as well as its deontological 
structures. Paul emphasises the difference between the motivational 
structures of the person who is merely concerned to observe the dictates of 
the law as against the person who undergoes a 'circumcision of the heart' 
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(Romans 2). It is the latter that is significant as a response (Romans 5) to the 
work of Christ (Christ's death is protrayed as paradigmatic of love (aya.7t11) in 
Philippians 2). 
The second feature of Pauline morality examined here is his view that 
the believers' concern for each other, rather than a preoccupation with rules 
or with rightness, is the appropriate action-guiding principle. This view figures 
especially in Paul's attempts at resolving disputes. The solutions Paul offered 
to those in tangled and tense situations often involved advice to relax the 
bindingness of existing codes. 3 1n one case, for example, he mediated 
between two groups of converts, one which insisted on adhering to certain 
rules (for example, of not eating food offered to idols (I Corinthians 8, 1 0))-
which Paul termed the 'weak'-and another which, because of their new-
found freedom, did not see the need for keeping to this particular rule (Paul 
called them the 'strong1. Paul's recommendation was in neither party's favour 
in that, while he considered the rule itself obsolete (Romans 8:4-6), he 
advocated that it should be adhered to (by the strong) if there was any 
possibility of any of the weak being further confused and floundering in their 
attempts to work out the new codes and norms (Romans 8:8-13). 
In the final section of this chapter, the two features of Pauline morality 
are drawn together and compared with some of the characteristics of care 
morality discussed in Chapter four. While Paul's rejection of deontological 
morality is important in this context, what is particularly interesting is his 
emphasis on love ( aya.7t11) as the fundamental (I Corinthians 13) defining 
feature of the Christian communities. Paul argues that love for another is the 
basis upon which one seeks the other's well-being. The dynamics of aya.1t11-
what love requires of the moral agent, either as person-loving or as person-
loved-is also examined. 
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6.1 ... No One Will Be Justified by the Works of the Law4 
According to Paul, one of the changes to the believers' lives brought about by 
the Christ-event was the feature of faith (mo-ns). While Paul's notion of faith 
is poorly defined and inconsistent in its range of uses, certain common 
themes can be discerned in the epistles. For instance, one of the notable 
aspects of mo-ns in the epistles is the way Paul contrasts it with (the 
requirements of Jewish) law. Rejecting legalistic interpretations of Jewish 
law, Paul claims that behaviours and actions motivated solely by a concern to 
fulfil the dictates of law (works of law: epyov voJlov) are ineffective as far as 
the attainment of the much-desired condition of righteousness (otKa.W<n>Vl]) 
is concerned (Galatians 3-6). 
Rather, what will be effective for the believers' pursuit of salvation 
(crOYtT]pta.) are 'work[s] of faith' (epyov mmeros)5, arising from a 'circumcision 
of the heart' (Romans 2)6. Relating his personal experience, Paul discounts 
his past achievements and regards them as 'rubbish' (Philippians 3:2-11). 
Any sense of 'boasting' is immediately excluded by what he terms the 'law of 
faith' (Romans 3:27); he rejects the idea that works (of law) earn or produce 
righteousness; this theme he presents in all of his epistles. Obviously, this is 
one of the themes he needs to stress if he also wants to maintain that the 
requirements of the judaic law are no longer relevant for salvation or for entry 
into the community.7 
Paul sets up the respective domains of VOJlOS and mcrns within 
respective time frames and contexts. He argued that while VOJlOS was 
operative and effective for the period up to the Christ event, thereafter, mo-ns 
was to replace it (II Corinthians 3:7-16).8 Furthermore, in Galatians 3:19, Paul 
claims that the Jewish law was given by the angels; this greatly restricts its 
authority, legitimacy and scope. In this passage, the term ota."ta.)'£1.S is used, 
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meaning 'ordained' or 'authored'. This term implies that the law was actually 
composed by the angels and not merely transmitted by them. This greatly 
diminishes its credibility and status. 
Paul's general attitude towards the Jewish law was that it had a limited 
and temporary validity, leading up to the fuller revelation of Christ.9 He limits 
the function of the law to the previous time period leading up to the Christ-
event. In Galatians 3:24-25, he describes it as having played the role of a 
guide (1tatllcxywyos).10 However, he was still willing to concede that Jewish-
Christians might, if they so wished, continue to observe the precepts of the 
law (Torah), though he regarded such observance as not making any 
contribution to salvation. In addition, he was strongly opposed to the idea that 
Gentile converts should adopt the Torah; this he regarded as a betrayal of 
the principle that the resurrection was sufficient to produce salvation. Even 
Jewish Christians who regarded their observance of the Torah as salvific, 
rather than a matter of custom were, in Paul's view, betraying the basic 
Christian principle. 
Paul's criticism of Jewish legality prepares the way for the one 
inevitable conclusion: the law has served its purpose in preparing the world 
for Christ and, like all outworn things, must take itself off the stage-
according to Paul, God has seen this from the beginning (Galatians 4:1-2).11 
Obsession with the law and with keeping to its dictates was a theme Paul 
dealt with thoroughly. He argued that adherence to law detracted from the 
significance of the Christ event whenever one was over-enthusiastic about 
keeping to it: for some it became a stumbling block (Romans 9:31-32). It 
seems as if Paul is exasperated when he writes that the role of the law was 
to condemn and thus to 'put under a curse' (Romans 5:13-20; I Corinthians 
15:56; Galatians 3:1-14).12 The letter to the Galatians is particularly 
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condemnatory of the role of the law: it comes from angels (3:20); it is 
associated with the undesirable conduct of the Jews in observing holy days 
(4:10); it is a religion of servitude (4:1f; 5:1); it is a burdensome system of 
rites and ceremonies, a system that belongs essentially to the domain of 
crap~ (flesh) (5:3; 6:15) (see discussion in Section 3.2.2). 
Paul's rejection of law can be understood within the more 
comprehensive framework of his rejection of Jewish attitudes toward (the 
dictates of) law. In this context, Paul's emphasis is not merely that certain 
features of Jewish law are inconsistent with ideas in Christian thought. Thus, 
as well as suggesting this, he is putting a more sophisticated argument in 
favour of the motivational structures embodied in the concept of mcrns as a 
response to the C:X"f<X1t11 of Christ. Without attempting to decipher Paul's actual 
intentions, this reading of the epistles focuses on the structures rather than 
on the content of behavioural norms. In his analysis of the Pauline epistles, 
Leander Keck argues that the former was in fact Paul's concern: 
If human existence under law is bondage to a divinely sanctioned 
structure of obligation which must be met in order to be rightly related 
to God, be it law epitomized by circumcision or by stoicheia, then one 
can understand why Paul's theological analysis of law shows no 
interest whatever in distinguishing one law from another: for example, 
the ritual from the moral , the permanently valid from the transient, the 
fair from the unfair, for the problem is not certain laws but law. If one 
bases life on law, if one's relation to the divine is the result of meeting 
requirements, it does not really matter under which law one's life takes 
shape. 13 
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The reading Keck offers is especially supported by Romans 2. In this 
passage, Paul rejects the whole idea of external compliance to a rigidly set 
standard, characterised by the Jewish law. In a sweep to include the 
Gentiles, he points out that although they may not know the (dictates of the 
Jewish) law, they do have a conscience and will be judged by their 'secret 
thoughts' (vv. 15-16). What emerges from Paul's argument here is an 
emphasis on the inner motivations which appropriately reflect a response to 
God. Indeed, it is the circumcision of the heart that counts: for a person is not 
a Jew who is one outwardly (ev 1:00 c~>a:vepro), nor is true circumcision 
something external and physical. Rather, a person is a Jew who is one 
inwardly (ev 1:00 x:pt>lt'tro), and real circumcision is a matter of the heart (vv. 
28,29). 
Significantly, in this passage, Paul discusses the limited applicability of 
the law not in terms of a time frame but in terms of its demands only for 
outward show and its legalistic structure. Thus, a distinction is made not 
between this a:trov and the previous one, but between what counts as real 
and true circumcision. Real circumcision is a matter of the heart; and this is 
one of the main distinguishing features between the works of law and the 
works of faith. This criterion is still vague, however, because, as Keck rightly 
notes, Paul is not interested in the content of either kind of epyov. There are, 
though, significant differences between the two. 
First, the epistles portray motivational structures within a legalistic 
system as being based upon an imperative-indicative relation. What this 
means is that the desired condition of 'righteousness' is achieved through 
obedience to the law. In other words, the promise of the law was that if it was 
obeyed, the salvation of the believer could be attained.14 By contrast, Paul 
characterises Christian behaviour, especially with respect to the works of 
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faith, as being underscored by an indicative-imperative structure. " ... since we 
have been made righteous ['rightwised'] by faith" (Romans 5:1; italics mine), 
" ... should we continue in sin in order that grace may abound? By no means!" 
(Galatians 6:1-2). 15 There are different motivational assumptions at work in 
the imperative-indicative and in the indicative-imperative structures. While the 
former is predicated upon externalist motivations of correct behaviour which 
one performs in order to achieve a specified end, the latter is based upon an 
internalist ( cognitivist) position of deriving an ought from an is.16 
Secondly, Paul's imperatives are grounded in the same principle as 
that by which he urges the believers to manifest works of faith. The domain 
and scope of these works, because they are qualitatively different from the 
works of law and, furthermore, because they arise from different motivational 
factors, are crucial in marking out the new modes of life of the believer. Paul 
seeks a new system in which the concern for inflexible principles, coupled 
with a belief in the absolute status of Jewish customs, is put to the test. While 
a preoccupation with the law drives one to despair (Romans 7:13-28), the 
new system proposed by Paul focuses on love for the other and emphasises 
liberation from legalistic structures. 17 A sense of freedom and liberation is 
articulated explicitly by Paul when he makes the point that everything is 
permitted (I Corinthians 6:12; 10:23-25).18 Thus a primarily rule-based system 
is replaced by another which emphasises relationships, the latter being 
characterised in part by the paradigmatic models of Paul himself and of 
Christ. 19 Within this context, universally-applicable rules lose their binding 
nature and significance given that zealousness in fulfilling their dictates 
detracts from a proper focus on God and on other human beings. The 
structure of Pauline morality could, in that connection, be described as a 
system in which there is: 
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... an open-ended commitment to concrete relationships rather than 
general regard for the ground rules which protect and govern social 
order. These relationships are not without form, but their precise forms 
are to be negotiated in concrete interactions. An active process of 
negotiation displaces an ongoing interest in the interpretation and 
application of traditional moral norms.20 
An appeal to rules does not adequately deal with the dynamism in the 
development of human relationships. Therefore, there is a sense of liberality 
and openness, a sense that appropriate forms of life need to be worked out 
(Philippians 2:12, 13). The next section discusses Paul's concern for 
communal harmony, his use of cxya1tT] as a community-sustaining value and, 
relatedly, the concept of the self. 
6.2 The Greatest of These is Love21 
The newly-formed Christian communities consisting of a heterogeneous mix 
of people from different cultures and social strata were a likely seed-bed for 
disputes. Paul therefore had the unenviable task of drawing together these 
divided peoples and uniting them a cohesive way of life. To this end, he 
maintained that the new believing communities were set apart from the rest 
of the world which they were part of but superior to. 
Paul uses a range of metaphors and images to define the modes of 
life available in the new Christian communities. These include: dying and 
rising with Chrisf2; baptism23; adoption24; and heirdom25. These images and 
metaphors served as boundary markers in that they defined membership and 
participaton in the community. Furthermore, they provided frameworks within 
which thinking and reasoning took place. 
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In this connection, aya7tT\. nominated by Paul as the fundamental and 
distinctive feature of the new communities, functions most prominently as a 
community-building and a community-sustaining value. Discussions of aya1t11 
in the Pauline epistles were almost always concerned with its functionality in 
situations and with how it might be realised in the communal life of the 
Christian converts.26 Aya1t11 is manifest in unselfish, courteous, kind and 
compassionate acts. However, it is not merely a simple aggregate of some or 
even all of these qualities (I Corinthians). The paradigmatic exemplification of 
aya1t11 is Christ's humility and sacrifice described in Philippians 2. In this 
regard, aya1t11 could be seen as a motivational source for other-directed 
behaviour, itself being brought about by the believer's recognition of and 
response to the aya1t11 of God (Romans 5:5-8). 
Aya1t11 was most often portrayed in terms of an affectionate concern 
for the other. In contexts in which Paul rejected a legalistic and formalistic 
approach to relational interaction, he often appealed to the notion of aya7tT\ 
as the fundamental principle of such interaction; aya1t11 is the operative 
principle which governs relationships between members of the community. 
In this regard, the body of Christ metaphor is especially interesting 
because it shows the distinctive way in which Paul conceives of community. 
"Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it (JJ£A.11 EK 
JJ£pous)" (I Corinthians 12:27). It is worth noting that the first point Paul 
makes about the body of Christ (in Romans 12 and I Corinthians 12) is that 
each member is different, he thereby acknowledges the empirical fact that 
the communities of believers were a heterogeneous mix. Given that the 
Greek term 'eK' means 'from', the 'body (of individuals deriving) from Christ' 
metaphor signifies that the structures and values of the community, as well 
as the lives of individual members, are to derive from that source. This 
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means that the identities of each of the believers is rooted essentially in that 
community and derives meaning from that membership. It is in this sense that 
the body from Christ concept has both precedence and priority over its 
individual members. What the believers have at stake and invested in the 
community is not a mere occasional gathering together, nor is it restricted to 
specific reasons and functions; what is at stake, rather, is the believer's whole 
being. There is a strong ethical incentive here: those who belong are 
enjoined to love 'because we are members one of another. Paul employs the 
body from Christ image to relate believers to one another and, as a group, to 
Christ; if one member suffers, all suffer together (I Corinthians 12:26). 
The locus for the believers to gather together to contemplate the love of 
Christ is the common meal (I Corinthians 17-34; 10:14-22). In re-enacting 
portions of the passover feast, the believers (re-)articulate their shared beliefs 
and (re-)emphasise the bases and assumptions of moral action and, more 
generally, of life together (I Corinthians 11 :23-26). The difference between 
this meal as a shared activity by the members of the community and having a 
meal at home cannot be overemphasised. Indeed, Paul expresses surprise 
that some of the believers should confuse the two (I Corinthians 11:22, 34). 
What is appropriate normally and in private homes is inappropriate at the 
common meal because there is a different set of assumptions and norms 
operating within the community; there is even a different name by which Paul 
marks this ritual: the lord's meal (I Corinthians 11 :20).27 
An interesting issue that arises, in considering the themes discussed 
above, is the notion of the self understood within the context of Pauline 
notions of community. In the first letter to the Corinthians (chapters 8-10), 
Paul addresses a problem faced by the Corinthian Christians: some of the 
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new believers were consuming food bought from the market, and it was 
commonly known that food sold at the market would have been previously 
offered as sacrifice to other gods. There were, thus, arguments within the 
Corinthian community as to whether this was an acceptable practice. 
Paul cast the opposing factions involved in the debate as the 'strong' and the 
'weak'. The strong, claiming to possess knowledge of the new conditions of 
their lives (I Corinthians 8:1-7), felt that their consuming of food offered to 
idols was an expression of their insight that 'there is one God' and that eating 
such food was therefore inconsequential and an expression of their faith, that 
'no idol in the world really exists'. Paul interpreted this practice of the 'strong' 
as an exercise of liberty (vv. 8-9). The weak, by contrast (because of their 
weak 'consciences'), have not acquired this knowledge nor, accordingly, 
understood the liberty of the Christian life, and are likely to join in this practice 
of the 'strong' but with different assumptions: in eating food offered to idols, 
the 'weak' might think that they are, indeed, participating in idol worship (w. 
9-11). 
The weak, with their weak consciences, have to learn the liberality of 
the Christian life. In this respect, an interesting account of the weak 
conscience is offered by Gooch, who argues that Paul assumed an 
introspective account of conscience which was linked to one's self-
perception.28 On this reading, the weak who 'stumble' do so because of their 
inadequate self-perceptions-they do not fully understand that life in Christ 
does not involve the search for rules and are therefore easily misled. What 
they have to learn is that given that" ... the earth and its fullness are the 
Lord's." (I Corinthians 10:26), they are free from existing structures (requiring 
compliance to the law (I Corinthians 9:19-23)). Thus, in the case of 
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consuming food offered to idols, the believer must understand that the food 
itself is of no moral value; what matters is what meaning the consumer gives 
to it (I Corinthians 8:8). 
While it might be objected that Gooch's thesis reads a certain amount 
of motivational psychology into Paul's reasoning, it should be noted that 
much of Paul's reasoning involves internalist assumptions regarding moral 
motivation. For example, in dealing with the behaviour of the converts, he 
urges renewal of perspectives (vous; see Section 3.1.2), as if that were 
sufficient to effect changes in behaviour (Romans 12:2; Romans 6:11). In 
addition, the indicative-imperative construction assumes this internalist 
structure of moral motivation. Paul's discussion in I Corinthians 8-10 reveals 
a cognitivist account of moral motivation: the difference between the weak 
and the strong is cast largely in terms of the lack or the possession of 
knowledge. It seems that what the weak are unable to appreciate is how the 
Christ-event has changed their lives.29 
If the problem with the weak is their lack of knowledge, it is, in a way, 
surprising that Paul does not address the issue of helping them to acquire 
that necessary knowledge. Instead, he urges that the strong, in consideration 
of the weak, refrain from the controversial practice for the sake of the latter: 
" ... do not eat it ... for the sake of conscience-! mean the other's conscience, 
not your own." (I Corinthians 10:28b-29a). For whatever reason, by asking 
that the strong be considerate of the weak, Paul's solution seems to deal with 
the case only in a superficial, temporary way, in that it fails to deal with the 
inadequacies of the weak. 
Paul's handling of this case reflects an overriding concern for the 
harmony of the community: ""All things are lawful," but not all things are 
beneficial. "All things are lawful," but not all things build up." (I Corinthians 
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1 0:23). In this attempt to justify his proposed solution, Paul again contrasts 
the structures of his moral system with those of the law. Emphasising the 
superiority of the former because it gives consideration to that which is 
beneficial and that which 'builds up' (otKOOO!J.Et), Paul condemns sin against 
any member of the community for the reason that it is a sin against Christ (I 
Corinthians 8:12). This appeal to a common ground of unity (belief in Christ) 
is meant to lead the believers to deliberate on issues not according to rules 
but by reference to other-regarding principles: if it is foreseeable that my 
intended action will cause another within my community to stumble or fall, 
then I should not do it (I Corinthians 8:13). 
When Paul addresses the notion of 'building up' in some of his other 
epistles, he suggests that the 'spiritual gifts' (for example, speaking in 
tongues, prophesy) are to be used for this purpose (I Corinthians 14:5, 12, 
3:10-15; I Thessalonians 5:11; Romans 15:2). More fundamentally, however, 
U"/U1t11 is the underlying basis of all that builds up. Thus in I Corinthians 12-
14, while Paul stresses the importance of the spiritual gifts, he sees them as 
having only instrumental value. He discourages both the pneumatic over-
valuation of the spiritual gifts and the attempt to set up a hierarchy of gifts, 
making the point that U"/U1t11 is the motivational source of all Christian beliefs 
and practices: 
If I speak in the tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not have 
love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. And if I have prophetic 
powers, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have 
all faith, so as to remove mountains, but do not have love, I am 
nothing. If I give away all my possessions, and if I hand over my body 
so that I may boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing ... faith, hope 
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and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love. (I 
Corinthians 13:1-3; 13). 
Paul makes it clear that the importance of each member's application or 
practice of the gifts lies not in the nature of their contribution, but in the fact 
that they derive from the same source and that they contribute to the 
maintenance and building-up of the community: ''the one and the same spirit 
energises all of these" (I Corinthians 12:11). Although the respective 
contributions of the different members are different, the church as the 
gathering of its members is the common good ('to cro~U~>epov) toward which 
the energies and talents of individuals ought to be directed (I Corinthians 
12:7). 
Given the way Paul has dealt with the problems discussed above, it 
could be argued that while Paul pays particular attention to the motivational 
source of appropriate behaviour and participation within the community, and 
makes some mention of the common good and of community stability, he 
does not pay much attention to the modes in which intention and volition are 
manifest and through which the stated ends are achieved. Emphasising the 
need of believers to understand the communitarian and egalitarian mood of 
the Christian communities (instead of setting up hierarchies), Paul remarks, 
somewhat astringently, that: 
... if the ear would say, "Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to 
the body," that would not make it any less a part of the body. If the 
whole body were an eye, where would the hearing be? If the whole 
body were hearing, where would the sense of smell be? ... The eye 
cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of you," nor again the head to 
the feet, "I have no need of you." (I Corinthians 12:16, 17, 21). 
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From the preceding discussion, it appears that Paul discusses the nature of 
individual contributions only in terms of their instrumentality, focusing 
essentially on aya1tT] as the fudamental motivational source and on its effects 
on communal life. In this connection, the pedagogical issues related to Paul's 
concept of aya1tT], construed basically in terms of moral motivation, are 
especially interesting because they, too, reveal Paul's indifference to rule-
based behaviour. In particular, the idea of imitation (IJ.tll£OIJ.at) of 
paradigmatic models as a means of cultivating various qualities is a strategy 
Paul uses in his epistles when he addresses members of the Christian 
communities regarding their behaviours and actions.30 
In the variety of situations when Paul asks that the converts imitate 
certain paradigms, he urges that they observe carefully the principles and 
characteristics which are manifest in the behaviours of these paradigms, 
rather than merely aping their behaviour.31 This is clearly demonstrated in his 
epistle to the Philippian church, where he encourages the believers to imitate 
Christ: not Christ's dying act but the principles of humility and sacrifice 
associated with that act (Philippians 2). Other characteristics to imitate 
include: aya1tT] (Romans 5:5; 5:8); patience (2 Thessalonians 3:5); holiness (I 
Corinthians 6:11; I Thessalonians 4:3-8); maturity (Philippians 3); and, in 
general, the characters of some of Paul's co-workers: Apollos (I Corinthians 
4:6); Silvanus and Timothy (I Thessalonians 1:6; 2 Thessalonians 3:7-9); 
Timothy and Epaphroditus (Philippians 3:17). 
In encouraging the believers to imitate paradigms, Paul appears to see 
it as necessary that the believers observe and experience first hand the 
paradigm at work. Thus, he calls on communities which he founded, and with 
which he had contact, to imitate him because they have had the opportunity 
to observe his behaviour. By contrast, he only asks members of the church in 
301 
Rome, which he did not found (Romans 1:10-15; 15:20-22) and which, prior 
to his writing of the epistle, he never visited, to imitate Christ, and not himself. 
It is notable, too, that Paul refers to the imitation of the Christ figure without 
referring back to Christ's life and works on earth.32 
With regard to Paul's use of the paradigms of Christ and of himself, in the two 
instances when Paul writes that he himself imitates Christ (I Corinthians 4:16; 
11:1), the admonition is for the believers to imitate him, Paul. At other times, 
Paul presents himself together with Christ as two alternative models (I 
Thessalonians 1 :6). 
Another important feature of imitation in Pauline morality is that while 
imitation presupposes a moral hierarchy, Paul writes that the imitator-imitated 
relationship is dynamic and can change such that when imitators have 
succeeded in attaining the required moral stature can themselves become 
models ('t"U7tOS) for others to imitate (I Thessalonians 1:6,7). 
Whilst Paul's imitation pedagogy allows for the possibility of change in 
power hierarchies-the learner (imitator) can himself become a model-such 
shifts in power are not always permitted. At some points in the epistles, Paul 
casts himself as the father-founder of the communities, from which he 
requires strict obedience. In his first letter to the Corinthians, for example, 
while Paul writes that, as a father, he admonishes (vou9e,;ero) and appeals to 
(7ta.pa.JCa.A.ero) the converts (4:14; 4:16), he also reminds them that he could 
take on a disciplinary role: "What would you prefer? Am I to come to you with 
a stick, or with love in a spirit of gentleness?" (4:21). 
The way in which Paul construes his relationships with the converts in the 
Christian communities reveals a picture of paternal caring. Casting himself as 
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the father figure determines somewhat the nature of the care Paul has for the 
converts. This has been critically described as 'love-patriarchalism".33 The 
concluding section of this chapter compares some of the ideals of the care 
ethic with Pauline notions of caring. 
6.3 Caring in Pauline Morality 
The aim of this section is to discuss certain features of relational attachment 
and how they compare with some of the ideals of the care ethic. Some 
concepts that provide the framework for discussion include ideas of 
autonomy, universalisability and caring affection. 34 
Autonomr 
As noted in the preceding section, Paul, in connection with some of his 
exhortations, presents himself as the father figure, with the converts as his 
children. It is clear, in most cases, that this is an attempt to justify his moral 
authority such that his advice and directives are complied with.36 On the other 
hand, it should be noted that Paul does at times present himself as the loving 
father, urging (1tapaK<XA.ero), encouraging (mxpaiJ.u9EOiJ.at) and pleading 
(iJ.ap't'llpOiJ.at) (I Thessaloninans 2: 11-12) . As a parent, Paul expects to make 
sacrifices for his children, and not them for him: " ... children ought not to lay 
up (91]craupt~ro) for their parents, but parents for their children. I will most 
gladly spend (&x1tavaro) and be spent for you." (II Corinthians 12:14, 15). 
It could be said that Paul views a father's role as basically providing 
moral guidance; this view is not incompatible with Paul himself being a model 
for the converts. In addition, the fatherly role has several dimensions: Paul, 
as a father, pleads, encourages, expects to make sacrifices, chides, reminds, 
and expects to enforce discipline. How Paul chooses between these modes 
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is not explained; there seems to be no distinguishable set of criteria, in the 
epistles, according to which Paul chooses. From the fact that he addresses 
the members of the church communities and his fellow-workers as his 
beloved37 (a)'U1t11'tOS), it can be inferred that Paul's exhortations and 
commands are motivated by his love and concern for them. On this account, 
what emerges is a picture of Paul as a loving carer whose primary concern is 
not the rightness or wrongness of actions and/or behaviour but the well-being 
of the believers; in presenting himself as the father-figure of the communities, 
as well as one of the paradigms of life in Christ, Paul takes on responsibility 
in caring for the believers. 
The way in which Paul construes his relationships with the converts 
has immediate and important implications for concepts of identity and 
agency, both for Paul and the converts. In particular, the issue of the 
autonomy of the converts-more specifically, the extent to which the converts 
are considered, by Paul, as self-governors-is extremely pertinent. Within the 
context of the Pauline epistles, there are at least two ways in which the 
individual believer's autonomy could be curtailed. The first is connected with 
their relationship with Paul as the father-figure; the second concerns 
relational norms and modes of life within the communities themselves. Each 
of these aspects is dealt with in turn. 
With regard to the dynamics of the relationship between Paul-as 
father and model-and the believers, it was previously argued that Paul at 
different times adopted different approaches, though with the basic premise 
that all of Paul's responses were motivated by a)'U7t11. Thus, while Paul 
threatens to adopt a disciplinary approach, he expresses a clear preference 
for a loving and persuasive approach (I Corinthians 4:21; Philemon 8,9). On 
the other hand, it needs to be noted that while Paul upholds love as the core 
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value in human interaction, his notion of cxramt does at times involve 
elements of coercion. One could say, for example, that in I Corinthians 4:21, 
while Paul upholds a loving approach, the question he asks the believers is a 
rhetorical one ("Am I to come to you with a stick, or with love in a spirit of 
gentleness?") which ultimately points to obedience. 
In the letter to Philemon, the discourse of coercion is apparent as 
well.38 While Paul writes that he prefers for Philemon to act in cxramt (w. 8-9; 
13-14), and while he appeals (7tcxpcxKcxA.ro: w. 9, 10) and does not wish to act 
without Philemon's consent (v. 14), he nonetheless commands (emtcxcrcretv: 
·V. 8) and calls for Philemon's obedience (u7tetKOTJ: v. 21). In this letter to 
Philemon, Paul's choice of words, as well as the general tone of the epistle, 
clearly reveals that Paul expects his directives to be obeyed.39 
What emerges from this discussion of Paul's treatment of the believers is a 
matter for concern: if Paul, qua carer, requires the believers, qua cared-for, to 
comply with his wishes, it seems that the independence of the latter, with 
regard to their moral behaviour and beliefs, is not acknowledged. Examining 
this predicament from the point of view of care morality, it would be insidious, 
indeed if, under the guise of care (in Paul's case, cxramt), the autonomy of 
the cared-for is compromised. Because the relationship between carer and 
cared-for is, most usually, a hierarchical one, proposals for a viable care 
morality need to address the possibility of the carers' domination of the cared-
for. 
The issue of domination also arises at other points in the Pauline 
epistles, in particular, in Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians in which he 
addresses the eating of food offered to idols. As noted in a previous section, 
when Paul discusses this problem, a curious feature of his advice is that 
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rather than suggesting that the condition of the weak be rectified (by their 
being brought to understand aspects of the Christian life) Paul suggests that 
the strong should be considerate of the weak. On one possible reading, it 
seems as if Paul is asking the strong to adopt a patronising stance toward the 
weak by curbing their behaviours for the sake of the weak. While such a 
reductionist interpretation of Paul's prescriptions could be rejected on the 
account that the prescriptions need to be understood within the context of 
Paul's concern for community-maintenance, this explanation does not 
mitigate the fact that these prescriptions have implications for both the weak 
and the strong, but particularly for the weak. Furthermore, there seems to be 
little or no attempt to cater for the moral development of the weak. 
Specifically with regard to the autonomy of the weak, it could be a point of 
concern that whilst the weak are seen as morally immature because they 
merely imitate behaviours of the strong without having the moral maturity that 
the latter possess, there is no suggestion that their situation should be 
rectified. Paul's solution rests not in having the weak instructed, and thus in 
altering their conditions and dealing with their immaturities directly but, in a 
more superficial manner, through circumscribing the behaviours and 
practices of the strong though their practices are not in themselves 
inappropriate.40 
It is important, in this context, to note the analysis of Gerd Theissen, who 
characterises Paul's way of dealing with the communities as 'love-
patriarchialism'.41 Limiting his study to the Corinthian community, Theissen 
argues that the primary ethos of Pauline teaching-in other words, Paul's 
major contribution to a communal ethic-is conflict-resolution through 
mitigation of the difference(s) between the strong and the weak by 
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emphasising aya7tT1. In effect, according to Theissen, Paul plumbs for the 
maintenance of the existing social order; a social order in which the strong 
show consideration for the weak, while the weak are asked to display 
subordination, allegiance and reverence towards the strong: 
This love-patriarchalism allows social inequities to continue but 
transfuses them with a spirit of concern, or respect, and of personal 
solicitude.42 
Whilst Theissen's general thesis that Paul was concerned with conflict-
resolution is fairly uncontroversial, his more specific assertion that a sense of 
equality (of members of the community) is compromised in order to resolve 
conflict, if accurate, is a matter for concern.43 If Theissen's analysis is correct 
and if conflict resolution is, indeed, for Paul, a primary and overriding one 
such that individual autonomy is compromised, what needs to be addressed 
is the desirability of such a compromise. Relating Paul's treatment of this 
issue to the structures of care morality, if the carer in the relationship is 
understood as the strong, and the cared-for as the weak, the result is a 
worrying account of care morality. What emerges is an account of concern (of 
the strong) for the well-being of the weak which, because it does not seek to 
address the weaknesses of the latter, does not attempt to rectify the 
vulnerability of the weak (the cared-for). Additionally, because the issue 
regarding the moral development of the weak is evaded, the question of their 
autonomy as responsible and responsive moral agents is likewise cast aside. 
The moral agent as an individual self, capable of self regulation or self 
governance is, it seems, what a weak member is exactly not. Paul's failure to 
address this issue demonstrates either a lack of concern regarding the 
autonomy of these weaker members of the communities or, at least, that the 
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autonomy of these weaker members is an factor overriden by other 
considerations. 44 
The lack of autonomy of some of the members of the Pauline 
communities-or Paul's failure to address the moral development of these 
individuals-is compounded by a noticeable lack of predictability and 
regularity in Paul's moral reasoning. In other words, given that the weak in 
the Corinthian community are deemed not to have (and are not accorded) 
self-governing capacities, the problematic condition of the weak is intensified 
if there are no predictable and classifiable norms or values one might appeal 
to in moral reasoning. Paul used a variety of modes of moral reasoning that 
were, separately or in combination, most appropriate for dealing with the 
situation in particular instances. The range of Paul's modes of reasoning 
included: appeals to his (Paul's) authority, calls to imitate Paul, Christ and 
Paul's fellow-workers, appeals for reasonableness and responsibility on the 
part of the believers, appeal to the importance of both his and Christ's tasks, 
and so on. Apart from the strategies Paul used in his reasoning, the content 
is, as well, varied and difficult to classify. There is, however, little or no 
suggestion in any of the epistles that Paul sought a universally-applicable 
system of morality, either in its mode or in its content. 
Engberg-Pedersen, commenting on Paul's moral reasoning, rejects 
Theissen's thesis of love-patriarchalism.45 According to Engberg-Pedersen, 
Paul's techniques of persuasion themselves demonstrate that he (Paul) 
respected the converts: he admonishes (voro8e"tro), exhorts (napaKW..ro) and 
reminds (<XV<XIlVllO"Et) them about aya;1tT]. Engberg-Pedersen argues that 
these methods are not patriarchal because they do not encroach upon the 
independence of the believers. He writes: 
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... the proper 'method' for making other people adopt love as the 
ultimate norm of their life is one that is itself an expression of love, one 
which speaks to them in the form of reminding or exemplifying, but 
which does not in any way bring force to bear on them.46 
In arguing against Theissen's thesis, Engberg-Pedersen presents a more 
dynamic conception of Paul's moral reasoning. While Theissen's account 
restricts Paul's aims to that of conflict-resultion, Engberg-Pedersen's thesis 
allows that Paul might have had more than one aim. Engberg-Pedersen 
argues that although Paul's thought does not exemplify a single formula, 
Paul's mode of reasoning-in his discussion of particular problems, his use of 
universal statements of belief and in his autobiographical references-is 
unified and homogeneous. What unifies Paul's approach, according to 
Engberg-Pedersen, is aya1t1]: 
The gospel is one of love, of giving up oneself for others and of willing 
that and willing it alone.47 
It seems that although Engberg-Pedersen's analysis picks out some features 
of Paul's methods of moral reasoing, it focuses only on a limited range of 
these and thus allows him to read into the Pauline epistles a leniency and 
lack of coercion which is not always manifest. In his attempt to render Paul's 
moral reasoning as a consistent and unified system, Engberg-Pedersen fails 
to adequately take into account the full range of Paul's uses of aya1t1]. It 
ignores, for example, the more demanding and authoritative modes of Paul's 
reasoning, presenting a somewhat biased and unrealistic view of Pauline 
morality. 
Indeed, both Theissen's and Engberg-Pedersen's analyses of Paul's 
reasoning ignore the range of strategies Paul uses in moral persuasion; as 
well, both oversimplify Paul's tasks. A more substantial and satisfactory 
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analysis of !X"fUltTl should include a study of Paul's use of ayaltTl in, as far as 
possible, the full range of the situations Paul had to address. 
Wayne Meeks, who discusses Paul's uses of ayaltTl in its contemporary 
social and cultural contexts, attempts a more inclusive analysis.48 Meeks 
approaches the discussion from the perspective of socio-cultural tensions 
existent in urban Christianity in the first century. In his attempts to describe 
the ordinary life of Christian communities in that era, Meeks paints a picture 
of ayaltTl that has a range of different functions: religious, moral, didactic and 
theological. Meeks' conclusions about a-yaltTl are at once more accurate and 
more tentative than either of Theissen's or Engberg-Pedersen's. 
Universalisability and Particularity 
The variability of both the content and the modes of reasoning in Pauline 
morality can only be properly understood if we have reference to distinctive 
features of Pauline moral reasoning. First. one needs to note the 
eschatological time frame which provided an important perspective from 
which all aspects of life were constructed and evaluated. Secondly, some 
weight needs to be given to the empirical fact that these Christian 
communities were then newly-formed.49 Within this framework, it is less 
surprising than it might otherwise be that there were not more objective or 
universalisable codes of behaviour for the believers. This lack of universality 
was, in part, connected to Paul's emphasis on freedom, at times expressed 
rather extremely in statements such as "against such there is no law" 
(Romans 5:23); "I am all things to everyone". Thirdly, Paul's rejection of 
Jewish legacies, as discussed previously (in Section 6.2), necessitated a 
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negotiation between the converts and the Jewish Christians regarding new 
forms and modes of life. 
There have been numerous attempts to analyse and characterise the 
features and structures of Pauline moral thinking. One of the important 
debates is whether Pauline morality can be characterised as situational 
ethics. Much of the literature on Pauline morality resists that stance, arguing 
instead that Pauline moral reasoning needs to be understood within the 
framework either of the socio-cultural and demographic situation,50 or of the 
eschatological time frame 51, or both. An interesting position adopted by some 
in this debate is that Paul's ethics defies classification because it is 
motivationally grounded in o:ya7tTj. Relatedly, because o:ya7tTj is a relational 
ethic primarily rooted in concern for the other, Paul's seemingly arbitrary 
pronouncements are in fact specific cases of manifestations of o:ya7tTj.52 
Wolfgang Schrage, for example, acknowledges that while there might be 
some justification for classifying Pauline ethics as situational, that 
acknowledgement has to be distinguished from the position that for Paul all of 
Christian life is totally dictated by the situation. Indeed, because of the 
indefinability of o:ya7tTj and the possible danger of associating it with any 
specific moral injunctions: 
[t]he difference between Paul's approach and casuistry lies not in a 
lack of concreteness but in the absence of any elaborate system 
embodying every possible injunction and reducing them all to a lowest 
common denominator of triviality.53 
The move from legalistic structures to a focus on maintaining and enriching 
relationships within an agapeistic community would account, at least in part, 
for variation in the content and modes of Paul's moral reasoning. Aya1t11 is 
not associated with rule-following nor with the successful completion of 
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certain acts (I Corinthians 13); it is a mode of existence motivated by concern 
for the others' well being. Emphasis on obligation (to obey laws) is shifted to 
emphasis on response. Paul's themes of building up, of sacrifice, and other 
similar expressions, "ultimately make the same point, both negatively in 
polemic against pneumatic individualism and subjectivism, and positively as 
an expression of love."54 
Caring Affection 
The concept of ayam] is best understood in connection with its functional role 
in community-building and maintainence. To understand ayam] as the 
fundamental operative principle in human relationships in Pauline thought, it 
helps to explain and clarify some apparent inconsistencies in his epistles. For 
example, while Paul seeks to eliminate the moral significance of social status 
(master-slave), of culture (Jew-Greek) and of gender (male-female) 55, such 
apparently egalitarian moves seem somewhat inconsistent with Paul's 
inaction regarding the moral condition of the weak as described in I 
Corinthians 8-10. It could be argued, however, that Paul's advice in these two 
instances derives from his concern about community maintenance: 
elimination of divisive differences (in the case of cultural norms, for example) 
is important and so is the removal of the basis of disagreement (Paul's asking 
the strong to stop eating meat offered to idols while he did not himself see 
that as wrong). 
An obvious and important question that needs to be dealt with in this 
context is whether ayam] had, in Paul's scheme, merely an instrumental role 
in community-maintenance. Paul's most extensive treatment of a')'am] in I 
Corinthians 13 seems to suggest that ayam] is not merely instrumental in 
maintaining the community but that it is integral to the lives of the believers 
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and, indeed, that it is definitive of the Christian life. Care and concern for the 
well-being of the other is the essential and fundamental component of aya1tT]. 
Thus, it is stated clearly in I Corinthians 13 that the performance of other-
regarding acts-even of self-sacrificial ones-is devoid of meaningful content 
if that performance lacks aya1tT], the required motivational ground for such 
acts: 
If I give away all my possessions, and if I hand over my body so that I 
may boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing ... Love never ends. 
But as for prophecies, they will come to an end; as for tongues, they 
will cease; as for knowledge, it will come to an end ... For now we see 
in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in 
part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known. And now 
faith, hope, and love abide, these three, and the greatest of these is 
love. (I Corinthians 13:3, 8, 12, 13) 
As described in I Corinthians 13, aya1tT] seems to be a constituent of human 
excellence, for both the individual believer and the community of believers. 
There is a strong suggestion that the connection between the good life for the 
individual believer and the good life within the community is a symbiotic one 
(I Corinthians 12). Within this framework, consideration for the other as a 
member of one's community is seen as most important: 'do not use your 
freedom as an opportunity for self-indulgence, but through love become 
slaves to one another' (Galatians 5:13); 'all things are lawful, but not all things 
build up' (I Corinthians 10:23; 6:12). 
The life of the believer modelled on the humble sacrifice of Christ is 
the substantive content of aya1tT]. Legalistic structures are totally inadequate 
in this regard not only because overemphasis on their legalistic nature 
actually distracts one from acting from genuine concern but also because 
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they fail to provide reasons for pursuing excellences, both of oneself and of 
others. Aymrr] demands a responsible response to the other. It is within such 
a community that "the concrete negotiation of relationships marked by 
freedom and love holds sway."56 
Notes 
'. Paul's missionary strategy reflects this belief: in Luke-Acts, records of Paul's visits to 
certain cities involve his engaging with priests at synagogues, discussing doctrines. At 
times, after being thrown out of some of these synagogues, he would approach the 
non-Jews. As recorded in Acts, Paul's preaching was opposed by the Jews during his 
first visit to Corinth. In reacting to that, he dissociated himself from them: "Your blood 
be on your own heads! ... From now on I will go to the Gentiles" (Acts 18:6). 
2 See Paul's sarcasm in Galatians 5:12: "I wish those who unsettle you [regarding the 
necessity of circumcision] would castrate themselves!" 
3
. This does not mean that Paul was never firm on conformity to or obedience of rules and 
principles. See, for example, I Corinthians 5 and 6. 
4
. Galatians 2: 16b. 
5
. See, for example, 2 Thessalonians, which was sent as a warning against idleness. The 
epistle contains a section (1:5-12) on judgment and concludes with Paul's expression 
of a wish that the Thessalonian believers be "worthy of [God's] call and will fulfil by 
[his] power every good resolve and work of faith" (Epyov mCYtEros). Here, what Paul 
terms m=s is combined variously with obedience, work, and righteousness, implying 
that what is expected of the believer as a response is not merely an intellectual or 
mental change. Rather, that primary response of change in belief necessarily ensues 
in action, in effecting works of faith. At several points, Paul contrasts the works of faith 
with the works of law (Epyov VOf.lOV) (especially in 1 and 2 Thessalonians). It is 
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exasperating, however, that he does not spell out the substantive content of either of 
these kinds of work. Perhaps some of it might come to light through examining the 
respective roles of law as contrasted to faith. 
6
. See the discussion ot.:apota in Section 3.1.1. 
7
. While Paul deemphasised the effectiveness of works in achieving salvation, at some 
other points he maintains that the believers are judged by their works. An interesting 
analysis of this difficulty is offered by Nigel Watson (in "Justified by Faith; Judged by 
Works-an Antinomy?" in New Testament Studies, Vol. 29, pp. 209-221. Watson's 
thesis is that judgment by works is a theme Paul uses in his arguments against 
believers who assume they need not manifest their faith. He suggests that Paul is not 
interested in the doctrinal content of the idea of judgment but, rather, makes use of the 
idea for argumentative force. To this effect, Watson notes, warnings of judgment are 
more prominent in I Corinthians, a community with many problems, than with any of 
Paul's other churches. 
8
. Paul draws a similar contrastive relation between the ministries of Moses and Christ. 
9
• Curiously, though, in two Romans passages, he writes that the law is to be upheld-
even in the present (3:31 ). Indeed, he carries on in this letter to assert that the law is 
holy (7:12). There is some inconsistency between these two passages and his other 
passages on law; the two Romans passages do not merely assert the usefulness and 
role of law within a limited time frame, but claim its relevance for the life in Christ. It is, 
however, not the concern here to justify or explain the two passages but just to note 
the overwhelming evidence that Paul limits the role of law to a definite time frame. 
10
• The meaning of the term nrolia'yiDjos as used by Paul is discussed, with reference to 
its other uses within its socio-historical context, by T. David Gordon, in "A Note on 
nrooayoryos in Galatians 3:24-25", in New Testament Studies, Vol. 35, 1989, pp. 150-
154. 
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11 In Galatians 4:21-27, Paul discusses the images of the matriarchs of the Jewish 
tradition as figures in the larger scheme of world history. Hagar and Sarah 
represented two covenants, one of Mount Sinai, the other of Christ, respectively. In 
Paul's scheme, Hagar was made alien to the Jews and a connection drawn between 
them and Sarah. Thus, Sarah becomes a proto-Christian, just as Abraham does. 
Hyam Maccoby notes this point, and makes the further suggestion that the allegorical 
method used by Paul preserves the validity of the Hebrew Bible while rejecting or 
declaiming some of its literal meaning as no longer relevant (in Paul and Hellenism, 
SCM Press, London, 1991). 
12
. Many attempts have been made to explain this idea of the connection between law 
and curse; Christopher Stanley in "'Under a Curse': A Fresh Reading of Galatians 
3:10-14" (in New Testament Studies, Vol. 36, 1990, pp. 481-511) provides a 
comprehensive summary of the different views. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine this connection. 
13
. Leander Keck, Paul and His Letters, op.cit, p. 84. 
14
• Although Paul notes that given the assumption that no person is without sin, then the 
final outcome is that the works of the law are ineffective in bringing about salvation 
(Romans 7:10). 
15
. Regarding the terms 'oucmouv' and 'm<YCEUEtv', E.P. Sanders~. Oxford University 
Press, 1991, pp. 44-64.) presents an interesting thesis that English translations of 
Greek are inadequate in articulating their subtle meanings: 
noun otlC!XtoauvE (righteousness) 
adjective otKCLtos (righteous) 
verb ot KCLtouv (?) 
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ltl<J'ttS (faith) 
mcr'toS (faithful) 
ltl<J'tEUEtV (?) 
According to Sanders, the English language has no verbs corresponding to the nouns 
'righteousness' and 'faith'. In Romans 5:18, Galatians 2, 3, and Romans 3, 4, the 
passive form of the verb 'lltrotouv' is used. This is the term 'llt1COOro9Evt£S" (translated 
'rightwised' by Sanders). It is in aorist passive form, signifying not only that believers 
have been made righteous not of their own doing, but through that of Christ's. 
16
. See discussion of the indicative-imperative in Section 3.1.3. 
17
. It needs to be noted, though, that the epistles do not present a unified and consistent 
rejection of legal structures. As Ogletree notes, sometimes Paul does revert to lawlike 
admonitions to individuals and churches; The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, 
Basil Blackwell, UK, 1983, pp. 141ff. 
16
. Paul proposed system does at times sound anarchic, at other times relativist: see I 
Corinthians 9: 19-23. 
19
. The use of Paul himself as a paradigm is discussed in Section 6.3. 
20
. Thomas Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, op.cit, p. 199. 
21
• I Corinthians 13. 
22 
'Dying and rising with Christ' is an important way in which Paul defines the community 
(Romans 6). Apart from its theological significance (see, for example, Eduard 
Schweizer, "Dying and Rising with Chrisf', in New Testament Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 1-
14.), this symbolism has important ethico-social meaning. Paul uses this image to 
persuade the believers that they should no longer be subject to the values and ideals 
of existing structures. Dying is used allegorically to mark out the antithesis and the 
inconsistencies between the modes of life before and after conversion. On conversion, 
one has first to die to sin, and it is the 'old self which dies. Contrary to the common 
understanding of death as a negative experience, death to sin, for Paul, is a 
redemptive and liberating one. It marks the believer's liberation from the binding 
forces of the old oorov. This identification with the death and resurrection of Christ 
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serves as one of the bases for Paul's ethical admonitions that the believers should no 
longer sin. 
23
. Through baptism, the resurrection of Christ, together with its range of meanings, is re-
enacted. Baptism defines entry into the community. It is significant that Paul does not 
deal with the process of baptism or its methodology but with the ethical implications of 
baptism as a symbolic process from whence begins a new mode of existence. 
24
• Another metaphor which Paul used is to refer to the believers as 'sons of God'. The 
metaphor of adoption as sons iml"lies, in the then contemporary context, a freedom 
from the demands of slavery. There is the idea of 'buying over' a slave suggested (I 
Corinthians 6:20; 7:23); believers were 'bought with a price'. See Francis Lyall, 
Slaves, Citizens, Sons: Legal Metaphors in the Epistles, Zondervan Publishing House, 
Michigan, 1984. 
25
• Heirdom is an important implication of the adoption: one is adopted as a son and, only 
as a son does one become an heir (Romans 8:14-17; Galatians 3:29-4:7). In tum, 
heirdom is a mark of membership of a community of which God is the father-figure. 
27_ The domain of (l')'IX!t"Tl as depicted within the Pauline epistles was never clearly 
marked, partly because the Christian communities were then newly-formed. According 
to Gager, formations of new sects generally go through a 'no rules' stage whereby 
freedom is emphasised. See John G. Gager, Kingdom and Community, Prentice Hall, 
UK, 1975, citing the work of Kenelm Burridge (New Heaven, New Earth, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, p. 166), pp. 32ff. 
T'- Stephen Barton provides an interesting discussion of this issue in "Paul's Sense of 
Place: An Anthropological Approach to Community Formation in Corinth", in New 
Testament Studies, Vol. 32, 1986, pp. 225-246. 
28
. Gooch, "Conscience in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10", in New Testament Studies, vol. 33, 
1987, pp. 244-254. 
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29
• Allen Verhey, in The Great Reversal: Ethics and the New Testament op.cit, 1984, pp. 
1 03ff; describes this change of perspective as a 'new discernment' through which a 
total change in life is effected. 
"'. The concept of imitating leaders, exemplars, teachers, fathers and rulers was a 
widespread theme in Paul's world. See Ernest Best, Paul and His Converts, T & T 
Clark, Edinburgh, 1988, pp. 61ff; and Edwin Judge, "The Teacher as Moral Exemplar 
in Paul and in the Inscriptions of Ephesus", in In the Fullness of Time, David Petersen 
and John Pryor (eds) Lancer, Australia, 1992, pp. 185-201. 
31
. John Schutz (Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, Cambridge University 
Press, 1975) makes an interesting observation that Paul's notion of imitation is 
passive and is expressed in passive language. For example, in becoming imitators 
(E')'EV119rjte j.llj.l'T]tm) (I Thessalonians 2:14), what is active is the acceptance 
(liexecr9m) of the word of God. It is interesting that is that the passive term is used not 
to refer to the imitating process but in becoming an imitator. From this, it can be 
inferred that becoming an imitator is a necessary consequence of acceptance of the 
word of God. There is an internalist connection here between the choice of a lifestyle 
and its necessary consequence with regard to moral development. Incidentally, this is 
one of Paul's earliest usages of 'imitation'. 
32 This idea of imitation of Christ's humility and self-sacrifice is often associated with the 
idea of suffering (!tCXOXElV) (Romans 8:17, 18). Paul's converts were waiting on the 
arrival of the new mrov. Suffering was experienced because the converts' values were 
different from, and at times antithetical to, those in the present mrov. Such conflict was 
characterised dramatically by Paul: the whole creation groans in anticipation of that 
arrival (Romans 8: 19-23). 
33
. See, for example, Gerd Theissen's The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays 
on Corinth, edited and translated by John Schutz, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1982. 
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34
. These concepts are discussed in detail in Section 4.2. In Section 5.3, these three 
concepts provide the framework for analysing Confucian notions of connectedness. 
3s The term 'autonomy' is derived from Greek, but is not a Greek or Jewish notion; in any 
case, the idea of being a lawgiver to oneself is quite odd. On the other hand, someone 
like Paul, who was very conscious of his status as a Roman citizen, was very aware of 
the complex of ideas around agency, responsibility, individuality, being in control of 
one's life, engaging in mature, adult behaviour (ct. "when I was a child ... but when I 
became a man ... ) The case is open and shut. But of course Paul's understanding of 
these things needs to be set in the context of Christian belief and the whole 
community context and his own temperament. To get a fuller picture of Paul one 
needs to read the Acts of the Apostles, a book which is largely concerned with his 
doings, as well as his own letters. 
36
. See Paul W. Gooch, "Authority and Justification in Theological Ethics: A Study in 1 
Corinthians 7", Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1983; and Jay Shaner, 
"Paul as Master Builder: Construction Terms in First Corinthians", New Testament 
Studies, Vol. 34, 1988. 
37
• 1 Corinthians 10:14; 15:58; Philippians 2:12; 4:1; Romans 12:19; Philemon 1 :1; Titus 
1:4; II Corinthians 7:1; 12:19. 
38
• John M.G. Barclay, in "Paul, Philemon and the Dilemma of Christian Slave-
OWnership", New Testament Studies, Vol., 3, 1991, p. 171, writes: "The opening 
thanksgiving, for instance, in praising Philemon's refreshment of 'the hearts of the 
saints' (v. 7), clearly prepares the way for Paul's request that Philemon now refresh 
his heart in Christ (v. 20) especially since Onesimus has earlier been described as 
Paul's own heart (v. 12, cntA.rJ.yyya in each case). Indeed, Paul goes out of his way to 
stress how precious Onesimus has become to him (w. 10-13) so as to be able to 
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portray Philemon's reception of his slave as a sign of his relationship to Paul (as is 
explicit in v. 17)." 
39
. While Paul deems Onesimus his son (v. 10) and addresses Philemon as brother (v. 
20), he writes that his directives should be obeyed because Philemon is in debt to 
him: "I say nothing about your owing me even your own self." (v. 19b). 
"'. "Food will not bring us close to God. We are no worse off if we do not eat, and no · 
better off if we do ... Eat whatever is sold in the meat market without raising any 
question on the ground of conscience, for "the earth and its fullness are the Lord's."" 
(I Corinthians 8:8, 10:25, 26). 
41
• Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, op.cit. 
42 ibid. p. 139. 
43
• An important qualification that needs to be made with regard to Theissen's thesis is 
that it is limited to the context of the Corinthian church community. Given that this 
community was a particularly troublesome one-as noted at many points in I 
Corinthians-it is perhaps understandable that Paul might have had to use more 
emphatic techniques, amongst them a love-patriarchalist approach. Theissen's 
analysis of Paul's enterprise is consistent with the view discussed above, that the 
maintenance of the community, and of the relationships within the community was 
more important to Paul than the moral development of individual members of the 
community might be morally immature. 
44
• It is probable that given Paul's eschatology (that the mxpo-oota was imminent), he was 
prepared to wait rather than suggest radical changes. Thus, he makes the remark that 
although the rationale for a new and different lifestyle was in operation, the believers 
should remain in their existing conditions. See the discussion in Section 3.2.2. 
". T. Engberg-Pedersen, "The Gospel and Social Practice According to 1 Corinthians", 
New Testament Studies, Vol. 33, 1987, pp. 557-584. 
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46
. ibid., p. 575. The notion of love presented here is also too idealistic; there is an 
assumption that love does not command nor is authoritative. 
47
• ibid. p. 582. 
48
• Wayne Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1983. 
49
• See note 52 of Chapter Three. 
50
. See, for example, the works of: C. H. Dodd, Gospel and Law, Cambridge University 
Press, 1951; Engberg-Pedersen, "The Gospel and Social Practice According to I 
Corinthians", op.cit.; John Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early 
Christianity, op.cit.; Abraham Malherbe, Social Aspects of Early Christianity, Louisiana 
State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1977; Wayne Meeks, The Moral 
World of the First Christians, op.cit.; Stephen Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, 
Oxford University Press, 1982; Allen Verhey, The Great Reversal: Ethics and the New 
Testament op.cit, Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, op.cit. 
51
. See the works ot Thomas Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, op.cit, 
Jack Sanders, Ethics in the New Testament SCM Press, London, 1975; Wolfgang 
Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1988. 
52
. See, for example, Stephen Molt's, Biblical Ethics and Social Change, op.cit. Mott 
argues that the new testament of the Christian bible does not, in general, provide a 
comprehensive program because there were specific concems which limited the 
nature and scope of morality. These concems include continuity with the old 
testament; the social status of the converts; and issues associated with the existing 
political atmosphere. 
See also Victor Fum ish, in The Moral Teaching of Paul, Abingdon Press, USA, 1979; 
Albert Schweitzer The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, Adam and Charles Black, 
London, 2nd ed, 1953; and Jack Sanders, Ethics in the New Testament op.cit. 
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53
• Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, op.cit, p. 189. 
54
. ibid, p. 213. Schrage remarks, in p. 216, that the reduction of love to Augustine's "love 
and do what you will" is a grossly inaccurate rendering of Pauline ayaltT] because the 
latter does not leave judgment to subjective individual whimsy. 
55
• See discussion in Section 3.2. 
56
• Thomas Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, op.cit., p. 200. 
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CONCLUSION 
Relational moralities such as the feminist care ethic pose a considerable 
challenge to moral theories which construe moral agents fundamentally as 
detached selves. It is obvious that theories which uphold impartiality, 
impersonality and universality as unconditional and perhaps as overriding 
criteria are doubly defective. First, they do not properly reflect the lived 
experience of moral agents and, in particular, the fact that much of a moral 
agent's interaction is with others to whom that person is related. Secondly, 
they do not acknowledge that our relationships with others are marked by 
different kinds of loyalties, commitments, concern and affection; and that 
these differences are part of what an adequate moral theory must account 
for. The issue, in other words, is how the notions of moral agency and 
motivation upheld by moral theory should be so starkly different from the way 
human beings perceive and experience life. For should moral agents 
consistently and constantly deny their differential attachments? The question 
answers itself: the demands that moral practice involves treating all others 
alike without preference or special consideration is not only unrealistic, it will 
often lead to outcomes which are unacceptable. 
The feminist care ethic, which emphasises the connectedness of human 
persons, is concerned to articulate a moral system grounded in notions such 
as trust, responsibility, commitment, empathy and care. Feminist moral 
thinking argues that values like responsibility and care are significant 
especially for women and their experience of morality: such values are 
intimately intertwined with women's perceptions of themselves, their identities 
and their understandings of how they should live their lives. These 
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observations are important in that they are instrumental in the emancipation 
of women from structures and modes of thought grounded essentially in 
masculine perceptions and conceptions of human life. 
On the other hand, however, the implications of the care ethic in 
feminist philosophy extend beyond the realm of women's experience. Thus, 
while concepts of connectedness and responsibility are typically operational 
in women's morality, it is not clear that they are functional and desirable only 
within the context of women's relationships with others. The point that is 
being made here is that moral philosophy should come to acknowledge and 
recognise that moral values which maintain the connectedness of persons 
are important for all human persons: men as well as women. 
Values which encourage and foster connectedness allow for a more 
realistic and robust conceptualisation of moral agency and responsibility: the 
moral agent is held accountable not merely in the sense that she has been 
impartial or impersonal, or has acted on universalisable principles. The idea 
of differential loyalties, attachments and responsibilities to a range of 
significant others throws up a model of moral deliberation and reasoning that 
is both more realistic and riddled with complexity. 
An important question that needs to be raised at this stage is, "How 
might contemporary moral philosophy accommodate or assimilate ideals of 
human connectedness?" 
A morality that considers human connectedness as having moral 
significance cannot at the same time uphold rule-application as an ideal in 
moral deliberation. In other words, a morality focusing on relationships is 
different from rule- or duty-based moralities not only in its content, but also in 
the modes of moral reasoning it holds as ideal. 
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Given that relationships are unique, there is some weight to the 
caution that a morality which is focussed solely or exclusively on 
connectedness could culminate in a theory of favouritism and undesirable 
partialism. On such an account, the moral agent need only act morally 
towards those to whom she is specially attached with the result that 
treatment of individual strangers, as well as more global moral concerns, are 
left unaccounted for. 
It is clear that there is an inevitable arbitrariness that comes with 
attention to detail and particular aspects of moral situations. But perhaps it 
simply needs to be noted that the moral reasoning of human persons in 
actual lived human contexts is just like this and, accordingly, that moral 
philosophy needs properly to deal with and account for these aspects of life. 
We do, in our moral practice, accord priority to the needs of friends 
and family over those of strangers'. Indeed, some special consideration to 
particular others is tied up with the issue of one's having obligations specific 
to these others. For example, a parent's obligation to provide basic 
neccessities for his child would come before his consideration of the 
possibility of providing the same basic necessities for other children in need. 
Furthermore, affectionate concern and other feelings that operate 
within relationships should be properly dealt with by moral theories. Indeed, 
many moral actions motivated primarily by affectionate concern-for 
instance, one's spending three or four days a week to look after a friend who 
is terminally ill-are often simplistically considered supererogatory; few moral 
theories properly deal with supererogation. 
These dynamics of moral deliberation, amongst others, should (as 
some have convincingly argued) occupy a more central and fundamental role 
in moral theories. 
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The investigation of the classical Confucian and Pauline Christian traditions 
has allowed for interesting insights into morality as a lived human reality; it 
has facilitated a more effective examination of the dynamics of moral 
reasoning within a framework of human connectedness. It has been 
demonstrated that, within both traditions, there are tendencies to 
overemphasise the particularity of special attachments and, relatedly, to 
understate the significance of clearly specified and universalisable norms and 
principles applicable to such interactions. It has been argued, in this 
connection, that at least certain norms should be specified and universalised 
so as to avoid instances of subordination and exploitation that might impinge 
on moral agents as self-governing persons. 
In conclusion, the general direction of this thesis is to suggest a synthesis of 
the range of concepts discussed: particularity, responsibility, affection and 
connectedness, on the one hand, and universalisability, impartiality, 
impersonality and detachment, on the other. With regard to the construction 
of a moral theory that balances the above-mentioned concepts, what is 
important (apart from scrutinizing the concepts) is the careful assessment of 
existing structures and frameworks. In other words, rather than assume that 
the values upheld by relational moralities (or, more specifically, within the 
context of care morality) are simply supplementary or complementary to 
existing moralities, existing simplistic dichotomies-such as that between 
personality and impersonality-should be scrupulously examined. 
Additionally, the construction of the substantive content of such a 
morality, because it has to account for norms and codes pertaining to 
relationships, will have to consider culturally-, historically- and socially-
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relative details pertaining to moral agents and their communities, which are 
relevant to moral reasoning in a detailed way. 
The redress of the content and structures of morality begun in this 
thesis paves the way for a construction of a moral system which, if it is to 
properly balance ideals pertaining to attachment and autonomy, can only be 
properly effected within the lived-in, intersubjective contexts of specific 
communities. 
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